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Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency that has created a new revolution in peer-to-peer technology. 
Built upon decentralised technology known as Blockchain, it supports transparent, fast, 
cost-effective and irreversible transactions, without the need for trusting the third-party 
financial institution. The privacy of Bitcoin users is protected, by the pseudoanonymous 
transaction. At present, Bitcoin holds the largest market share in cryptocurrency and the 
Blockchain technology had captured the interest of multi-corporations, such as Microsoft, 
Dell, and T-Mobile. However, Bitcoins have no legal tender in most and it is even worse 
with the illicit use by the irresponsible people and the cyber-attacks towards the 
application. Hence, these are the primary motivation of this Ph.D. work, to explore the 
trust between people and Bitcoin technology as well as identify the opportunities to 
design for the trust challenges. This thesis investigates the challenges and design works 
with 80 Bitcoin stakeholders such as users, miners, Blockchain experts and novices in six 
different but interrelated studies. The first and second studies report in-depth preliminary 
studies with 20 Bitcoin users and 20 miners to identify the trust challenges in people’s 
daily practices in using Bitcoin. Based on the findings, users’ risk related to dishonest 
partner in peer-to-peer Bitcoins transactions is the highlighted trust challenges to be 
addressed in this thesis. With a strong understanding of Bitcoin mining process, a 
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physical Blockchain design kit, namely BlocKit was developed based on the embodied 
cognition theories and material centred design. This BlocKit was evaluated by 15 Bitcoin 
Blockchain’s experienced users and one of the important outcomes proposed the 
principles to design for trust application in peer-to-peer Bitcoins transactions. Later the 
algorithms of trust for Bitcoin application were developed based on the suggested 
principles and were validated by 10 Bitcoin Blockchain’s experienced users. Finally, 
based on the designed algorithms as well as a newly identified heuristic evaluation for 
trust, a mock-up prototype of Bitcoin wallet application namely, BitXFps was developed 
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 Problem Definition 1.1
“Bitcoin is a purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash that allows online payments 
to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial 
institution” (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 1) 
 
Bitcoins were issued in 2009 by an anonymous entity called Satoshi Nakamoto, and 
have become the leader in peer-to-peer currency. Bitcoins have been adopted by the 
public at large with increased interest. Experts have foreseen that Bitcoin’s users will 
reach almost 200 million by 2024 (Young, 2017). This growing community buy Bitcoins 
in online marketplaces and get them sent to their digital Bitcoin’s wallet in exchange for 
fiat money, or use them to buy goods or services (Göbel, Keeler, Krzesinski, & Taylor, 
2015). However, these transactions are somehow different from the traditional 
transactions involving fiat money. This is due to the concept of money; Bitcoins are not 
printed, but mined, through the widely distributed computing power supported on the 
Blockchain. 
 
“Blockchain is the public ledger of all executed Bitcoins’” (Swan, 2015, p. x) 
 
Blockchain is a complex decentralised technology that consists of public distributed 
nodes involved in authorising Bitcoin transactions between anonymous parties 
(Nakamoto, 2008). These nodes are represented by miners, who are people that create 
Bitcoins in a controlled way, by running dedicated programs on their machines that are 
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connected within the Blockchain’s network. By sharing Blockchain’s characteristics, 
mining is a decentralised, transparent, and unregulated, yet lucrative practice, as miners 
are rewarded in Bitcoins for their successfully validated Bitcoin transactions. The core of 
Blockchain’s ecosystem is miners, and their validation of Bitcoin transactions through 
the trustless mechanism. Other than Bitcoin, Blockchain has been widely explored by 
experts as a platform of other cryptocurrencies including Etherum.  Unlike Bitcoin’s 
Blockchain that is designed specifically to record Bitcoin transactions, Etherum 
Blockchain is able to record multiple types of arbitrary data (Karamitsos, Papadaki, 
Baker, & Barghuthi, 2018). This enables developers to build various types of systems on 
top of the Blockchain platform. Furthermore, its built-in smart contracts allow users to 
exchange money, properties or other valuable things in a transparent way (Ekblaw, 
Azaria, Halamka, Lippman, & Vieira, 2016; Singh & Singh, 2016). These exchange 
processes are validated by the miners and recorded in the Etherum Blockchain.  
 
 “Bitcoin is an electronic payment system that is based on cryptographic proof, allowing 
any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted 
third party” (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 1) 
 
Bitcoin transactions are verified with sophisticated algorithms, and stored on miners’ 
computers geographically distributed throughout the world (Nakamoto, 2008). Satoshi 
created the algorithms by allowing the transfer of Bitcoins’ ownership from one user to 
another directly through the transaction being validated by the miners and permanently 
recorded in the Blockchain ledger (Swan, 2015). Hence, the dismissal of trusted third 
party for Bitcoins transactions such as in conventional banking systems has led to such 
transactions to be called trustless transactions.  
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Such an innovative form of financial transactions appears particularly appealing to 
Bitcoin users. However, Bitcoins are categorised as one of the alternative currencies, 
identified as a medium of exchange that emerged as substitute to national fiat currencies 
(Guadamuz & Marsden, 2015).  Most alternative currencies were developed due to 
economic concerns, as well as to support local communities’ needs, without being 
regulated by governments. The unregulated nature of alternative currencies such as 
Bitcoins poses challenges to their users who could no longer feel secured and protected 
by their central or governmental authority. The absence of central authority in Bitcoin 
technology is likely to lead to distrust. People’s distrust towards Bitcoin Blockchain may 
be intensified by the characteristics of decentralisation and pseudo-anonymity. These can 
pose crucial challenges to Bitcoin users, such as those affected by illicit use and cyber-
attacks (Costanza, 2003a; Wray, 2012). Additionally, the Bitcoin architecture differs 
significantly from prior electronic payment systems, which in turn could also lead to a 
lack of trust. This contrasts with most HCI trust models, many of which have been 
informed by empirical work on e-commerce or e-payment systems and are traditionally 
centralised, regulated, and non-anonymous. Hence, the feasibility of these models for 
theorising about users’ trust in Bitcoin Blockchain requires exploration. 
On the one hand, the emerging social organisation of mining practices brings forward 
issues of trust among miners such as the risk of 51% attack (Bradbury, 2013) and that of 
selfish miners (Buterin, 2013b), as explored mostly within the security research area. 
These security threats of mining contrast to the claim of trustless mining protocol 
(Nakamoto, 2008). Thus, they offer interesting opportunities for exploring miners’ 
attitude towards such threats. However, in the HCI field, there has been limited 
exploration of miners’ practices from the first-person perspective, and how the specific 
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Blockchain’s characteristics impact on miners’ trust. Thus, it is worth exploring the 
involvement of miners and their trust in this complex technology.  
In order to explore miners’ and users’ practices and their trust in Bitcoin Blockchain, 
it is important to also explore their understanding of its underlying technology. However, 
the disruptive Blockchain technology has significantly challenged the traditional 
understanding of financial institutions. The Blockchain’s inner working is not trivial to 
understand. In other words, a structural mental model of Blockchain technology is 
complex and arguably difficult to acquire, as it challenges the traditional understanding 
of similar financial or payment systems, which are traditionally centralised and 
regulated. Hence, new methods to support the process of understanding the Blockchain 
are much needed.  
 Research Aims 1.2
The thesis’s overall aim is:  
Understanding and designing for trust in Bitcoin Blockchain and this aim is broken 
down in the following main research objectives. 
 Research Objectives 1.3
1) To explore the challenges related to users’ and miners’ trust through empirically 
grounded understandings of their routine practices within Blockchain technology. 
2) To explore new methods to understand the complex Bitcoin Blockchain 
technology. 
3) To explore the design opportunities for Blockchain to mitigate the identified trust 
challenges. 
4) To explore the design for people’s trust in Bitcoin Blockchain. 
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5) To explore people’s perceptions of trust in Bitcoin Blockchain by evaluating 
BitXFps, a novel mobile application’s interface. 
 
These objectives are intended to address the following main research questions. 
 Research Questions 1.4
1) Why do people such as users and miners engage in Bitcoin transactions on 
Blockchain technology? What are the challenges they faced, and the specific trust 
issues? 
2) What are the elements of BlocKit – an innovative kit for materialising Blockchain 
- that could support people’s understanding of Blockchain? What are the values 
of this approach for people to engage with Blockchain? 
3) What are the principles to design for trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoins transaction? 
How should the design of Blockchain be supported?  
4) What are the approaches to design new tools, such as wallet mobile apps, for 
users’ trust? How to evaluate the design of such tools? 
5) Which are the elements in the design of BitXFps support people’s trust in Bitcoin 
transactions? 
 
Table 1.1 below offers an overview of the research aim, objectives and research 
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Sub-Research Question  
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Study 1, Chapter 4 
Which are the motives for 
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Bitcoins and how do they use 
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 The Thesis’s Main Contributions 1.5
There are three types of contributions derived from this thesis, which are further 
described as theoretical, methodological and technological design contributions. 
 Theoretical Contributions 1.5.1
The theoretical contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
A research framework for exploring trust in Bitcoin Blockchain technology 
This is a novel research framework that is built on existing theories of trust, and the 
roles of the four Btcoin Blockchain’s main stakeholders: users, miners, merchants, 
and exchanges (Sas and Khairuddin, 2015). This framework has been further used 
as a supporting conceptual tool in the empirical studies exploring users’ trust (Sas 
and Khairuddin, 2017) and miners’ trust (Khairuddin and Sas, 2019). 
 
A framework of trust inducing features for Bitcoin mobile application 
This framework is built on two prevalent frameworks for websites and mobile apps 
which describe the characteristics of user interface design that induce trust. Initially, 
there were four characteristics offered by this framework, which consists of graphic 
design, structure design, content design, and social-cue design (Wang & Emurian, 
2005). Later, underpinned by a study on e-commerce and banking websites 
(Seckler, Heinz, S., Tuch, & Opwis, 2015) the framework was extended with a new 
characteristic: personal and social proof design. In this thesis, this latter framework 
has been extended with a new characteristic, underpinned by the expert’s evaluation 
of 20 Bitcoin mobile apps, as well as by an empirical evaluation with 15 Bitcoin 
users of our newly designed Bitcoin wallet app, BitXFps. Thus, from five 
characteristics, the framework of trust inducing features was extended to six with a 
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new characteristic, namely Bitcoin peer-to-peer transaction cues, which is 
particularly tailored for Bitcoin mobile applications. 
 Methodological Contributions 1.5.2
The methodological contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
BlocKit – Physical kit materialising the Blockchain infrastructure 
BlocKit materialises 12 main Blockchain’s entities or key concepts through 
materials such as clays, plastic containers, or sticky-notes. The construction of 
BlocKit has been informed by embodied cognition theories (Hampe & Grady, 2005) 
and material centred-design (Wiberg & Mikael, 2014). BlocKit was evaluated by 15 
Blockchain experienced users, and the findings indicate that this physical kit offers 
a novel approach to communicate about and design for Blockchain. BlocKit also 
benefits on learning and understanding the Blockchain. (Khairuddin, Sas and Speed, 
2019). 
 Technological Design Contributions 1.5.3
The technological design contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
An Empirical Framework to Design Bitcoin Wallet app on Blockchain for 
Users’ Trust in Peer-to0Peer Bitcoin Transactions 
This framework is built based on the outcomes of the five empirical studies 
conducted throughout this Ph.D thesis. It is constructed on the theoretical 
framework for exploring trust described in Chapter 2 which consists of 
technological trust, social trust, and institutional trust (Sas and Khairuddin 2015). 
Then, this empirical framework was used to explore the main trust challenges 
experienced by users while engaging in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions 
(Khairuddin et al., 2016; Sas and Khairuddin, 2017), which were classified under 
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social trust. Technological trust is supported by three principles to design for trust; 
the Blockchain Bitcoin mobile app to support the design for trust, and the design for 
trust of Bitcoin wallet app could be further explored using BlocKit (Khairuddin, Sas 
and Speed, 2019).  
 Thesis Structure 1.6
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter presents the relevant literature, drawing from five research areas: trust in 
HCI, history of money, Bitcoin cryptocurrency, Blockchain technology, and mental 
models in HCI. One theoretical paper has been published based on the insights gained 
from this chapter (Sas and Khairuddin, 2015). 
 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter highlights the relevant methodology applied in this thesis. Key research 
methods include interviews, user participatory design workshops, and heuristic 
evaluation method. 
 
Chapter 4: The Trust Challenges and Opportunities among Bitcoin’s Users 
This chapter presents the findings on the motivations and challenges related to trust 
among Bitcoin users. It also discusses relevant theoretical and design implications. Two 
papers have been published on the findings described in this chapter (Khairuddin et al., 





Chapter 5: The Trust Challenges and Opportunities among Bitcoin’s Miners 
This chapter presents the findings on the motivations and challenges related to trust 
among Bitcoin miners. It also discusses relevant theoretical and design implications for 
the Bitcoin miners. One paper has been published on the findings described in this 
chapter (Khairuddin and Sas, 2019). 
 
Chapter 6: Construction of BlocKit 
This chapter explores the materialisation of Blockchain infrastructure in the form of 
BlocKit. One paper has been published on the findings described in this chapter 
(Khairuddin, Sas, and Speed, 2019). 
 
Chapter 7: Evaluation of BlocKit 
This chapter presents the findings on the evaluation of BlocKit with Blockchain 
experienced users. This chapter also describes the experts’ suggestions for designing for 
trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoins transactions. One paper has been published on the findings 
described in this chapter (Khairuddin, Sas and Speed, 2019). 
 
Chapter 8: Design and Validation on Algorithms for Trust Peer-to-Peer Bitcoin 
Transactions on Blockchain 
This chapter describes the design of algorithms for embedding trust in peer-to-peer 
Bitcoins transactions. It also discusses the findings from the validation of these 






Chapter 9: Design for Trust User Interface of BitXFps Mobile Wallet Application 
This chapter describes the guidelines that were applied to design the interface for 
BitXFPs apps. It also presents the design of BitXFps, a Bitcoin wallet mobile 
application, along with particular elements of trust implemented in its interface. 
 
Chapter 10: Evaluation of Trust User Interface of BitXFps Mobile Wallet 
Application  
This chapter presents the evaluations of the trust elements of BitXFps’s interface. 
 
Chapter 11: Discussion 
This chapter discusses the overall findings of the thesis, revisits the research questions, 
and unpacks the main contributions of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 12: Conclusion 
Finally, the conclusion chapter summarises the entire journey of the thesis. It also 
discusses limitations and proposes directions for future work. 
 
Figure 1.1 is a diagram of the overall thesis structure to show the links of each chapter 
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 Trust in HCI 2.1
Trust is defined as the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party (Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995). Trust has also been described as a subjective belief in the character, 
ability, strength, reliability, honesty or truth of someone or something (Grandison et al., 
2001). The multifaceted concept of trust has been explored across a large range of 
interactive systems, and consistent findings have shown the distinction between 
technological, social, and institutional trust (Leppanen, 2010; Lippert & Swiercz, 2005; 
Misiolek, Zakaria, & Zhang, 2002). In the Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) context, 
there are two main directions of conceptualising trust: trust between people and 
technology, and trust between people interacting with technology.  
 Trust between People and Technology 2.1.1
The technological trust consists of individual perceptions and assessments of 
technology-related trust issues (Leppanen, 2010). It can be better understood in the 
light of its three attributes: advantage to use, expectation of technology usability, 
and perception of user’s skills. The advantage to use refers to the needs for 
implementing a technological system that will increase task performance (Goodhue, 
Lewis, & Thompson, 2006). The expectation of technology usability has been 
defined by Davis (Davis, 1989)  in terms of user’s initial presumption on what using 
the technology will be like. Usability can also be seen as a set of objectives and 
guidelines for system designers and software developers to create devices and 
applications that take minimal effort to use. For example, Nielsen (Nielsen, 2000) 
proposed guidelines for enhancing individual trust in website by assessing usability, 
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in contrast to the risk of making online transactions. The perception of user skills 
captures each individual’s perception of his or her capabilities and motivations to 
use a computer or a technological system (Nielsen, 2000). 
The prevalent model of trust related to trust between people and technology is the 
model of online trust. Corritore and colleagues (Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 
2003) identified three trust factors: user perceptions of technology’s credibility, ease 
of use, and risk. Their four dimensions of credibility include honesty (well intention, 
truthful and unbiased actions), expertise (knowledge, experience, and competence), 
predictability (the expectation that technology will act consistently based on past 
experience), and reputation (recognised past performance). The model has been 
extensively applied to web design in e-government, e-commerce, and e-banking, but 
its value for Blockchain technology has received limited attention. The model also 
shares similarities with that of Davis  (Davis, 1989). 
2.1.1.1 User’s Trust towards the User Interface Design 
In the landscape of people interacting with the website, the design of a website 
is vital for the initial user’s trust. Wang and Eumurian (Wang & Emurian, 2005) 
suggested a framework of trust-inducing features for website along four 
dimensions: graphic design, structure design, content design, and social-cue 
design. The graphic design refers to the graphical design factors on the website 
that generally impacts on consumers a first impression, which includes the uses of 
colors, layout design and the quality of the photos presented in the website 
(Karvonen & Parkkinen, 2001; Kim & Moon, 1998; Seckler et al., 2015; Wang & 
Emurian, 2005). Meanwhile, the structure design elements relate to website 
organisation. This presents the overall look of a website and the accessibility of 
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information. It also includes the usability of the website in terms of the 
effectiveness of the design, ease-of-use of the website navigation and avoidance 
of pop-up advertisements in the design. In addition, the structure design is also 
related to the demands by the website to persuade users in a good way to share 
their URL with others, to register an account with the website or to download a 
piece of software (Goodhue et al., 2006; Leppanen, 2010; Mayer et al., 1995; 
Seckler et al., 2015). Meanwhile, content design refers to the informational 
formats provided by the website providers, either graphical or textual, which 
includes the security signs, the branding of the website, expertise, privacy policy 
related to personal data collections and secondary use of the data, web address, 
implausible promise and the website policy (Davis, 1989; Karvonen & Parkkinen, 
2001; Leppanen, 2010; Lippert & Swiercz, 2005; Seckler et al., 2015). The final 
dimension is the social cue design, which relates to the social signs that reduce 
the gap of social distance and increase intimacy. Social media integration with the 
website is one of the common ways to connect the web providers and enhance the 
communication between users (Kim & Moon, 1998; Leppanen, 2010; Nielsen 
1998; Seckler et al., 2015). In building trust, it is important for websites to 
provide sufficient information on their personal branding also the service and 









Dimension Description Characteristics Literature sources 
Graphic Design Websites’ 
graphical elements 
that trigger the 
users’ first 
impressions. 
  Visual design (Karvonen & Parkkinen, 
2001; Kim & Moon, 1998; 
Seckler et al., 2015; Wang 
& Emurian, 2005) 
Structure Design Accessibility by 
users to the 
information 
displayed on the 
website and how 






(Goodhue et al., 2006; 
Leppanen, 2010; Mayer et 
al., 1995; Seckler et al., 
2015)  
Content Design Informational 
elements that are 
placed on the 
website, either 
textual or graphical 












(Davis, 1989; Karvonen & 
Parkkinen, 2001; 
Leppanen, 2010; Lippert 
& Swiercz, 2005; Seckler 
et al., 2015) 
Social-cue Design Social cues that are 
integrated into the 
website, such as 
photographs and 
names of customer 





 Real-world link 
(Kim & Moon, 1998; 
Leppanen, 2010;  Nielsen 
1998; Seckler et al., 2015) 
Personal and social 
proof 
Social remarks 
such as comments 
and ratings from 
other users 
 User’s social 
proof 




(Seckler et al., 2015) 
  Table 2.1: Trust-Inducing Features of Website Interface Design 
(Seckler et al., 2015; Wang & Emurian, 2005) 
 
This framework has been applied in variety studies of various types of 
websites, such as cloud computing services (Öksüz, 2014) and geographic 
information system (Skarlatidou, Cheng, & Haklay, 2013). Although the 
framework was initially designed for websites, it also has been adopted in the 
study on mobile applications trust design (Hasslacher, 2014). Interestingly, 
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Seckler et al. (Seckler et al., 2015) also adopted the framework and conducted an 
empirical study with 221 participants to measure the trust and distrust through 
several types of website design interface, including e-commerce and e-banking/ 
finance websites. Based on the outcome of their study, they extended the 
framework by adding another dimension which is personal and social cues. This 
new element is associated with the design for users’ social proof such as user’s 
feedback and reviews. On top of that, this is also related to the friend’s social 
proof, which can be identified through the website connection with social media 
channels that enable the users to see their mutual friends that engage with the 
website as well as shared experience by other users (Seckler et al., 2015). The 
extended trust-inducing features for the website interface design are summarised 
in   Table 2.1. 
 Trust between People Interacting with Technology 2.1.2
Meanwhile, the trust between people interact with technology is associated 
with social and institutional trust. Social trust has been defined as the feeling of the 
good disposition of the other (Falcone & Castelfranchi, 2001). Leppanen 
(Leppanen, 2010) also identified four key concepts of trust: disposition to trust, 
perceived trustworthiness, situational factors, and shared attributes. Disposition to 
trust indicates the trustor’s own willingness to be dependent on others, further 
determined by a trusting stance and faith in humanity (McKnight, Cummings, & 
Chervany, 1998). It has been argued that the disposition to this goodwill arises from 
positive trust concerning exchanges with people, which lead to a positive general 
belief on mankind. Boon and Holmes (Boon & Holmes, 1991) also discussed how 
an individual’s disposition towards trust sets expectations for trustworthiness in 
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general. Hence, personal, first-hand positive experience towards a new context is 
paramount in building up the disposition to trust. Perceived trustworthiness has been 
defined as the expectation that another party will perform a particular action (Fisher 
et al., 2007). This is an important concept which relies on distinct categories of 
beliefs such as benevolence, competence, honesty, and predictability (McKnight et 
al., 1998). Situational factors are those targeting the context of an organisation 
(McKnight et al., 1998). Moorman and Purser (Moorman, Deshpandé, & Zaltman, 
1993; Purser, 2001) argued for the importance of the context in which trust 
formation takes place. Sharing attributes with a trusting partner is crucial in building 
a trusted relationship (Grandison et al., 2001). These include the importance of 
positive past exchanges that have been emphasised in Boon and Holmes’s (Boon & 
Holmes, 1991) model describing the continuous nature of the shared experience. 
According to this model, both short- and long-term exchanges can benefit from 
shared attributes of trust.  
Meanwhile, institutional trust is defined as the party being initially willingly 
vulnerable to a counterpart’s action (Mayer et al., 1995). It can be described in 
terms of power relations and organisational structure. Power relation becomes 
important for trustworthiness in social relationship where an individual has a 
position of power for decision making in an organisation (Tyler & Degoey, 1996). 
Trust in organisational structure reflects the importance of hierarchical relationships 
across the organisation (Kramer & Kennedy, 1996). In McKnight’s (McKnight et 
al., 1998) trust model, the organisational trust is explained through the system of 
rules and regulations governing each activity in the organisation. There have also 
been attempts to conceptualize trust in decentralised systems. For example, 
Gutscher’s (Gutscher, 2007) trust model integrates public key authenticity 
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verification to evaluate arbitrary trust structures which allow multiple keys per user. 
This also enables the sign of a trusted certificate to limit the length of the trust 
chains and to define the semantics of trust. This trust model consists of four building 
blocks. Two basic blocks define the existing trust and authentication relations 
together with inference rules for combining them. The other two blocks describe 
representations of trust values and how to compute them for trust relations.  
On the other hand, Blaze and colleagues (Blaze, Feigenbaum, & Lacy, 1996) 
addressed the issue of decentralised trust management through four principles: 
unified mechanism; flexibility; the locality of control; and separation of mechanism 
and policy. The unified mechanism holds the policies, credentials, and relationships 
for network application security, while the complex trust relationship falls under the 
flexibility principle. The locality of control supports the trust of relationship across 
the community, while the separation of mechanism policy supports control of the 
verifying credentials of the applications.  
In HCI, the prevailing trust model for technology-mediated trust between users that 
has been applied to e-commerce is the framework on mechanics of trust 
(Riegelsberger, Sasse, & McCarthy, 2005). This framework identifies two key 
properties warranting trust in a transaction’s partner: contextual and intrinsic 
properties. Contextual properties are described as temporal, social and institutional 
embeddedness. Temporal embeddedness refers to parties’ potential for engaging in 
future transactions, and interest in their relationship’s longevity. This, in turn, 
prevents the risk of defection, as the present gains come at the cost of future lost 
ones. Temporal embeddedness requires traceability of action through “repeated 
interaction with stable identities” (Riegelsberger et al., 2005) so that the trustor can 
accumulate more knowledge and make better predictions about the trustee’s future 
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behaviour. Social embeddedness captures the exchange of information among 
trustors about trustees’ past performance. This motivates the trustee to fulfil the 
agreement in order to protect his reputation among the larger pool of trustors 
accessing information about his past performances. Institutional embeddedness 
captures the legal aspects of underpinning transactions, able to enforce sanctions 
such as litigation or punishment for the parties who do not fulfil their agreement. 
Given this protection by the law institutions, the trustors are comfortable to engage 
in transactions with trustors of whom they know little. 
Intrinsic properties of the trustee include his ability or motivation to act in a 
trustworthy manner inferable on the basis of his credibility; internalised norms 
which capture trustee’s integrity or respect for moral principles which can be 
supported by the parties’ social identify and presence; and benevolence capturing 
trustee’s concern for the wellbeing of the other (Riegelsberger et al., 2005). 
Benevolence resembles Hardin’s (Hardin, 2002) theory of trust and the 
encapsulated interest: parties’ interest in a relationship which tends to be rich and 
ongoing. He also discusses risk as the uncertainty of a trustee’s choice to engage in 
betrayal or deflection. This type of risk is better mitigated in a group or thick 
relationships in which the trustee’s reputation is socially embedded. 
2.1.2.1 Reputation System to Support Trust 
In line with the social embeddedness dimension in the framework of 
mechanics of trust (Riegelsberger et al., 2005), trust among strangers can be built 
based on the history of past interactions and connected to the expectation for 
future engagement that is reflected by present interaction behaviour (Resnick, 
Zeckhauser, Swanson, & Lockwood, 2006). These concepts of trust are the 
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important properties for a reputation system to provide feedback from a present 
consumer that can be relied on the future. The reputation system management 
system model has been widely applied in various areas such as e-commerce, peer-
to-peer systems and social networks (Janiszewski, 2017). In order to ensure that a 
reputation system works effectively, there are three important elements. The 
system must be able to provide a long term reputation record to inspire the 
expectation of future interaction; capture and disseminate feedback on present 
interaction; and enable other users to refer to the feedback as guidance for trust 
decision (Resnick et al., 2006). It is also essential for a reputation system to 
provide information which allows buyers to distinguish between trustworthy and 
non-trustworthy sellers, encourage sellers to be trustworthy and discourage 
participation from those who are not (Resnick et al., 2006). 
From a technical perspective, the trust reputation management systems are 
built based on the concept of trust and reputation between the nodes (users) of the 
system (Rahimi & Bakkali, 2014), while the network architecture is designed in 
the form of a centralised or distributed reputation system (Kinateder & 
Rothermel, 2003). The centralised reputation system is managed by the central 
authority, which will typically collect the feedback ratings from the participants, 
then generate reputation scores and share the scores publicly. Resnick and 
colleagues (Resnick et al., 2006) identified seven categories of centralised 
reputation system: feedback forums (auction site provides opportunity for seller 
and buyer to rate each other); expert sites (group of people that are willing to 
answer questions based on their experience and expertise and the group members 
are allowed to rate the answer given by the experts); product review sites 
(people’s reviews towards products); discussion forums (ratings for the users who 
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contribute to the discussion topics); web page ranking systems (way for search 
engines to list the hyperlinks based on the page’s reputation); supplier reputation 
systems (ratings on the supply chain process);  and scientometrics (reputation for 
researchers in terms of the citation and publication). There are a few examples of 
centralised reputation systems, such as the well-known e-commerce website 
eBay, which facilitate a live rating system immediately after recent purchases for 
both the seller and buyer to rate each other with either positive, neutral or 
negative ratings and also an option for comments (Jøsang, 2007). Additionally, 
TripAdvisor and Yelp are both community reviews websites related to interesting 
places around the world. They allow members to give their feedback and reviews 
on the places that they have visited. For TripAdvisor, the community will drop 
reviews on the hotels that they have visited and at the same time, other members 
can give rate their preference whether the reviews given are helpful or not. 
Meanwhile, Yelp has a broader focus for reviews, with more than 20 categories 
and also discussion forums segmented by city (Brown, 2012). 
Meanwhile, in the distributed reputation system, there is no central authority 
which manages reputation scores. The reputations are based on two types of 
mechanisms: distributed communication protocol (participants obtain ratings 
from community ratings) and reputation computation method (individual agent 
computer the ratings based on the rating received) (Blaze et al., 1996; Gutscher, 
2007). One prevalent example of a decentralised reputation system is 
OpenBazaar, an online platform for vendors to sell their products in Bitcoins and 
other over fifty types of cryptocurrencies. The OpenBazaar reputation system 
allows the buyers to send the ratings to the vendor in five categories: feedback, 
item quality, item description, item delivery, and customer service. The ratings 
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can be sent in a form of 1-5 stars and the buyers are allowed to include text for 
the feedback with a limitation of words. The ratings in OpenBazzar are tied to 
Bitcoins transaction and involve a small cost to make the rating (Open Bazaar, 
2015). 
 Section Summary 2.1.3
The trust concepts, models and principles described above either fail to 
address trust in decentralisation systems or address it from the sole perspective of 
users of such systems. In the case of Bitcoin Blockchain, it is not only a 
decentralised system, but a grassroots-driven technology involving multiple 
stakeholders. Thus, it offers a unique perspective to explore the development of 
trust within and across these stakeholders, together with its most challenging and 
promising issues. A thoughtful chronological history of the existence of Bitcoins as 
cryptocurrency would be able to reflect the exploration of people’s motivation, 
practice, and trust in Bitcoins.  
 History of Money 2.2
In the past, humans created an object as a medium of exchange to replace the barter 
system (Schweikart, 1991). The object could be a shell, stone or anything that was 
valuable to both buyer and seller. The ancestors deposited their valuable belongings with 
goldsmiths as a way for safe keeping and in return were given a receipt called a 
goldsmith note (Wray, 2012). However, in the 17th century, the role of goldsmiths was 
replaced by the government central banks which issued a national currency or fiat money 
(Wray, 2012). This, in turn, creates a new transformation of money from individual 
assets and money management to a new centralised authority which manages the money 
movements from one to another. Today, fiat money is still dominant and the evolving 
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technology makes information move briskly. Though, with all these advanced 
technologies, money movement is still slow, expensive and needs to bypass the regulated 
central authority (Raul Carrillo, 2015), compared to ancestors’ method of money 
movements in which the transactions were conducted spontaneously without any hassle. 
As a result, several types of alternative currencies have been created to generate and 
strengthen people purchasing power. 
 Alternative Currency 2.2.1
Alternative currencies are used as a substitute for national currency that has 
been privately developed. However, most alternative currency has no legal tender 
and is not regulated by national governments or banks (Lipkis, Sarah and Roth, 
2014). Fontinelle (Fontinelle, 2011) stated that there are four main reasons for 
creating an alternative currency. Firstly is to promote and enrich the local economic 
development. Secondly, is to build up social capital. Other than that, the alternative 
currency may help to nurture a more sustainable lifestyle among the communities 
and to meet the needs that mainstream money would not be able to provide. Finally, 
there are complementary currencies that exist to help the local community to have 
an equal human right. Alternative currency is also known as a complementary 
currency. Costanza (Costanza, 2003a) listed three types of complementary currency: 
fiat-backed complementary currency, mutual credit complementary currency and 
commodity-backed complementary currency. 
2.2.1.1 Fiat Backed Complementary Currency 
Fiat backed complementary currency is very similar to the way that national 
currencies work, as the value of the money is based on the faith of the users 
towards the organisation or community that create and manage the monetary 
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system (Costanza, 2003b). The vital difference between those two currencies is 
that the community currency promotes the cooperation and development of 
community bonds within the users of fiat-backed complementary currency, while 
the value of national currency is derived from the scarcity to their usefulness 
(Costanza, 2003a). A few examples of fiat-backed complementary currencies are 
the Brixton pound, Sardex, and Koru Kenya that have been used in the United 
Kingdom, Italy, and Kenya, respectively (Raul Carrillo, 2015).  
2.2.1.2 Mutual Credit Complementary Currency 
Mutual credit complementary currency works in a ledger system that records 
the credit and debit of member accounts (Migchels, 2012). For each item 
purchased, the credit will be subtracted from the account, and vice versa. Unlike 
with conventional banks, there is no interest collected for the debts. The system 
allows the debts to be paid off by trading with goods and services (Hub Culture, 
2014). For example Bangla-Pesa, the alternative currency in Kenya uses a mutual 
credit system to serve a local community that provides goods and services to each 
other by circulating the Bangla-Pesa as money (Darby, 2018).  
2.2.1.3 Commodity Backed Complementary Currency  
The other type of complementary currency is the commodity-backed 
complementary money. Differing from fiat-backed complementary currency; this 
currency does not need the interference of the national currency. It is underlying 
on a physical commodity with an intrinsic value such as gold and silver, such as 
the Liberty Dollar, which is backed by silver (Costanza, 2003a). 
All of these three types of currencies are not legal tender. However, those 
currencies are managed by the organisations that facilitate the money transactions 
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among the communities. In reflection to trust, although it is not governed by the 
government, the users’ trusts toward the currencies and money transactions rely 
on the central entities that create and manage those currencies. This, in turns, 
mirrors the category of users’ trust in those alternative currencies similarly to the 
users’ trust towards the national fiat money. In the framework of mechanics of 
trust, this type of user’s trust is known as institutional trust (Riegelsberger et al., 
2005). Meanwhile, the internet revolution does bring different waves to 
alternative currency as well. People started to create alternative money through 
the paperless system. This is where the revolution of digital currency begins. 
 Digital Currency 2.2.2
Digital currency is an Internet-based medium of exchange which is dissimilar 
in terms of physicality compared to real currency. Digital currency exhibits similar 
possessions to real currencies and allows for prompt and borderless transfer of 
ownership (Tasca, 2015a). The previous studies suggested that electronic cash or 
cybercash and virtual currency are all forms of digital currencies (Antwerpen, 1990; 
Lim & Lee, 1993; Shoaib, Ilyas, & Hayat Khiyal, 2013; Wray, 2012).  
2.2.2.1 Electronic Cash 
Electronic cash or cyber cash is a digital representation of money that can be 
found either on a smart card (credit or debit card) or computer hard drive 
(FinCEN, 2000). The smart card can be used by using a proper reader and the 
monetary value can be added or deducted in the electronic account (FinCEN, 
2000). In addition to the smart card, electronic cash is also largely used to 
facilitate internet payment in the electronic commerce industry today. Banks have 
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introduced electronic banking systems to enhance and support the usage of 
electronic cash over the Internet (Bakare, 2015). 
2.2.2.2 Virtual Currency 
A virtual currency can be defined as a type of unregulated, digital money, 
which is issued and usually controlled by its developers and used and accepted 
among the members of a specific virtual community (European Central Bank, 
2012). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, 2016) argued that virtual currencies are a kind of electronic 
money, which are not tangible and which users may agree to accept and treat like 
dollars, euros, or other forms of money. There are two ways to own virtual 
currencies: either users can purchase it using the real money from the community 
at the agreed conversion rate, or they can engage with specific online activities 
which will reward them with the virtual currencies (Darby, 2018; Tasca, 2015b). 
Allen and Overy (Allen and Overy, 2015) classified virtual currency into two (2) 
categories which are open (convertible) and closed (non-convertible) and both 
administrations may be centralised or decentralised. The closed virtual currencies 
can only be used within the designated community, such as a specific online 
game environment. Meanwhile, open virtual currencies allow the exchanges for 
the real currency and are categorised into two groups, non-cryptocurrency, and 
cryptocurrency (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2016). 
 
 Non-cryptocurrency 
Non-cryptocurrency was first founded in 1996 as E-gold, which is backed by 
gold (White, 2014). Then in 2006, another alternative digital currency was 
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founded, named Liberty Reserve, allowed users to exchange dollars or euros to 
Liberty Dollars or Euros. However, those currencies were shut down by the US 
government due to excessive money laundering activities using both digital 
currencies (Lim & Lee, 1993; Resnick et al., 2006). In 2007, Stan Stalnaker 
(Knoop, 2015) forms a new virtual currency, Ven, which is backed by 
commodities such as oil, currencies or other exchange-traded assets that are 
chosen by the board (Ilett, 2013). Currently, there are more than 50 million units 
circulated among the communities. The price of Ven is controlled by the 
algorithm and is still actively used by the community (Hub Culture, 2014; Knoop, 
2015). Hub Culture is the company which is responsible for managing the flow of 
the money as well as handling the disputes among the users. Hence, the trust of 
the users is categorised as institutional trust (Riegelsberger et al., 2005).  
 
 Cryptocurrency 
Cryptocurrency refers to a math-based, decentralised convertible virtual 
currency that is protected by cryptography (FATF, 2014). Bitcoin Satoshi 
Nakamoto is the anonymous entity who introduced the first cryptocurrency in 
2009 known as Bitcoin. Bitcoin provides a solution to the digital money transfer 
without employing a third party institution (Nakamoto, 2008). Unlike fiat-backed 
currency or commodity currency, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are created 
with a mathematical cryptographic algorithm, and are not backed by either fiat 
money or commodities (FATF, 2014). The fundamental feature of Bitcoin 
cryptocurrencies is the underlying technology, named Blockchain, which 
provides a transparent and a decentralised ledger to record the cryptocurrencies’ 
transactions (Swan, 2015). However, due to the decentralisation of Bitcoin, the 
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user’s trust is no longer dependent on any central authority. Thus, it offers 
negative spaces for scammers to create fraud transactions. This, in turn, has 
threatened the trust of the users.  
 Properties of Money 2.2.3
Be it a paper or digital money, the properties of money are important to allow 
it to be materialised and accepted by people and communities. Jevons (Jevons, 
1890) suggested seven properties of money, which are: value of material, 
portability, durable, homogeneous, divisibility, the stability of value and being 
cognizable. However, Sykes (Sykes, 1905) argued that the value of the material to 
create money is not relevant in the new age as the banks have started to produce a 
banknote using a paper and yet people can still accept it as money and the stability 
of the value of money although it is important, it is very difficult to retain. Table 2.2 
described the six properties of money used in this study.  
Property of Money Description Literature source 
Durable The durability of money is defined as 
physically able to use for a very long 
time without being damaged or need 
to be reworked 
(Bank of Canada, 
2016; Jevons, 1890; 
Sykes, 1905) 
Divisible Money must also be mechanically 
divisible into usable quantities or 
fractions and the aggregate value 
after division should be almost 
exactly the same as before division 
(Bank of Canada, 
2016; Jevons, 1890) 
Portability Money must always be easy to be 
moved and transferred from one to 
another 
(Bank of Canada, 
2016; Jevons, 1890 
Scarcity/ Stability of Value Scarcity of money is described as 
money should not be easily produced 
and not fluctuate in value but at the 
same time it must be sufficient for 
economic exchanges 
(Bank of Canada, 
2016; Sykes, 1905) 
Homogeneity/ Fungible The homogeneity of money refers to 
the equal quality of materials and 
weight and size for money that has 
the same value 
(Bank of Canada, 
2016; Jevons, 1890 
Verifiable/ Cognizable The capability to identify the (Bank of Canada, 
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originality of money to avoid people 
from using fake money 
2016; Jevons, 1890 
 
Table 2.2: Properties of Money  (Bank of Canada, 2016; Jevons, 1890; Sykes, 1905) 
 
 Alternative Currencies in HCI Study 2.2.4
Meanwhile, the HCI community has recently started to engage with the topic 
of digital currency (Kaye, Vertesi, Ferreira, Brown, & Perry, 2014). Ferreira et al. 
(Ferreira, Mark, & Subramanian, 2015) explored user experience with the Bristol 
Pound (£B), a local complementary currency used in Bristol, UK. Authors run a 
survey with about 200 users on how people conduct mobile phone transactions via 
SMS and their motivations and challenges for using this currency. Study findings 
highlighted the payment’s unpredictable and slow qualities and its value for 
strengthening social connections through ludic interactions, as well as increased 
mindfulness about their practice of purchase and consumption. This underlies the 
paradox of how a technology lacking trust, allows for strengthening the social trust 
between the actors involved in transactions, leading in turn to a more cohesive 
community. The study also emphasised that Bitcoin technology may benefit from 
leveraging such face to face social connections in small communities to mitigate the 
challenges of slow, unreliable transactions.  
In a critique of alternative and complementary currency and exchange 
paradigms, Carroll and Bellotti (Carroll & Bellotti, 2015) discussed four 
technological innovations: local currencies, time banks, cryptocurrencies, and 
microenterprises. In particular, they highlighted the value of cryptocurrencies like 
Bitcoin for individual privacy and control, potentially subverting centralised 
governmental and financial institutions. Authors have placed this critique in the 
current global economic context, whose challenges may well benefit from such 
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novel, money centred design, and technologies, as a rich space for CSCW and HCI 
communities to engage with. 
In contrast with gold or physical money, digital currencies have a more recent 
history but have witnessed a growing community of users. In addition to Bitcoin, 
other digital currencies such as Ripple, Litecoin, Dash, or Dogecoin have attracted a 
wide range of users from specific communities, i.e. online games (Glaser, 
Zimmermann, Haferkorn, Weber, & Siering, 2014). The functions and roles of 
money, largely explored in social and economic sciences, have been less explored 
with respect to cryptocurrencies. Such currency, however, may have both similar 
and distinct qualities from gold and national currencies. 
 Section Summary 2.2.5
The main aim of the creation of alternative currencies as well as the digital 
currencies is to escalate the people’s purchasing power as mediated by the 
government and limit the usage of their own money. Those currencies are created 
by a central entity with the aim to manage the flow of monetary transactions, 
according to the community issues and capabilities. However, indirectly, these 
organizations also act as an institutional trust for the users, unlike Bitcoin which 
was created by the anonymous entity and it is not governed by any central authority. 
Hence, it is worthwhile to explore the trust issues as well as mitigating action taken 
among the users.  
 Bitcoin Cryptocurrency 2.3
Issued in 2009 by an anonymous entity (Rogojanu & Badea, 2014), Bitcoin 
technology has become a leader in peer-to-peer crypto-currency, allowing secure transfer 
and exchange of digital tokens in a distributed and decentralised manner (Nakamoto, 
48 
 
2008). Bitcoin can be exchanged for other national fiat currencies at the agreed market 
rate (Coin Desk, 2019) through online marketplaces into a digital wallet. In addition to 
money, the exchange can also be done for goods and services, or use the Bitcoins to buy 
goods or properties (Göbel et al., 2015). At present, Bitcoin is a leader among more than 
2000 peer-to-peer currencies on the market (Coin Market Cap, 2019b) and experts have 
foreseen that Bitcoin users will reach almost 200 million by 2024 (Young, 2017).  
In the Bitcoin network, money is not printed, but mined through widely distributed 
peer-to-peer network computing power in a controlled way by the miners running a 
dedicated program in their computer system (Bradbury, 2013). The miners’ job is to run 
the program to record the Bitcoins transactions from one user to another user. Those 
transactions will be recorded in a publicly distributed ledger called Blockchain (Swan, 
2015). In a Blockchain ledger, the set of Bitcoins’ transactions are publicly distributed 
throughout the peer-to-peer nodes across the network. The uniqueness of this underlying 
technology for Bitcoin is it allows for secure and transparent transactions while 
protecting the identity of transaction’s parties (Nakamoto, 2008). Transactions are 
considered pseudoanonymous because although the transactions are publicly archived 
under an individual’s Bitcoin address, the identity of the owner’s address remains 
undisclosed. These processes in Bitcoin network are decentralised and supported by 
multiple stakeholders.  
 Bitcoin Stakeholders 2.3.1
Bitcoin is managed and applied by a community. Shcherbak (Shcherbak, 2014) 




2.3.1.1 Bitcoin Users 
Bitcoin users are people who own the Bitcoins in their Bitcoin’s wallet. The 
Bitcoin users use Bitcoins either to buy goods and services from the Bitcoin 
merchants or to buy and sell Bitcoins for other national fiat currencies such as 
USD and Pound Sterling (Shcherbak, 2014) or other types of cryptocurrencies 
such as Ether and Nem from the Bitcoin exchanges (Agrawal, 2018).  
2.3.1.2 Bitcoin Miners 
Bitcoin miners are those who own the miner machine that is used to process 
Bitcoin transactions and record in the Blockchain. In return, the miner will be 
rewarded with Bitcoins for each new block of Bitcoin transactions recorded in the 
Blockchain ledger (Eyal & Sirer, 2014). The miner’s machines range from the 
CPU of an ordinary personal computer to an ASIC Bitcoin miner, which is a 
machine that consists of an integrated circuit that is designed specifically for 
Bitcoin mining (Martindale, 2018). 
2.3.1.3 Bitcoin Merchants 
Bitcoin merchants are businesses which accept Bitcoins as a medium of 
exchange for goods and services. The merchants can be either an online business 
or a physical store. For example, one of the famous franchises Kentucky Fried 
Chicken (KFC) in Canada does accept Bitcoins in their branches (Higgins, 2018) 
and Microsoft accepts Bitcoins in their online stores (Vanian, 2018).  
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2.3.1.4 Bitcoins Exchanges 
Bitcoin exchanges are companies that provide the online trading platform for 
Bitcoins to be exchanged with fiat money or other types of cryptocurrencies. The 
Bitcoin exchanges act as a third party between the Bitcoin seller and buyer. 
However, users are required to register and de-anonymise themselves to the 
exchange company. In addition, for each Bitcoin transaction, there are also 
additional fees to be paid to the company (Coinbase, 2019).  
 Bitcoin Trust Research Framework 2.3.2
Based on the literature of trust and Bitcoin technology, I have collaborated 
with my supervisor, Professor Corina Sas, to propose a framework (Figure 2.2) for 
exploring trust in Bitcoin technology (Sas & Khairuddin, 2015) which integrates the 
key aspects of trust from HCI literature, with the main challenges posed by Bitcoin 
technology, to ensure the exploration of trust across all the Bitcoin stakeholders (Sas 
& Khairuddin, 2015). The framework places Bitcoin technology at its centre and 
highlights how different stakeholders are involved in shaping the three different 
levels of trust. The study defines technological trust as people’s trust in Bitcoin 
technology as experienced before, during, and after engaging in online transactions. 
This could include users’ trust that their Bitcoin account is secured and cannot be 
hacked or payees’ trust that the transfer is authorised.  
Social trust is the trust that Bitcoin stakeholders develop with each other. This 
trust is enlisted for each type of exchange occurring across (and within) different 
categories of stakeholders. For example, transactions involving the purchase of 
goods enlist trust between users and merchants. Upon completion, these transactions 
require miners’ authorisation, so both users and merchants need to trust the miners 
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for completing their job. At the same time, selfish miners can raise issues of trust 
among miners (Eyal & Sirer, 2014). Social trust between users/merchants and 
exchanges can be also problematic. This study argues that because of its 
decentralised nature, the classic definition of institutional trust does not apply to 
Bitcoin. However, there is a higher authoring to which Bitcoin technology is 
requested to be accountable, namely governmental institutions. The study defines 
institutional trust, the trust of governmental institutions in Bitcoin technology. The 
main issues here are related to money laundry and deflation. 
2.3.2.1 Applying the Framework to Identify Trust Challenges  
The study now explores how the framework can be applied to identify 
important trust issues which deserve stronger HCI engagement. It should be noted 
that there is limited empirical work exploring the experience of using Bitcoin and 
the issues of trust surrounding it. The study starts by describing the Bitcoin 
stakeholders, grouped by (Shcherbak, 2014) in four categories: users, miners, 
exchanges, and merchants. Users are people who use Bitcoin to buy goods and 
services from Bitcoin merchants. Merchants are businesses which accept Bitcoins 
as a medium of exchange for goods and services and are connected to the Bitcoin 
network. Exchanges are the providers of online trading platforms where the 
registered members can exchange their Bitcoins for traditional currency and vice 
versa. Miners are those Bitcoin stakeholders who can record transactions (and 





Figure 2.2: Research Framework for Exploring Levels of Trust in Bitcoin Technology 
(left) and across Stakeholders Groups (right) (Sas and Khairuddin, 2015) 
 
 Users’ Trust in Bitcoin  
One specific challenge pertaining to users is their limited knowledge of how 
Bitcoin technology works and how they need to protect their Bitcoins. Keeping 
Bitcoins on one’s computer involves security risks similar to keeping large sums 
of cash in one’s physical wallet (Bitcoin Wiki, n.d.). Although Bitcoin is 
decentralised and at large has no single point of failure, it is nevertheless 
susceptible to forms of denial of service or double-spending attacks (Karame et 
al., 2014). 
  
 Miners’ and Exchanges Trust in Bitcoin  
There is a limited exploration of trust challenges faced by these stakeholders. 
However, exchanges are crucial in gaining users’ and merchants’ trust, and at 
large the social trust within the Bitcoin system. For example, exchanges have no 
audit process and no verification procedures (Talk, 2010). Equally, although each 
transaction should be digitally signed and secure after being verified by an 
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unknown miner, there has been a limited exploration into mechanisms concerning 
miners’ competence and integrity. Recent work has shown that the reward 
structure which incentivises miners to contribute to the system and its 
decentralised nature, can motivate some miners to circumvent the Bitcoin 
protocol and mine selfishly at the cost of honest miners (Eyal & Sirer, 2014). This 
suggests that issues of trust can also develop within the same stakeholder 
category.  
 
 Merchants’ Trust in Bitcoin  
Merchants’ trust is challenged by their limited knowledge about buyers, and 
whether their payment will be received in time or at all (Shcherbak, 2014). They 
also lack the ability to track reliable buyers with whom they have previously 
engaged in positive transactions.  
 
 Governments’ Trust in Bitcoin  
Bitcoin is a protocol promoted as the first peer-to-peer institution, offering an 
alternative to central banks (Abramowitz, 2014). It has been argued that the 
demand for peer-to-peer transactions can be an indication of  the development of 
trust in Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008). In this context, it is useful to revisit the main 
components of peer-to-peer governances as a mechanism for institutional trust in 
Bitcoin: arbitration, trust, bank, business association, and public law. For 
example, peer-to-peer protocols can offer structure through a set of rules for 
controlling the Bitcoin technology. The peer-to-peer protocol can also be used by 
governments to develop a structured legal framework for Bitcoin technology. In 
peer-to-peer decision making, arbitration is one way to resolve disputes 
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(Thornburg, 2012). If peer-to-peer arbitration is able to serve decisions, then it 
could also serve as the foundation for peer-to-peer trust. It would be beneficial for 
the trustee to be able to invest deposited Bitcoins to grow their trust corpus 
(Abramowitz, 2014). However, the challenge in cryptocurrency is there is no 
mechanism allowing such accounts to own virtual assets. In order to own the 
assets, there is a need for an intermediary link between the virtual and the real 
world. Indeed a cryptocurrency bank may able to establish this connection. If the 
peer-to-peer bank is able to accept bank funds, make investment decisions, and 
approve expenditures, then peer-to-peer decision making can be used to operate 
the peer-to-peer business association (Abramowitz, 2014). A significant obstacle 
to private peer-to-peer institutions is government hostility (Abramowitz, 2014). 
Despite lacking trust, peer-to-peer systems can yet produce decisions with a high 
degree of consensus. This limited form of decision-making inherent in Bitcoin 
technology could serve as a foundation for more sophisticated types of decision-
making mechanisms, allowing legal institutions to be created without the 
designation of a central authority.  
 Section Summary 2.3.3
The research framework has shown that the challenges of trust are pervasive, 
affecting all Bitcoin stakeholders, albeit in different ways. They are also 
interdependent, as distinct user groups may have conflicting goals. Not least, some 
trust challenges are hidden, i.e., miners’ activities are seldom open for scrutiny. The 
study argues that a user-centred approach to the exploration of trust can shed light 
into the challenges experienced by people using Bitcoin. This is radically different 
than the current algorithmic approach to trust in Bitcoin. Research supported by this 
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framework can also open up novel design opportunities to address the identified 
challenges and support trust. For example, one can imagine a new class of 
interactive technologies where trust is captured, materialised and gained or lost 
through exchanges. This new design space for decentralised interactive 
cryptocurrency technologies may not only support better adoption of Bitcoin 
technology, but also the digital currency economy at large.  
 Blockchain Technology 2.4
As a public ledger, Blockchain is known as a transparent system. Each machine 
connected to the Blockchain can download a full copy of the ledger, allowing for 
browsing or querying the global history of transactions as well as the remaining balance 
of the Bitcoins left in each wallet address (Swan, 2015). Since it no longer requires trust 
in third-party entities to keep the ledger, Blockchain technology has been called trustless. 
In Nakamoto’s view (Nakamoto, 2008), the concepts of irreversible transactions and 
trust are strongly coupled. The Blockchain aims to address the key weakness of the 
traditional trust-based model where financial institutions act as trusted third parties to 
mediate e-payments. Bank transactions, however, are costly both in time and fees (Raul 
Carrillo, 2015). In contrast, Blockchain was intended to eliminate this middle link and its 
higher cost. 
Another important aspect of Blockchain is protecting the privacy of the parties involved 
in Bitcoin transactions (Swan, 2015). Similar functionality is available in the banking 
system, in which privacy is ensured by limiting access to transaction information to the 
involved parties and the bank. However, the protection of privacy in Blockchain is even 
stronger, since it does not require any personally identifiable information to allow users 
to engage in Bitcoin transactions. This makes the Blockchain pseudoanonymous 
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(Caetano, 2015): the wallet address is public while the identity of its owner is not 
(Nakamoto, 2008). However, the pseudoanonymous nature of Blockchain technology 
leaves it open to misuse on the online black market such as the Silk Road, with negative 
consequences for Blockchain’s reputation (Crosby, Nachiappan, Pattanayak, Verma, & 
Kalyanaraman, 2016). Nevertheless, the Blockchain application has moved beyond 
Bitcoin and cryptocurrency. The unique decentralised platform offered by Blockchain 
has attracted plenty of multi corporations (Chen, 2014) to adopt the technology to be 
applied in various fields such as in medical, real estate and copyright management 
applications (Ekblaw et al., 2016; Elsden et al., 2018; Karamitsos et al., 2018).  
 Bitcoin Blockchain Protocol  2.4.1
The Blockchain protocol is known to be very complicated and complex, as it 
challenges understandings of the traditional banking system or other payment 
systems that are centralised and regulated. The protocol is associated with several 
entities and different functions which are described in this following section.  
2.4.1.1 Bitcoin Wallet 
In creating a Bitcoin transaction, the first thing needed is the Bitcoin wallet for 
both the sender and receiver. Similar to physical ordinary wallets which can hold 
several credit and debit cards, Bitcoin wallets also consist of several pairs of 
public and private keys that hold the Bitcoins (Latifa, Kiram, & Ahemed, 2017). 
The private key is hidden by the Bitcoin wallet, though it can be printed in a 
physical form as a backup for the owner. It is the responsibility of the wallet’s 
owner to not disclose the private key to anyone and to keep it safe (Caetano, 
2015). It is because it is not possible to retrieve the Bitcoins in the wallet if 
someone lost the private key. Meanwhile, the public key is used to generate the 
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Bitcoin address through a cryptographic hashing algorithm (Caetano, 2015). Just 
like an email address, public key and Bitcoin address are the main identity for the 
user to receive Bitcoins from the sender.  
2.4.1.2 Enacting Bitcoin Transaction 
 In order to create a transaction, firstly the sender needs to specify all current 
Bitcoin addresses of the wallet owner (some wallets consist of more than one 
address) and the receiver’s wallet address and the owner’s own wallet address 
(Antonopoulos, 2010). The owner needs to send all Bitcoins in his wallet by 
specifying the number of Bitcoins to be sent to the receiver’s wallet address, the 
mining fee and the balance of the Bitcoins to be sent back to his own wallet 
address. Then, this transaction needs to be digitally signed or encrypted by the 
sender’s private key. The public key is used to decrypt the transaction or to verify 
the signature (Caetano, 2015). 
Once the transaction is signed or encrypted, it will be sent for a verification to 
the full nodes (Caetano, 2015) to ensure that it meets the validity guidelines of the 
consensus rules for inclusion in a new block, i.e., to verify the signature by 
ensuring the private and public key are matched and checked the size of the 
transaction (Caetano, 2015). If the transaction has fulfilled the requirements of 
the consensus rules, the transaction will be broadcast and sent to the memory pool 
together with other unconfirmed transactions (Caetano, 2015). 
2.4.1.3 Bitcoin Mining 
From the memory pool, the unconfirmed transactions will be collected and put 
in a new block. This block can hold up to 1 MB of transactions (Abramowitz, 
2014; Caetano, 2015; Swan, 2015). The selection of the unconfirmed transactions 
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to be included in a new block is based on the highest mining fee provided by the 
sender. This block will be processed by the miners in the network by using their 
computational power to solve the complex mathematical algorithm (Abramowitz, 
2014; Caetano, 2015; Swan, 2015). The miners work to solve the block by using 
the hash function to generate a hash result. If the result is invalid, a nonce will be 
added to the block’s data set and the data set will be hashed again by the miner 
using a different hash until it matches the target considered the solution.  
The solution is broadcast to the network as a new block which also contains 
the difficulty target and the winning nonce (Abramowitz, 2014; Caetano, 2015; 
Swan, 2015). This is called proof-of-work. The other miner in the network will 
use the broadcasted solution to recompute the hash on the new block to verify the 
proof-of-work (Abramowitz, 2014; Caetano, 2015; Swan, 2015). Once the 
solution has been verified by the network, the winning miner sends the solved 
block back to the full nodes to check against the consensus, such as to ensure 
there are no double-spending Bitcoins in the transaction (Caetano, 2015). Finally, 
once the block is validated, it will be publicly recorded in the Blockchain ledger.  
2.4.1.4 Mining reward 
Once a new block is successfully recorded on the public ledger, the winning 
miner is rewarded with 12.5 Bitcoins. The number of rewards are halved in every 
four years. This process is named as halving which the algorithm created reflects 
the scarcity properties of Bitcoins, whose total supply of 21 million will be 
completed by 2140 (Donnelly, 2016). The winning miners are also rewarded with 
transaction fees, albeit these are covered not by the Blockchain system, but by the 
transaction parties (Caetano, 2015; Swan, 2015). 
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 Security Research on Mining-related Threats 2.4.2
Most work on mining’s trust challenges has taken place in the security research 
area, and focused on the risk of an entity owning a large share of a network’s 
computational power. The threat of 51% attack occurs when a group owns over 
50% of the computational power of the whole Blockchain network, and is, 
therefore, able to behave dishonestly by performing changes to the protocol or the 
public ledger’s records (Carroll & Bellotti, 2015; Latifa et al., 2017). The other 
threat is 25% or selfish miners’ attack which occurs when miners work on their 
proof-of-work without releasing the solutions publicly until theirs is the longest 
(Antonopoulos, 2010; Cawrey, 2014; Eyal & Sirer, 2014; Torpey, 2015). There are 
also arguments that selfish miners need at least 25% (Eyal & Sirer, 2014), or even 
50% of a network’s computational power (Cawrey, 2014; Torpey, 2015). 
 The Comparison between Bitcoin and Ethereum Blockchain Ledger 2.4.3
Trust in a decentralised ledger involves two main mechanisms: the security 
protocol and consensus (Salomaa, 1996). Firstly, the security protocol mechanism is 
related to the public cryptographic key representing the encryption scheme that uses 
two mathematically related, but not identical keys – a public and private key 
(Salomaa, 1996). These keys are to prove that the created transaction is 
authenticated and validated (Salomaa, 1996). Secondly, the consensus mechanism 
aims to ensure the validity and consistency of the newly created record (Stevens, 
2018). Both mechanisms are applied in Blockchain technology (Ray, Ventresca, & 
Wan, 2018). 
Blockchain was introduced in 2008 and described as a technology component 
underlying the Bitcoin cryptocurrency (Nakamoto, 2008). However, later people 
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started to look at Blockchain beyond Bitcoin by expanding the protocols and the 
architecture of the Blockchain. Today, there are more than 1000 cryptocurrencies 
available in the market, led by Bitcoin and followed by Ethereum (Coin Market 
Cap, 2019a). Both Bitcoin and Ethereum Blockchains are supported by the 
decentralised and distributed ledger, and the records in the ledger are 
cryptographically chained together. However, both cryptocurrencies were created 
with different aims.  
2.4.3.1 Usages and Capabilities 
The Bitcoin Blockchain was developed with the aim of serving as a peer-to-
peer electronic cash system, enabling an online payment system for the 
community. Bitcoin allows people to send money without using a centralised 
payment system such as the banking system. Although there are studies to 
explore the methods to expand the Bitcoin Blockchain capabilities by inserting 
other arbitrary data including images, the current Bitcoin Blockchain still remains 
to only hold Bitcoin transactions (Sward, Vecna, & Forrest, 2018).  
In contrast, the Etherum Blockchain is an open software platform that was 
built in the decentralised Blockchain technology, which allows the developers to 
build and deploy decentralised applications (Buterin, 2013a). Unlike Bitcoin 
Blockchain, the Etherum Blockchain enables the recording of multiple types of 
arbitrary data (Buterin, 2013a). This allows the developers to store the 
decentralised applications, also known as a smart contract in the Etherum 
Blockchain (Vujicic, Jagodic, & Randic, 2018). 
A smart contract is a decentralised way for people to make a transparent 
exchange for either money, real estate or anything that is valuable (Hertig, 2018; 
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Karamitsos et al., 2018). An exchange in the smart contract can be conducted in a 
conflict-free way, at the same time avoiding the service of a middleman. Each 
executed contract will be permanently stored in the form of a digital token on the 
Ethereum Blockchain (Buterin, 2013a). The Etherum technology has been 
applied in many sectors including finance, healthcare, and supply chains (Bocek, 
Rodrigues, Strasser, & Stiller, 2017; Ekblaw et al., 2016; Singh & Singh, 2016). 
2.4.3.2 Cryptocurrency 
The Bitcoin Blockchain cryptocurrency is known as Bitcoin. The Blockchain 
acts as the ledger containing the historical records of all Bitcoin transactions that 
ever occurred in the network (Nakamoto, 2008). This is similar to the Etherum 
Blockchain, but the cryptocurrency is known as Ether (Buterin, 2013a).  Ether is 
also used by people on the network to pay mining fees for smart contract 
execution on the Etherum Blockchain. 
2.4.3.3 Mining Works 
The mining protocols for Bitcoin and Ether are almost the same. Both require 
miners to solve a complex mathematical puzzle by working on the proof-of-work  
in order to record the new block on the Blockchain. There is only one miner who 
will be the winner for each block (Acheson, 2007; Swan, 2015). As for Bitcoins, 
each winning miner will receive Bitcoin as reward for their work, and the current 
amount of reward is 12.5 Bitcoins (Donnelly, 2016). The time for the miner to 
record a new block on Bitcoin Blockchain is approximately 10 minutes for each 
block (Acheson, 2007; Swan, 2015). 
In comparison, the winning Ether miner for each block in Ethereum 
Blockchain will receive 2 Ether as a reward (Ogono, 2018) together with the gas 
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fees provided for the transactions of the block. The gas fee is also known as a 
transaction fee for each executed transaction on Etherum network. Each user 
needs to  include sufficient gas fees to cover the miner’s computational resources 
used for the executed transaction to avoid the out of gas error (Buterin, 2013a). 
Just like Bitcoin, the highest gas fee provided has more opportunity to be selected 
from the memory pool. However, the time taken to record a new block in 
Etherum Blockchain is much faster compared to Bitcoin, i.e., around 12-15 
seconds (Buterin, 2013a). 
2.4.3.4 Multisignature technology 
A standard cryptocurrency transaction in Blockchain requires only one 
signature of the owner of the private key that is associated with the public key or 
a Bitcoin address (Nakamoto, 2008). This is known as a single signature. In 
contrast, multisignature technology requires more than one key or signature to 
authorise the transaction, which in turn makes the transaction safer and secure. 
This normally involves more than one user in a transaction, often referred to as 
M-of-N transaction (Davenport, 2015). The multisignature transactions require 
cooperation and agreement of more than one person in order to proceed with a 
transaction. The multisignature can be in either between 2 persons (1-of-2 or 2-
of-2) or, to avoid any disputes, the transaction can also involve a third or more 
persons (2-of-3 or 3-of-5) (Davenport, 2015). Bitcoin network does support 
transactions that require the signatures of multiple people before the Bitcoins can 
be transferred. There are several Bitcoin wallets that support multisignature 
technology such as Armory, Electrum, Copay, and BitGo (Khatwani, 2018). 
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However, compared to Ethereum, the Bitcoin multisignature scheme is more 
rigid. In other words, if the transactions are signed by all required signatures, then 
it will be broadcasted to the network, but if it is not, then the transactions will 
remain in the wallet (Miller, 2017). An additional advantage of Etherum 
multisignature includes allowing the transaction to be in 3 attributes which are the 
binary outcome, restricted functionality, and creation finality. The binary 
outcome means that the transaction can be either accepted or failed immediately. 
Restricted functionality allows the wallet to make the transaction, but it does not 
have any authority to move beyond that. In addition, the Etherum multisignature 
allows the creation of finality that enables the developer to create a parameter and 
seal it in a smart contract (Miller, 2017). Thus, the transaction in the 
multisignature wallet can be automatically executed based on the parameters or 
rules that had been identified by the owners in the multisignature wallet. 
 Section Summary 2.4.4
To conclude, Blockchain technology and its mining protocol have been 
purposefully designed as decentralised, transparent, and unregulated. While these 
contribute to its trust, they also raise risks and challenges when a mining pool 
acquires the majority of computational power to control the Blockchain. There is 
however a limited empirical work exploring Blockchain’s characteristics and their 
impact on miners’ trust through qualitative fieldwork. 
 Mental Model in HCI 2.5
In HCI research, the mental model concept has been used to describe a cognitive 
mechanism for representing and making inferences about a system or problem which the 
user builds as they interact with, and learn about the system (Borgman, 1999). The 
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historical findings by  Craik (Craik, 1943) suggest that mental models offer ways for 
humans to translate physical interactions into their internal representations. This 
definition has become the main reference for further exploration of the mental model 
concepts. For example, Young (Young, 1981) defines mental models as human 
assumptions needed to create the mental representations of a system, in order to assist 
people to understand the system activities. Another view advanced by Clarke (Clarke, 
1988) in his three-level human-computer interface model argues that the human 
intuition, creativity, strategy, conation, and memory are the important mental functions 
for designing a system interface. 
From Norman’s seminal work (Norman, 1990) distinguishing between a designer’s 
and user’s mental model capturing how the system is designed, or understood to work, 
much HCI research (Borgman, 1999) has shown the value of such models in supporting 
system learning  (Kieras & Bovair, 1964), problem-solving  (Klemmer, Li, Lin, & 
Landay, 2004), increased system’s efficiency (Staggers & Norcio, 1993) or accuracy 
(Larkin, 1983). Previous findings indicate that mental models support the users’ learning 
of complex devices which in turn allows for increased task performance (Fein, Olson, & 
Olson, 1993), an effect which is stronger for novice users (Staggers & Norcio, 1993). 
The distinction between novices’ and experts’ mental model is an important one, with 
consistent findings indicating that the latter is more accurate, complex, and abstract 
(Diesessa, 1981; Doane, 1982; Greeno, 1983) enabling a deeper understanding of the 
inner working of a system rather than merely how it can be used. In addition, a wealth of 
findings has shown that people have limited mental models of technological systems, 
such as personal or home technologies, including appliances (Caillot & Nguyen-Xuan, 
1995; Doane, 1982; Kieras & Bovair, 1964) or energy monitors (Sas & Neustaedter, 
2017). Such systems tend to be operated from superficial functional models rather than 
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structural ones. Other studies suggest that abstract concepts are particularly challenging 
to grasp as they lack materiality or visibility (Fischer, 2008; Pierce & Paulos, 2012b, 
2012a). While much of previous work focused on mental models of interactive systems 
(Borgman, 1999) learning environment (Kieras & Bovair, 1964) or complex home 
technologies (Sas & Neustaedter, 2017), less work explored the mental models of large-
scale distributed systems or technological infrastructures such as Blockchain. Current 
attempts to communicate mental models of how Blockchain works include mostly non-
interactive visual representations, be they static such as infographics (Cartwright, 2018) 
or dynamic such as videos (The Guardian, 2014). Many of these representations have 
been developed in the private sector with a limited reflection on the analogies they aim 
to support. 
 A noticeable example of materialising the Blockchain and communicating its mental 
models through objects involved LEGO blocks, which both experts and novices may use 
to describe their understanding (Maxwell, Speed, & Campbell, 2015). Unlike 
commercial visual representation, such physical materialisation of Blockchain is 
interactive, allowing people to touch and move the Lego blocks in order to simulate 
interactions on the Blockchain. However, given the complexity of Blockchain 
infrastructure, this study argues for more specific objects rather than generic Lego 
blocks. A purposeful design of the kit and its objects which would more explicitly reflect 
the main properties of Blockchain’s key entities, both in terms of their appearance and 
affordances for interaction, could allow stronger and more embodied engagement.  
 Physical Interaction 2.5.1
Mental models have been externalised in various of ways, from text, diagrams 
(Hegarty & Just, 1993), or animations (Lowe & Boucheix, 2008) to physical three-
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dimensional models (Johnson-Laird, 2004). One way to explore a user’s mental 
model is through a tangible user interface (TUI): the everyday physical objects and 
environment that has been used to describe the digital information (Ishii & Ullmer, 
1997). Ishii and Ulmer (Ishii & Ullmer, 1997) described tangible interaction as 
giving physical form to digital information and its subsequent physical control. 
Their research focused on developing a new landscape of human, tangible 
interaction, from the Graphical User Interface (GUI) to Tangible User Interface 
(TUI). Previous research on GUI suggested a metaphor for a desktop computer 
workstation, with several HCI design principles that enable people to interact with 
the computer by using the mouse, windows, icons and property sheet (Ishii & 
Ullmer, 1997; Lowe & Boucheix, 2008). 
Today, the GUI is widely used by Microsoft Windows (Microsoft, 2018). 
However, Ishii and Ulmer (Ishii & Ullmer, 1997) argued that the implementation of 
GUI screens limits the human skills in manipulating and interacting with the 
physical worlds which are supposed to be beyond the screen, windows, and 
keyboard. Hence, he suggested TUI, which aims to customize each application from 
the physical to the digital world. The basic concept of TUI design is the input and 
output, or control and representation (Ishii & Ullmer, 1997). For example, Ishii and 
Ulmer (Ishii & Ullmer, 1997) introduced the Tangible Bits that consists of three 
elements: interactive surfaces (e.g. wall, doors and ceiling), graspable objects (e.g. 
cards, books and models), and ambient media (e.g. sound, light and water) to 
represent the respective digital concepts of virtual space, digital information, and the 
background of cyberspace that indulges the human perception. One example is 
Clearboard which integrated shared drawing and interpersonal space for users to 
work simultaneously on design, regardless of their geographical location. The 
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interaction between the users of this device has transformed the concept of a passive 
structured “wall” into a new vision of architectural space whose all surfaces 
including walls, ceiling, and windows as active surfaces enabling people to interact 
in both real and virtual worlds (Ishii & Ullmer, 1997). 
Later, Fishkin (Fishkin, 2004) adopted Ishii and Ulmer’s TUI theory (Ishii & 
Ullmer, 1997) and developed the TUI taxonomy as guidance for the tangible user 
interface design. The framework has two axes, which are the embodiment and 
metaphors. The embodiment describes the distance of the input and output of a 
system and how the users manipulate it. There are four characteristics of 
embodiment. The first is known as full, in which the output of a device is actually 
the input of a device. This can be seen in the application “Sketchpad” where 
whatever user writes or draws is also the display of the work (Fishkin, 2004). The 
second is nearby, the output is near to the input, as shown  in the light pen. The third 
is environmental, where the output is around the user. For instance, the audio sound 
is the output of the music player, and the fourth is distant, where the output is far 
and input will be used to control the output, such as in the concepts of television and 
its remote control (Fishkin, 2004). The other axes of the framework are the 
metaphors which consist of five elements such as none to explain the object that 
does not have a specific metaphor, noun as the analogy that is based on shape, look, 
or sound of an object, verb as the analogy of the action or movement being 
performed (Fishkin & P., 2004). The metaphors of noun and verb can also be 
combined to describe an analogy, and lastly is full, in which there are no metaphors 
because the virtual system is built based on the physical system (Fishkin, 2004). 
However, Hornecker and Buur (Hornecker & Buur, 2006) argued against Ishii 
and Ulmer’s theory on TUI by stating that tangible interaction is not only about 
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controlling digital data through tangible appliances but also as remote control of the 
real world through the user interface design. They placed the tangible interaction in 
a larger design space, in a broad range of systems and interfaces through exploiting 
the richness of bodily movements relying on embodied interaction, tangible 
manipulation and physical representation of data, embeddedness in real spaces and 
digitally augmented physical spaces (Bongers, 2002; Buur, Jensen, & 
Djajadiningrat, 2004) . To support these arguments, they developed a framework to 
explore the tangible interaction through four different perspectives (Hornecker & 
Buur, 2006): 
 tangible manipulation refers to the material representations with distinct 
tactile qualities, which are typically physically manipulated in tangible 
interaction 
 spatial interaction refers to the fact that tangible interaction is embedded in 
real space and interaction, therefore, occurs by movement in space 
 embodied facilitation highlights how the configuration of material objects 
and space affects and directs emerging group behaviour 
 expressive representation focuses on the material and digital representations 
employed by tangible interaction systems, their expressiveness, and 
legibility 
In the light of these TUI and tangible interaction theories, HCI researchers could 
capture and communicate mental models through interaction design concepts, 
including sketches (Shaer & Jacob, 2009), storyboards (Truong, 2006), conceptual 
designs (Benyon, 2013) and more recently through physical prototyping kits such as 
Arduino, integrating computational power in physical devices that people can 
physically interact with and move in space (Greenberg & Fitchett, 2001; Hartmann 
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et al., 2006). One such landmark example is the marble answering machine where 
the marbles, placed in a dish are mapped to recorded messages or missed calls 
(Bishop & Durrell, 2009). However, there are limitations in terms of using a 
standard set of vocabularies to communicate the metaphors of physical interaction 
design and mental models. 
 Embodiment in HCI 2.5.2
Embodiment typically refers to people being living, feeling, bodily entities 
situated in a physical world (Marshall & Necker, 2013). It also described an 
important theory exploring bodily interactions with behaviour-responsive, adaptive 
architecture which integrates the body, cognition and physical world. Due to this 
universal understanding of the role of the body for cognition, it has been applied in 
many disciplines including sociology and HCI (Dalton, Zeidman, McCormick, & 
Maguire, 2018), 
In embodied cognition theory, Dalton, et al. (Dalton et al., 2018) described 
how the mind and the body work separately. This understanding has been used in 
the computationalism which interprets the brain as a computer machine and 
embodiment as part of the cognitive system. However, phenomenologists rejected 
this prior theory and redefined it as cognition emerging from the embodiment and 
more important with the involvement of the active body in the world,  through both 
physical objects and social interactions (Marshall & Necker, 2013). The latter 
concept of phenomenology has been widely applied in embodied cognitive science.  
An interesting concept derived from embodied cognition theory is image 
schemata: the representations of repeated dynamic patterns of physical interactions 
structured in the way people understand the world  (Hurtienne, 2009). There are 
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over 30 groups of image schemas (Hampe & Grady, 2005; Lakoff, 1987). One of it 
is containment that describes the image schemes of a container, in and out, content, 
full, empty and surface. The metaphors associated with image schemata create links 
between the target and source domain, i.e., “more is up” linking quantity with 
verticality (Lakoff, 1987) which can also be explored through linguistic analysis, as 
previously applied to the design of tangible interfaces (Hurtienne, 2009).  
 DIY Kit Representation of Mental Model 2.5.3
Over the last decade, there has been a growing HCI interest in design kits 
including those for the making of physical objects (Kuznetsov & Paulos, 2010) 
making of sensors (Kuznetsov et al., 2011), as well as the making of both low 
(Kuznetsov & Paulos, 2010) and high-tech devices (Lakoff, 1987). Such kits consist 
of the collection of basic components, electronics or non-electronics such as paper, 
or cards, which people can interact with to simulate interaction or to assemble them 
into an artefact. Much of this work has focused on low tech artefacts (S Kuznetsov 
et al., 2014), with much less research exploring the making of high tech one (Sas & 
Neustaedter, 2017), or the understanding of infrastructures, i.e., through Lego 
blocks (Maxwell et al., 2015). Framed under the DIY umbrella term, most such 
findings suggest that people enjoy working with their hands in the making of 
artefacts (Sas & Neustaedter, 2017). In order to be effective, physical design kits 
should allow for analogies between the models that can be built using them, i.e., 
assembled representations of the system, and what they model, i.e., the system 
(Hardy & Alexander, 2012). One useful approach to the development of such 
physical kits is the material-centred design framework consisting of four 
dimensions: materials, details, texture, and wholeness (Wiberg & Mikael, 2014). 
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Hardy and Alexander (Hardy & Alexander, 2012) outlined the design 
requirement for a DIY toolkit, which firstly is the design toolkit should match the 
current hardware or software as well as support the interactivity, content, geometries 
in various system life span. Secondly, the kit should also be supported by the 
abstraction of the display. For instance the surfaces of the physical object and the 
desired project display such as a door, table, and walls. The suitableness and ease of 
abstraction are significant for the user to communicate and demonstrate the design 
kit and for the researcher to capture their mental modes. The toolkit can be designed 
as software, hardware, or a physical representation (Hardy & Alexander, 2012). 
Hardy and Alexander (Hardy & Alexander, 2012) applied these design 
requirements in their UbiDisplay, design toolkit which is an interactive surface 
using projection and a depth camera that can be used by users to get the idea to 
program in ubiquitous projection. Another example of the DIY toolkit was designed 
by Muszynska, Michels, and Zezschwitz (Muszynska, Michels, & Zezschwitz, 
2018) to explore the user’s mental model towards the privacy permission request on 
mobile phones. They designed a physical kit based on the physical embodiment of 
data type approach to support their research aim. They materialised the data on the 
typical smartphone into a DIY kit based on the physical embodiment of data type 
through permission cards, boxes, also info-cards and label those as x, y, and z and 
conducted a focus group study using those materials. The findings indicate that the 
materialisation contributed to the non-experts understanding of a complex topic of 
personal data privacy.  
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2.5.3.1 Material Exploration 
Wiberg (Wiberg & Mikael, 2014) proposed a framework for the material-
centred interaction design method (Figure 2.3), which could be used to inform 
the design of a physical representation or DIY kit. There are four interrelated 
dimensions in his framework: materials, details, texture, and wholeness. 
 
Figure 2.3: Framework for the material-centred interaction design 
method (Wiberg & Mikael, 2014) 
First is to focus on the selection of materials to represent the system. There are 
two elements associated with materials. The first is to have an in-depth 
understanding of the properties’ of the materials in order to ensure that these can 
properly demonstrate the system function and further support the system design 
(Wiberg & Mikael, 2014). The other is the materials’ character which describes 
the functionality of each material in the system flow. The craftsmanship of the 
materials to visualize the system is also significant. Second is to focus on the 
wholeness to ensure that the composition of the materials is able to provide 
support for digital exploration, and for the interpretation of the meaning of the 
material artefact and how it matches the real function of the system (Jung & 
Stolterman, 2012). The third is to focus on the texture, which communicates the 
appearance of the material properties such as the surface. The appearance of the 
texture is important in order to show the look and the feel of the compost 















their composition, as well as appearance so that digital systems can be 
represented by normal objects of everyday life.  
The framework also highlights the importance of focusing on the details of the 
implementation of the designed materials from the materials’ selection, 
arrangement, composition until the analysis.  
Section Summary: The exploration of users’ mental models through the 
concepts of physical interaction and embodiment could be achieved through the 
development of a DIY kit. This method is valuable to materialise the complex 
Blockchain infrastructure and Bitcoin cryptocurrency in the form of physical 
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The methodology adopted for this thesis is qualitative research. In order to understand 
the routines of Bitcoin stakeholders as well as to identify their trust challenges in using 
Bitcoins, the interview method was employed. Then, based on the identified trust 
challenges, BlocKit, a physical Blockchain kit was built to explore the opportunities to 
design for Bitcoin trust.  The BlocKit was employed in a participatory workshop with 
experienced Bitcoin Blockchain users. The outcomes of this  workshop consisted of a set 
of principles to design for Bitcoin trust, later used to inform the design of an algorithm 
as well as a mock-up prototype for the Bitcoin wallet app (BitXFps) embedding  trust in 
Bitcoin peer-to-peer transactions. Those algorithms and app were evaluated by 
experienced Bitcoin Blockchain users under the framework of trust. Descriptions of each 
employed method are further detailed in this chapter.  
 Research Paradigm in HCI  3.2
Kuhn (Kuhn et al., 1970) defined a research paradigm as a specific way to represent the 
cognitive work to be shared by the scientists while solving problems in their own fields, 
as well as their commitments, beliefs, or values. Additionally, Schwandt (Schwandt, 
2001) described research paradigm as a shared world view that represents the beliefs and 
values in disciplines and guides how problems are solved. There are four important 
elements in HCI research paradigms that are interdependent and grounded in deeper 
common conceptualisations as described below (Kuhn et al., 1970): 
 the common understanding of the salient properties of interaction  
 types of questions that appear to be both interesting and answerable about those 
properties of interaction 
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 a set of broad procedures which can be used to provide warrantable answers to 
those questions  
 a common understanding of how to interpret the results of these procedures 
 this set of elements is designed into two common research paradigms which are 
positivism and interpretivism 
 Positivism versus Interpretivism 3.2.1
Positivism is described as a structured research work which generalises the 
empirical findings by replicating the methods and measurements from prior work 
(Chilisa & Kawulich, 2015). Positivist researchers’ works are underlying the set of 
theoretical propositions or hypotheses to be tested through the analysis of empirical 
data. The aim of the research is to produce an exact representation of reality, 
unbiased and value-free (Chilisa & Kawulich, 2015). However, Eklundh and Lantz 
(Eklundh & Lantz, n.d.) argued that in HCI, positivism is about analysing human as 
an object by ignoring the human differences. There are needs and preferences of 
human beings as end-users that need to be understood about how they used the 
technology as a tool in their daily task rather than focusing on the technical 
characteristics of the technology (Gay & Hembrooke, 2004).  
In contrast, an interpretivist research paradigm is known as anti-positivism, 
and it is commonly related to human studies which aim for understanding and 
explaining processes rather than objective facts (Tharakan, 2006). In HCI, the aim 
of interpretivism is to understand and describe human nature in interaction with 
technology. Interpretivist approaches are subjective and constructed through the 
researcher's interpretations and study of participants (De Villiers, 2005). This 
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research paradigm is applicable to studies related to complex human being or other 
social phenomena (De Villiers, 2005). 
These two research paradigms can also be contrasted. While positivism 
research is conducted to test hypotheses, interpretivism investigates research 





While positivism more commonly employs quantitative methods, the subjective 
aspect of interpretivism research makes it a suitable paradigm for qualitative 
methods (Goldkuhl, 2012).  In addition, while the reliability of positivist research is 
measured by statistical tests, the reliability of interpretivist research is estimated 
based on the accuracy with which the findings reflect the natural settings or people’s 





, 2015). Table 3.1 further describes the comparisons 
between positivism and interpretivism (Pizam, Chon, & Mansfeld, 1999). 
 
Assumptions Positivism Interpretivism 
Nature of reality Objective, tangible, single Socially constructed, 
multiple 




Focus of research What is the general average 
and representative 
What is specific, unique and 
deviant 
Knowledge generated Laws absolute (time, 
context and value-free) 
Meaning relative (time 




Rigid separation Interactive, cooperative, 
participative 
Desired information How many people think a 
specific thing or have a 
specific problem 
What some people think 
and do, what kind of 
problems they are 
confronted with, and how 
they deal with them 
Table 3.1: The basic differences between positivism and interpretivism (Pizam, Chon, & 
Mansfeld, 1999)  
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 Research Method 3.3
There are several research methods applied within and beyond the positivism and 
interpretivism that are described in this section. 
 Quantitative versus Qualitative   3.3.1
Amongst social scientists, the debate on the significance and applicability of 
quantitative and qualitative research methods have been longstanding (Bryman, 
1984). These arguments reflected the pros and cons of both methods, and also 
emphasised their suitability for different types of studies and research paradigms 
(Bryman, 1984). Positivism is commonly conducted in the quantitative research 
method to test pre-determined research hypotheses (De Villiers, 2005). However, in 
human study and interactions with technology particularly in the context of trust in 
Bitcoin transactions, it is less appropriate to generate hypotheses regarding human 
behaviour . In HCI research, quantitative methods are useful for measuring the 
usability of the system or for comparing the use of different types of technology or 
interfaces (Cairns & Cox, 2008). There are several quantitative research methods, 
such as those for theorem proving, mathematical modelling and simulation, 
controlled experiments, field experiments, quasi-experiments and testing (Figure 
3.2). The data analysis techniques for quantitative methods often involve statistics, 
and there are two types of statistical analysis associated with quantitative research 
which are descriptive and inferential statistics (Elst, 2013). Descriptive statistics are 
used to describe the basic features of the data in a study that enable researchers to 
understand the data (Elst, 2013). In contrast, inferential statistics allow an in-depth 
understanding of the data to decide on the pre-determined hypotheses to be tested in 
subsequent studies (Cairns & Cox, 2008).  
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Mertens (Mertens, 1998) described qualitative research as naturalistic 
interpretive science involving methods such as case study, focus group, ethnography 
or artefact studies (Figure 3.2).  In HCI, quantitative research is often limited to 
measure the times and error rates of human interactions with technologies, but the 
scopes are broader in qualitative research. The latter places emphasis on people’s 
behaviours, movements, cognitive work and reasons for actions when interacting 
with technologies. These, in turn, provide richer and contextualised data (Beyer & 
Holtzblatt, 1998) supporting the understanding of novel and complex phenomena.  
However, the findings from qualitative research are not generalisable (Maykut 
& Morehouse, 1994) and cannot be used to test hypotheses (Popper, 1959) which 
are core to quantitative methods (Popper, 1959). The quantitative methods require a 
structured and standard procedure to measure data. Hence, they are fit for measuring 
the level of people understanding before and after interacting with the technologies. 
In contrast, qualitative analysis does not report numbers but subjective data in the 
form of users’ subjective accounts,  narratives and experiences (Yilmaz, 2013).  
Although most elements in positivism and interpretivism reflect the 
quantitative and qualitative research method respectively, there are however 
overlapping spaces in between these two research paradigms, known as the mixed 




Figure 3.2: Research Strategies (De Villiers, 2005) 
 
 Mixed Methodology 3.3.2
The combinations of qualitative and quantitative methods in different phases 
of the research process are known as mixed methods that are commonly employed 
under the pragmatism paradigm (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). For instance, in a 
questionnaire, the data collection through mixed methods could involve both closed-
ended and open-ended questions. The collected questionnaire will be analysed by 
two techniques, such as  factor analysis of the Likert scaled items as well as  using a 
constant comparative method for the narrative responses to the open-ended 
questions (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The types of studies that commonly 
employ mixed methods are sequential studies, parallel or simultaneous studies, 
equivalent status designs and designs with multilevel use of approaches (Tashakkori 
& Teddlie, 1998). Sequential studies are those where researchers begin with a 
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qualitative research phase, followed by a quantitative one, or vice versa (Tashakkori 
& Teddlie, 1998). There are two phases of studies conducted separately.  
In parallel or simulation study designs, researchers tend to combine 
quantitative and qualitative research methods at the same time (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 1998). For example, in a study for measuring the usability and trust 
towards the interface of the system, there would be closed-ended questions to 
measure the interface based on the usability and trust models, and open-ended 
questions to capture users’ feedback with the system interface.  The equivalent 
status design involves using both quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
understand the phenomenon under study (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998), while  the 
design with multilevel requires different types of methods at different levels of data 
aggregation (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). For example, in education research, the 
data could be analysed quantitatively at the course and program level, but also 
qualitatively at the faculty and university level. 
All collected data from the qualitative, quantitative or mixed method are required 
to be analysed with rigour  and structure.  
 User-centred Design and User Participatory Design 3.4
User-centred design is an iterative approach to design and develop software or 
products by expert teams that focus on user needs throughout the product life cycle.  
Commonly, the teams consist of professionals with different skills and backgrounds such 
as information architects, visual designers, developers, project managers, or technical 
writers. They collaborate to strategise, plan, create and implement a project (Norman & 
Draper, 1986). Their main focus is to create interfaces, artefacts, products and services 
that are applicable, appropriate and accessible to as many users as possible within the 
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constraints of the design specifications (Keates, Clarkson, Keates, & Clarkson, 2003). 
Due to the aim to attend the users’ needs, the final output of this design process will be 
used for the targeted audience.  
Similarly, participatory design aims to develop technologies through the cycles of 
requirements gathering, prototype development, implementation and evaluation with the 
close involvement of end-users and stakeholders (Sharma et al., 2008). Their 
involvement is either to contribute to the design and content development process, or in 
order to manage the entire development processes on their own. It requires users’ active 
participation in the process as co-designers by empowering them to propose and generate 
design alternatives themselves (Schuler & Namioka, 1993). This approach can be seen as 
an attempt to better understand and involve real users, and is imperative for creating 
more appropriate, and user-friendly products or services (Lindgaard et al., 2006; Muller 
& Druin, 2002).  
Although both methods focus on building solutions for the targeted end-users, the 
approaches to conduct studies involving either of them are dissimilar. For example, in 
the case of user-centred design, the roles of researcher and designer to investigate the 
user requirements and design the solutions are often interdependent. However, in the 
case of participatory design, the end-user often acts as the designer, while the researchers 
are responsible to build appropriate tools and infrastructure to fulfil and facilitate the 
design work. In my view, both approaches are relevant to design the system for end-
users, but the concern is to select the suitable users to be involved in each particular 
research stage.  
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 Usability Inspection Methods 3.5
Nielsen and Mack (Nielsen & Mack, 1994) described usability inspection as a set of 
methods to evaluate user interface designs. The main focus of these methods is to 
identify the usability issues in interface design in order to address the most severe ones 
(Nielsen 1994). Under the usability inspections umbrella, there are eight associated 
methods described as follows (Nielsen 1994; Nielsen & Mack, 1994): 
 heuristic evaluation is the most informal method to evaluate the design 
according to established principles, which is normally referred to as heuristics  
 guideline reviews are inspections where the interface design is checked for 
conformance with a comprehensive list of usability guidelines 
 pluralistic walkthroughs are meetings where users, developers, and human 
factors experts step through a scenario, discussing usability issued associated 
with dialogue elements involved in the scenario steps 
 consistency inspections have designers representing multiple projects inspect an 
interface to see whether it does things in a way that is consistent with their own 
designs. Thus, consistency inspections are aimed at evaluating consistency across 
the family of products that have been evaluated by an inspection team 
 standard inspections have an expert on some interface standard inspect the 
interface for compliance. Thus, standards are aimed at increasing the degree to 
which a given interface is in the range of another system on the market that 
follows the same standards 
 cognitive walkthroughs use a more explicitly detailed procedure to stimulate a 
user’s problem-solving process at each step in the human-computer dialogue, 
checking to see if the simulated user’s goals and memory for actions can be 
assumed to lead to the next correct action 
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 formal usability inspections use the six-steps procedures (planning, kick-off 
meeting, preparation phase where inspectors’ review - the interface individually, 
the main inspection review - when the inspectors’ lists of usability problems are 
merged, and follow-up phase where the effectiveness of the inspection process 
itself is assessed) with strictly defined roles to combine the heuristic evaluation 
and a simplified form of cognitive walkthroughs 
 feature inspections list sequence of features used to accomplish typical tasks, 
checks for long sequences, cumbersome steps, steps that would not be natural for 
users to try, and steps that require extensive knowledge/ experience in order to 
assess a proposed feature set 
Each method described above is dedicated to different aims in usability testing. The 
testing processes could be ranged from complex to simple. For instance, formal usability 
testing requires multiple steps and combinations testings to be conducted in individual 
and group inspections (Nielsen, 1994), while pluralistic walkthroughs and consistency 
inspections are described as an unstructured method that requires the usability tester to 
collaborate in the tests (Nielsen, 1994). The heuristic evaluation, cognitive evaluation, 
feature inspection, standard inspection also guideline reviews require the tests to be 
conducted individually with different guidelines and procedures. Both heuristic 
evaluation and guideline review are conducted based on a specific principle: the testers 
need to evaluate the design based on a given list of principles. For instance, guideline 
review testing is associated with 1000 types of principles (Nelsen, 1994) making it the 
most complex method.  
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 Methodological Approach in this Thesis 3.6
The research paradigm for this thesis is interpretative and consists of 5 studies which 
can be categorised into seven sections: understanding the Bitcoin stakeholders, 
constructing and evaluating the DIY Kit, designing and evaluating the trust algorithm for 
Bitcoin transaction, designing and evaluating the user interface for the Bitcoin wallet app 
(Table 3.2).  
 Interview 3.6.1
Boyce and Neale (Boyce & Neale, 2006) defined interviews as a qualitative 
research technique which involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a 
small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a particular idea, 
program or situation. It is a way to capture a great understanding of users’ 
experiences, perceptions, and values such as trust, by requiring the interviewer to 
ask specific questions while remaining open to exploring participants’ points of 
view (Qu & Dumay, 2011). Interviews can be conducted in three different formats: 
structured, semi-structured,  or unstructured. The structured interviews consist of a 
set of questions in a specific order that will be delivered to all interviewees (Qu & 
Dumay, 2011). The data analysis enables the researchers to make comparisons 
among the interviewees’ answers. In contrast, the unstructured interview has no 
predetermined set of questions and are often conducted in informal settings. The 
data analysis could be harder due to the variety of questions for different 
interviewees and the results are less reliable compared to the structured interview 
(Qu & Dumay, 2011). However, the structured interview may limit the explorations 
of the interviewees’ viewpoints (Boyce & Neale, 2006). 
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Therefore, for this research, the semi-structured interviews that consist of both 
structured and unstructured questions were applied. A set of interview guidelines 
was prepared for each of the five studies. At the same time, additional questions 
related to the topic discussed during the interviews were asked to clarify or further 
describe certain issues. (Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 7, Chapter 8, Chapter 
10). 
 User Participatory Design 3.6.2
As discussed in 3.4, user participatory design is a method involving  users 
directly with the research in order to support the design of a system. HCI, research 
focusing on the design for complex systems such as Blockchain can benefit from 
participatory design methods.. For instance, Nissen et al. (Nissen et al., 2018), 
conducted a participatory design workshop by using the cryptocurrency named 
GeoCoin to engage novice users in designing smart contract applications for 
Blockchain. In that workshop, the participants were given an opportunity to 
experience the location-based platform application that was built with GeoCoin 
Blockchain and, based on their experience, users explored the opportunity to design 
another type of applications on top of the GeoCoin Blockchain. 
In this research, the participatory design method was also used by experienced 
Bitcoin Blockchain users to explore the design opportunities for Bitcoin trust in 
Blockchain as well as to evaluate the users’ trust in the designed algorithms and the 
Bitcoin mobile application interface. 
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Table 3.2: Overview of studies conducted in the thesis 
 














User Interface for 
BitXFps 
Evaluating the 
Trust in the 
BitXFps User 
Interface Design 
Study 1 Study 2  Study 3  Study 4  Study 5 
Chapter 4 5 6 7 8 8 9 10 
Research 
Objective 
1 1 2 2 and 3 3 3 4 5 
Research 
Paradigm 
Interpretative Interpretative  Interpretative  Interpretative  Interpretative 
Participants Bitcoin users Bitcoin miners  
Bitcoin Blockchain  
experienced users 
 
















































































  Trust Evaluation 3.6.3
As discussed in 3.5, heuristic evaluation is one of the elements under usability 
inspection methods that commonly aimed to locate the usability problem in 
interface design. It is usually applied to the set of generic usability principles to 
evaluate the website user interface (Nielsen, 1994). However, the evaluation is not 
limited to the Nielson generic principles. It can also be applied to evaluate specific 
user interface applications with tailored principles and taxonomy. For example, 
Pinelle, Wong, and Stach (Pinelle, Wong, & Stach, 2008) had customised the 
heuristics for usability design principles for a video game design after conducting 
evaluations with 108 PC games. This method can also be applied to measure other 
key aspects of interface design, such as trust. For instance, Sillence et al. (Sillence et 
al, 2006) in their work to build the trust framework for web-based health, advised 
the employment of trust principles as the heuristic guidelines to evaluate user’s trust 
in the interface design.  
3.6.3.1 Expert Reviews 
The expert reviews are conducted based on someone’s past experience and 
knowledge on a particular tool. The outcome of the expert reviews normally will 
expand the guidelines for the evaluated tool (Harley, 2018).  
In this thesis, a proposed guideline to design for trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoin 
transactions has been outlined based on the framework of trust inducing features 
for web design (Wang & Emurian, 2005) and from the findings in Study 3 that 
focused on the design for trust principles. This guideline was used by the 
recruited experienced Bitcoin users to evaluate the trust design for BitXFps app 
(Chapter 10).  
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 Qualitative Data Analysis Techniques 3.6.4
The technology is rapidly changing and, for instance, cryptocurrency comes in 
different types and it offers diverse ways for people to use it. These abstractions of 
technological interactions had challenged researchers to look into the values 
underpinning trust in technology. HCI researchers tend to focus on understanding 
the qualities of a particular technology and how people use it in their lives, think 
and feel about it. In qualitative methods, there are no required hypotheses to be 
determined at the beginning of the study (Strauss et al., 1964) but the new theory 
emerged from the data sets. The qualitative data sets need to be fully transcribed and 
coded. The coding process involved six iterative processes known as thematic 
analysis that are described as follows (Braun & Clarke, 2006): 
Step 1: Familiarising oneself with your data – re-reading the transcripts and making 
notes 
Step 2: Generating initial codes – systematically coding the entire datasets and 
collating data that is relevant to each code 
Step 3: Searching for themes – generating codes into candidate themes for further 
analysis 
Step 4: Reviewing themes – checking whether the themes work with the data and 
creating a thematic map of analysis 
Step 5: Defining and naming themes – refining the themes and the overall narrative 
iteratively 
Step 6: Producing the report – which will, in turn, require a further level of 




The thematic analysis could be conducted in two ways, inductively or 
deductively. The inductive thematic analysis is applied when the researcher has 
little or no predetermined theory or framework for identifying the themes (Patton, 
1990). In contrast, deductive thematic analysis is associated with a structured or 
predetermined framework used in analysing the data sets (Boyatzis, 1998). 
Basically, the researchers create their own structure or theories on the data and use 
these as a guide to analyse the data. This approach is particularly useful for the 
researchers who, after they identified the research questions and desired themes, can 
then to look at the similarities and differences in the data. Even though the latter 
thematic analysis is easier to be conducted, the predetermined thematic framework 
could lead to bias and limit the interpretation of data.  
Hence, for this research, we applied thematic analysis by combining both 
inductive and deductive methods which is known as a hybrid approach (Fereday & 
Muir-Cochrane, 2006). This method integrated both types of thematic analysis by 
using the existing theory for the deductive coding while new theory grounded in the 
empirical data, contributed to the inductive coding (Chapter 4, Chapter 5, 
Chapter 7, Chapter 8, Chapter 10).  
 Triangulation 3.6.5
Patton (Patton, 1999) defined triangulation as qualitative research that employs 
multiple methods or data sources to acquire an in-depth understanding of 
phenomena. There are four types of triangulation that have been identified: data 
source triangulation, theory triangulation, investigator triangulation, and method 
triangulation (Denzin, 2006; Patton, 1999). The data source is when the researcher 
recruits different types of participants in a study including, for instance, those of 
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different race, religion, and expertise in order to gain multiple perspectives and 
validation of data (Denzin, 2006).  Theory triangulation uses more than one theory 
to interpret the data, while investigator triangulation is a collaboration of more than 
one researcher in the same study to provide multiple observations and conclusions 
(Denzin, 2006). Method triangulation involves multiple methods of data collections 
in the same study (Polit & Beck, 2016). 
This PhD project employed triangulation methods throughout, alongside several 
different methods such as interviews, workshops, and survey in five interrelated 
studies to support the objectives of this PhD research.  
 Chapter Summary 3.7
This chapter presented a thorough description of the research methodology. We linked 
all results from understanding the Bitcoin stakeholders (Chapter 4 and 5) to constructing 
and evaluating the methods to explore the design for trust (Chapter 6 and 7). It also 
describes the design and evaluating approaches for the trust algorithm for Bitcoin 
transactions (Chapter8), and finally the details of the design and trust evaluation for the 
Bitcoin mobile application user interface (Chapter 9 and 10). The detailed descriptions 
of each study are further outlined in the Research Method sections and related Result 
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This chapter presents the report on the explorations of people’s motivation and 
experience with Bitcoin. It is known as the first cryptocurrency which has received 
increasing interest over the last five years. Built upon a decentralised peer-to-peer 
system called Blockchain, it supports transparent, fast, cost-effective, and irreversible 
transactions, without the need for trusting third party financial institutions. The 
Blockchain technology has steered increasing research interest predominantly in the 
areas of cryptography, security, and peer-to-peer computing. However, there are limited 
empirical researches that report about people’s motivations and experience with Bitcoin 
and their trust-related issues. 
In this regard, a study on the exploration of people’s motivation, experience and trust 
on Bitcoin cryptocurrency has been conducted by addressing the following research 
questions: 
 what are the motives for early adoption and use of Bitcoins? How do people 
learn about Bitcoin and how do they use Bitcoins for?   
 how different Blockchain characteristics impact on the various dimensions of 
trust? 
 what are the main trust challenges and how do people attempt to mitigate them? 
It reports on interviews with 20 Bitcoin users in Malaysia about their experiences and 
trust challenges in using Bitcoin. The study advances the HCI theories on trust by 
identifying main Bitcoin characteristics and their impact on trust, such as 
decentralisation, unregulation, embedded expertise, and reputation, as well as 
transactions’ transparency, low cost, and easiness to complete. Based on the outcomes, 
the study discusses the motivations of the users, the impact of Blockchain characteristics 
on users’ trust, insecure transactions, the risk of dishonest traders and its mitigating 
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strategies. It concludes with theoretical implications on the construction of the theories 
on a model of trust for Bitcoin users, the paradox of unregulation and the challenge of 
pseudoanonymous transactions. Then finally, the chapter addresses the design 
implications including support for the transparency of two-way transactions, tools for 
materialising trust, and tools for supporting reversible transactions. 
 Research Method 4.2
Study 1 recruited 20 Bitcoin users, 18 male, 2 female, (mean age 30, range 21-50). 
Six participants had less than 6 months experience of using Bitcoins, 8 participants have 
between 6 months and 2 years, while the remaining 6 have more than 2 years. In terms 
of educational background, half of the participants had Bachelor degrees, 7 were school 
leavers, and 3 had Master degrees. Participants had a broad range of occupations: 8 in 
administrative roles, 4 in financial and marketing sector, 3 school teachers, 2 
unemployed, 1 in medical field, 1 in IT and 1 student. Each participant was rewarded 
RM50 (equivalent to £10 in Malaysian currency). Participants were recruited from five 
Facebook and Telegram groups of Malaysian Bitcoin users. Malaysia offers a specific 
opportunity for the exploration of Bitcoin practices. On the one hand, despite five 
decades of economic growth, it is still a developing country with the increasing inflation 
rate, underdeveloped democracy and a financial system which is now under the scrutiny 
of law enforcement. On the other hand, Malaysia experiences a massive growth of 
remittance and payment market, and interest in cryptocurrency, being in 2016 the first 
developing country considering Fintech regulation (Central Bank of Malaysia, 2016). 




The invitations for taking part in the study were both publicly posted and privately 
sent to the most active members in each of the online groups. The study also applied 
snowball sampling so that six more participants were introduced by the interviewed 
ones. The semi-structured interviews have been conducted between October 2015 and 
December 2015, to explore users’ motivation, understanding and use of Bitcoin.  The 
participants were asked: “why are you interested in Bitcoin”, “how did you learn about 
Bitcoin” and “which are the benefits and challenges of using Bitcoins”. They were also 
asked about users’ challenges and trust-related issues: “what are the challenges that you 
face when using or engaging with Bitcoin technology”, and “how much trust do you have 
in Bitcoin technology”, and followed up with additional questions on perceived security 
and anonymity. The study also explored participants’ perception of risk and their 
mitigation strategies: “did you experience any fraud”, and “will you take any actions to 
prevent that in the future”. 
The interviews took place via Skype or phone. They lasted for at least an hour, were 
audio recorded and fully transcribed. The analysis involved a hybrid approach where 
existing concepts were used for the deductive coding while new concepts grounded on 
the empirical data, contributed to the inductive coding (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 
2006). The deductive coding included concepts from the HCI literature on trust such as 
technological, social and institutional dimensions of trust (Sas & Khairuddin, 2015), 
factors of user’s trust in technology such as credibility, ease of use, and risk (Corritore et 
al., 2003), and properties warranting trust between technology users such as temporal, 
social and institutional embeddedness, as well as credibility, integrity and benevolence 
(Riegelsberger et al., 2005). In this study, the concepts related to Blockchain’s 
characteristics such as decentralisation, unregulation, pseudo-anonymity, as well as 
transparent and irreversible transactions were also used. The coding list was iteratively 
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refined in the light of the interview data, as new codes emerged under the theme of 
motivation, insecure transactions and risk mitigating strategies.  
 Findings 4.3
The report of the findings begins with outlining users’ motivation for engaging with 
Bitcoin technology, followed by a description of its key characteristics and their impact 
on users’ trust. In particular, the study highlights the issue of insecure transactions and 
the associated human and technology-related risks.  The study further unpacks the risks 
of dealing with dishonest traders, and the mitigating strategies for addressing them.  
 The Motivations for Using Bitcoin Currency  4.3.1
This section highlights the motivation of end-users, people with limited 
knowledge of Bitcoin technology, who adopt and engage in the use of Bitcoins. The 
motivation and perception of early adopters towards Bitcoins can be grouped 
according to Davis’ technology acceptance model (Davis, 1989) in perceived 
usefulness, and ease of use.  The study further describes the perceived usefulness of 
Bitcoins as an external motivational factor and its key economic rationale.  
4.3.1.1 Economic Rationale  
The economic aspect captures people’s distrust in financial institutions and the 
government legitimising them. Several participants referred to the importance of 
protecting one’s savings in the face of an unstable economic climate, dominated 
not only by inflation but also by governments’ decisions to control personal bank 
account holders’ money and their movement (Christin, 2012). For example, the 
following quote is illustrative for a quarter of the participants: “From what I 
learned from the Cyprus crisis, governments and banks have the authority to take 
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your money from your account […] the trust in financial institution is gone 
forever. So I looked for alternatives and found Bitcoin to keep the savings” [P16]. 
This outcome provides support for the security motive for acquiring money and 
Bitcoins’ perceived value for providing safety when people distrust the world and 
the future particularly in the context of inflation and economic downturn: 
“currently our currency is falling and I am worried. As a backup plan, I 
converted my money in gold or Bitcoins, which are not influenced by any big 
parties or power” [P8]. This is interesting as it reflects the assumption of gold as 
a commodity, which wrongly conflates gold’s long-run price stability with the 
absence of power for regulating its price: while such power does not need to 
belong to centralised banks, it still requires government’s authority (Bordo, 
1981). 
 A third economic reason underpinning the adoption of Bitcoins is speculation 
on their future value. Almost half of participants share this view: “I keep my 
saving in Bitcoins [because] their future value will increase over time” [P11]. In 
such cases, participants purposely explored alternative means of exchange for 
replacing their volatile fiat currency in order to both protect savings and more 
importantly, to invest for future income. 
4.3.1.2  Social Learning  
Findings indicate that in order to learn about the Bitcoin currency, participants 
leverage the emerging social network of Bitcoin users. This social aspect 
underpinning the initial motivation of Bitcoin’s early adopters include online 
communities where most of the participants have heard for the first time what 
Bitcoin currency is: “The first time I heard [about Bitcoins] was from the Reddit 
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forum” [P1]. After finding out about the Bitcoin currency and its potential value, 
participants described their efforts to learn more through self-guided online 
research: “First I read about Bitcoin online in 2009, [and] in 2013 I could see the 
price rising up, so I  started to learn more about” [P7]. An additional source of 
information about Bitcoin is peers and friends: “I started to know about Bitcoin a 
few years ago, when my friend told me about the wallet, the process and how 
Bitcoins could eliminate banks’ transactions” [P3]. This quote indicates how 
some early adopters champion the use of Bitcoin currency by highlighting its 
advantages against the national fiat currencies.  
4.3.1.3 Uses of Bitcoins  
While most of the literature describes Bitcoins as cryptocurrency (Carillo, 
2015; Coin Market Cap, 2019a) the findings indicate that they are used 
predominantly as store of value, i.e., predictably valuable for later use. Eight 
participants used Bitcoins on a regular basis to generate income, 7 used them 
occasionally for investment, while 5 were full time investors. This is interesting, 
because Bitcoins experience high volatility which makes them on the long-term 
unreliable stores of value (Yermack, 2013). It appears that the complete control 
over one’s savings is preferred over the less volatile yet less controllable fiat 
currency. Such characteristics were shared by other cryptocurrencies such as 




Figure 4.2:  Merchant’s Sign for Accepting Bitcoin Payment 
Another surprising finding is that there were only three isolated accounts of the 
use of Bitcoin as a currency for buying goods or services, despite the growing 
number of merchants who accept Bitcoins (Figure 4.2). Most of the payments 
were for online utility or phone bills, food, or mining equipment. For example, 
one participant noted the payment of his mobile phone’s prepaid credit with 
Bitcoins [P10], while another referred to the payment of food supplement from a 
friend: “he just sent me his QR code and I scanned the code and transferred the 
amount of Bitcoins” [P19]. In addition, one participant mentioned both online and 
offline uses of Bitcoin currency: “I pay my utility bills in Bitcoins from the 
cryptomarket.my. I even buy my cigarette from expedia.com, and use 
cheapair.com to buy my flight tickets and hotel bookings too. Then there is a 
restaurant in Johor where I pay in Bitcoins” [P12]. This diverse way of spending 
Bitcoins as a currency is an exception rather than the norm, as the study failed to 
find any additional participants reporting similarly a rich use of Bitcoin currency. 
Interestingly, there is only one account of illegal purchase: “I bought an 
unlimited Spotify account from the dark web using Bitcoin” [P1].  
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 Blockchain’s Characteristics and their Impact on Trust  4.3.2
This section describes the main characteristics of Bitcoin technology, and how they 
contribute to trust in Bitcoin. These include Blockchain’s decentralisation, 
unregulation, embedded expertise and reputation, as well as transparent, low cost, 
easy, and insecure transactions.  
4.3.2.1 Decentralised Blockchain 
One of the main identified characteristics relates to the decentralised nature of 
Bitcoin technology (Swan, 2015). Findings indicate that most participants 
appreciate that Bitcoin transactions do not involve any third party involvement 
from financial institutions: “A decentralised currency is a bit more secure in 
terms of handling it is same like an asset. So if nobody else [third party] handles 
the asset, it is more secure for me to handle it by myself” [P20]. The 
decentralisation of Blockchain also fosters confidence in its clear intention to 
circumvent, arguably dishonest central financial institutions. This, in turn, 
provides support for honesty as a dimension of credibility in Corritore and 
colleagues’ (Corritore et al., 2003) model of online trust.  
People also understand the reduced need for the complicated authorisation 
process for sending and receiving money: “if you look at the current banking 
system, it takes three working days to do the settlement, but with Blockchain you 
can settle it instantly” [P3]. This quote illustrates the appreciation for a quicker 
transfer of money between accounts, and therefore the ease of use.  
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4.3.2.2 Unregulated Blockchain  
Participants also expressed appreciation for the unregulated aspect of 
Blockchain technology. As a result, more than half of participants perceive this as 
an opportunity to become more empowered and privileged to regain control over 
their own money: “all governments love to control people [but] they cannot 
control Bitcoin, and that’s why they cannot accept it. Bitcoin is people’s money 
giving them financial freedom” [P14]. This is a militant statement, which links 
back to the initial motivation for engaging with Blockchain technology: the 
erosion of trust in financial and government institutions coupled with the 
economic crisis (Sas & Khairuddin, 2015). 
Unregulation sets no limits for sending and receiving money, which can take 
place either locally or worldwide: “I see no boundaries for people to do trading 
globally or nationwide; a freedom to do the trading without any restriction from 
the authority” [P2].  As a decentralised and unregulated system, the risk of abuse 
of power over individuals’ personal assets is highly restricted. This confirms a 
limitation of the perceived risk as the third dimension of the model of online trust 
(Corritore et al., 2003). Several participants referred to the benefits of 
Blockchain’s pseudoanonymity, and its value in supporting unregulation as 
illustrated by this quote: “we can keep our money as much as we want and the 
government will not be able to freeze our wallet because of the pseudo-
anonymity” [P11].  
4.3.2.3 Blockchain’s Embedded Expertise  
Another characteristic of Bitcoin technology is people’s appreciation for the 
expertise required for mining Bitcoins and verifying transactions. This is 
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interesting given that for example, mining a rig needs limited technical 
knowledge. Findings, however, indicate that the cost required by the mining 
process provides a guarantee for the invested expertise and ultimately for the 
credibility of the Blockchain technology: “producing Bitcoins is not something 
easy. There are specific ways to mine and expensive equipment needed” [P8]. As 
the competition and difficulty for mining Bitcoins increase over time, more 
computationally intense mining equipment is needed which in turn lead to higher 
costs for producing Bitcoins. Almost a quarter of participants mentioned this 
complexity and the cost of the mining procedure. Their appreciation for miners’ 
expertise fosters credibility in Bitcoin currency and transactions. This further 
confirms the credibility dimension of the online model of trust and its application 
to Bitcoin technology (Corritore et al., 2003). 
4.3.2.4 Blockchain’s Reputation  
The reputation of the Blockchain technology has been notoriously damaged 
due to illicit activities on Silk Road, an anonymous online marketplace 
predominantly for narcotics, which uses Bitcoins as its exchange currency 
(Christin, 2012). Four participants mentioned such reputation issue due also to 
current cybercrimes, since Silk Road was closed down in 2013: “there are lot of 
crimes due to Bitcoin’s anonymity: money laundering, terrorist financing and tax 
evasion” [P15] but surprisingly, with limited reference to its negative impact on 
participants’ credibility in Bitcoin technology. Interestingly, the study also found 
instances where participants, in fact, valued the growing reputation of Bitcoin 
technology: “in the long term, this technology has a very bright future. There are 
lots of big companies which start doing research on Blockchain” [P17]. This 
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quote suggests that the large companies’ interest in Blockchain offers alternative 
routes for legitimising its authenticity and ultimately credibility. Apart from trust 
in Blockchain, participants also referred to trust in Bitcoin transactions.  
4.3.2.5 Transparent Transactions 
 The findings indicate an important and valued characteristic of Bitcoin 
transactions: their transparency (Swan, 2015). The public ledger allows public 
access to the movement of Bitcoins from one wallet to another. Users are able to 
track any Bitcoin transactions from the very first one, until the present day: 
“because Bitcoin uses Blockchain, we can see the movement of the Bitcoins in a 
public ledger. It is very transparent” [P11]. Transparency echoes technology’s 
credibility dimension in Corritore and colleagues’ (Corritore et al., 2003) model 
of online trust, and its honesty dimension. 
4.3.2.6  Easy and Quick Transactions  
Another valued characteristic of Bitcoin transactions is their ease and speed of 
completion:  “With Bitcoin, you can move your money globally in just a second; 
very easy” [P11].  A similar quote emphasising the ease of completing worldwide 
transactions by comparing them with the ease of texting: “It is easy to move 
money from one country to another. It is just like you send a text message and the 
transaction is done” [P13]. The above outcomes suggest that through transparent, 
easy, and quick transactions, people experience the ease of use. According to 
Corritore and colleagues’ (Corritore et al., 2003) model of online trust, ease of 
use is one of the three factors of trust.   
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4.3.2.7 Low Cost Transactions 
A third valued characteristic of Bitcoin transactions is their low cost. A few 
participants provided quotes to support this: “it only costs me 10 cents for each 
transaction” [P6]; or “the main benefit of transactions is that they are easy, fast 
and cheap” [P14]. These outcomes indicate that transactions’ low cost could 
further contribute to reducing transactions’ perceived risk, as participants do not 
have to fear hidden or higher costs. In their model of online trust, Corritore and 
colleagues’(Corritore et al., 2003) referred to risk as the third factor of trust, and 
explained the direct relationship between users’ perception of control and their 
trust. If the above characteristics support users’ trust in their Bitcoin transactions, 
findings also indicate one characteristic which hinders trust which is further 
detailed. 
  Insecure Transactions 4.3.3
An important finding is that despite the above characteristics supporting trust 
in Blockchain technology and Bitcoin transactions, participants also reported their 
concerns about the risk associated with insecure transactions. It is worth mentioning 
that insecure transactions do not concern miners’ cryptographic protocol for 
authorising transactions. Indeed, none of the participants reported concerns about 
the security of this protocol, but strong trust in miners’ expertise and in the 
predictability of the protocol. Instead, insecure transactions relate to human error or 
malice and technology’s limitation to address them. More specifically, the study 
identified four types of insecure transactions, three related to human factors: those 
due to users themselves, to the other person or entity engaged in a transaction, or to 
the third human parties not engaged in transactions; and one related to technology’s 
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limitation to address them.  The next section will discuss the associated risks for 
each of these types of transactions.   
4.3.3.1 Risks Due to Users’ Challenges of Handling Passwords  
Six participants mentioned the risk of losing the password for their wallets, or 
the risk of insufficiently protecting it. For example, the quote below illustrates 
this type of risk and its serious consequence of no longer being able to access 
one’s Bitcoins from that wallet: “Make sure you don’t forget your password 
because Blockchain does not keep your password […] it cannot be recovered and 
you will lose all your Bitcoins from that wallet” [P16].  
The second risk of insufficiently protecting the password can have equally 
serious consequence of having the Bitcoins stolen: “I lost 30 Bitcoins in the last 
months because of my own security mistake. I set up my wallet password the same 
as my email password. One day, my wife clicked on a phishing email and the 
hackers were able to get my email password and use it to log in to my Bitcoin 
wallet” [P12].  
In order to address these risks, some users mentioned the importance of taking 
responsibility for securely storing and protecting their passwords: “As users we 
must know how to make sure that our Bitcoins are secured. It is the same as 
protecting our own cash or any personal valuable thing that can be stolen by 
others” [P15]. Some participants even installed additional security applications in 
their Bitcoin wallet such as double authentication [P12], since although “the 
system is secured, the security responsibility is with the user. If anyone lost their 
Bitcoins, the first person to be blamed is themselves, not the system” [P14].  
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4.3.3.2 Risks Due to Hackers’ Malicious Attacks  
Three participants mentioned that insecure transactions are also due to 
malicious hacker attacks. The study has seen above that some of these involve 
phishing emails to target wallet passwords. Such attacks can penetrate even 
through double authentication: “you must make sure that your password is 
difficult to guess. “A friend lost 14 Bitcoins even though he applied double 
authentication on multiple devices” [P11].  
4.3.3.3 Risks Due to Failure to Recover from Human Error or Malice  
Although a third of participants considered themselves responsible to secure 
their Bitcoins, a few also indicated that the recovery from users’ failure to protect 
their passwords or from hackers’ attacks is limitedly supported by the Bitcoin 
technology. The main limitation here is that transactions are irreversible: “let’s 
say the hacker has diverted the money to another Bitcoin wallet address; you will 
never know where your money has been transferred to and you cannot reverse the 
transaction either” [P1]. This is an interesting finding, indicating a drawback of 
the Blockchain technology. The rationale for irreversible transactions addresses 
the limitation of the centralised financial system which allows reversible 
transactions without being bound to enforce the parties’ contract stating that the 
sale is final (Fui, Nah, & Davis, 2002). However, as suggested in the above quote, 
this design feature fails to account for malicious transactions due to hacking, or to 
the dishonesty of the trading parties, as further detailed.   
It is important to make the distinction between how transactions are 
represented in Blockchain, i.e., data structure allowing the transfer of Bitcoins 
from one electronic wallet to another; and how the participants perceive 
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transactions: a two-way transfer of Bitcoins and money/goods. Unlike the one-
way remittance transactions well supported by the Bitcoin technology (Kazan, 
Tan, & Lim, 2015), all transactions reported by participants are two-way, with 
both parties sending and receiving assets. Although most transactions involve 
buying or selling Bitcoins against fiat currency, participants were only able to 
track one side of the transaction, namely the movement of Bitcoins captured 
within the Blockchain. This raises major risks and trust issues particularly in 
relation to potentially dishonest trading partners, as the untracked part of a 
transaction does not allow for scrutiny. This issue is further emphasised when 
dealing with traders who are not authorised entities.  
4.3.3.4 Risks Related to Dishonest Partner of Transaction 
Findings indicate that a considerable risk factor is dishonest partners with 
whom one engages in Bitcoin transactions. A quarter of participants reported 
incidents where either them, or their close friends have been cheated and their 
trust betrayed: “I transferred some Bitcoins but the buyer didn’t pay me” [P6]. 
This quote illustrates the importance of knowing about the transaction partner. 
This point has been mentioned by other participants who expressed concerns 
about strangers’ unknown reputation: “you don’t know whether the seller is a 
scam or not” [P1].   
 Strategies for Mitigating the Risks of Dishonest Traders  4.3.4
The study identified five strategies for dealing with dishonest transaction 
partners, and for mitigating their risks. These strategies involve two forms of 
trading: directly with another person, or through online exchanges, i.e. services for 
matching price and offer between Bitcoin sellers and buyers. These strategies are 
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further described starting with the most frequent one, and the running themes across 
these strategies are the traders’ pseudoanonymity and the unregulation of 
Blockchain technology.  
4.3.4.1 Trade with Authorised Exchanges 
The online exchange is by far the first and most preferred form of transaction, 
mostly because its regulation supports users’ trust. Indeed, although Bitcoin 
technology and its cryptographic protocol are unregulated, exchanges require 
authorisation from the financial services such as Financial Conduct Authority 
(Zanjani, 2004). For example, five participants mentioned their check of 
exchangers’ credentials: “I do look at their background and legal term conditions 
and from there I put trust on the exchange” [P2]. The exchanges’ websites are 
crucial for fostering trust: “a proper website, [indicating the amount of trading, 
and testimonials [supports] trust on the exchange” [P3].  
This extends previous HCI findings on the value of website for trust (Fui et al., 
2002) to the context of cryptocurrency transactions. An additional source of trust 
is the option to contact directly the exchange’s agents: “I prefer this exchange 
because they have their representative to contact if there is any problem or 
question to ask” [P12]. In turn, this makes users’ relationship with the exchanges, 
a more personal one. Apart from being authorised by financial services, and 
having credible websites, exchanges also foster trust in transaction partners, as 
they require sellers and buyers to register and have their identity verified. This is 
an important finding, indicating ways to address the extensive concerns around 
traders’ pseudo-anonymity. Surprisingly, only one participant reported the use of 
the escrow service (the third party holding the assets to be released once both 
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parties are satisfied with the transaction). Findings indicate that ease of use is 
negatively impacted by the use of the escrow, because of its additional 
registration requirements: “it is easier and faster to do the transaction [directly] 
with other traders” [P10].  
These findings provide support for the contextual properties described in the 
framework on mechanics of trust (Riegelsberger et al., 2005), warranting users’ 
trust in exchanges because of their successful performance and the expectation 
that they will perform consistently well in the future (temporal embeddedness), 
exchanges’ reputation (social embeddedness), and their legally authorised 
services (institutional embeddedness). The study also found evidence for the 
intrinsic properties warranting trust in exchanges, for example through social 
presence of professional websites and contactable local representatives 
(integrity), as well as reputation through testimonials (credibility). 
4.3.4.2 Trade with Socially Authorised Traders 
In comparison with exchanges, dealing with individual traders offers weaker 
risk mitigating strategies. The strongest strategy is dealing with socially 
authorised traders. These are well-known, de-anonymised members of online 
groups who regularly join discussions and trade Bitcoins. Thus they become 
trusted and their names are added by the group administrator to an online list of 
verified traders: “I only buy from authorised traders as lots of friends 
experienced scam and huge losses” [P18].  The label of authorised trader is 
usually provided within an online group of Bitcoin users on the basis of a series 
of successful de-anonymised transactions. This outcome indicates the crucial 
value of de-anonymity for credibility and trust. These findings also provide 
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evidence for the framework on mechanics of trust (Riegelsberger et al., 2005) 
warranting users’ trust in authorised traders (temporal and social embeddedness), 
but limited institutional embeddedness.   
4.3.4.3 Trade with Reputable Individual Traders  
If an authorised trader cannot be found, participants engage in a weaker risk 
mitigating strategy: dealing with reputable traders. Unlike traders authorised by 
an online user group, reputable ones benefit only by credibility by proxy, from a 
few group members who have engaged in successful transactions with these 
traders. For example, participants indicated the use of peers’ or friends’ 
recommendations: “I knew the trader from the telegram group, and a few 
recommendations from friends who can be trusted” [P8]. Almost half of 
participants noted that their first point of contact for a background check on an 
unknown trader is their online groups “if I am dealing with a stranger, I will ask 
in my online group to verify that particular person. If they don’t know him I will 
not proceed with the transaction” [P10]. In addition, more than half of 
participants mentioned their preference for known traders whom they have had 
successfully trusted in the past:  “most of them are my close friends, so I have no 
problem trusting them” [P20]. This shows the value of reputation and 
benevolence in supporting traders’ credibility (Corritore et al., 2003). These 
findings confirm the framework on mechanics of trust (Riegelsberger et al., 2005) 
warranting users’ trust in traders because of their reputation (social embeddedness 
and credibility), and when dealing with friends, because of perceived integrity 
and benevolence.  
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4.3.4.4 Trade with De-anonymised Individual Traders 
Although less common and mostly due to lack of experience, sometimes 
Bitcoin users engage in transactions with unknown traders. In such cases, 
findings indicate that seldom the traders remain unknown, as the study identified 
two mechanisms for ensuring traders’ de-anonymisation: face to face meeting, or 
online sharing of their IDs. For example, several participants expressed the view 
that they only proceed with the transaction if the trader is willing to de-
anonymise. One way of achieving this is through face to face meeting, where 
both sides of the transaction take place simultaneously, i.e., the exchange of 
Bitcoins and fiat currency or goods: “we cannot trust them online. We need to see 
that person and to do cash on delivery” [P4].  Other participants require traders 
to de-anonymise by emailing their copy of personal ID: “I need to know their 
identity” [P5]. This strategy does not provide any contextual factors to allow 
users’ trust in unknown traders for whom they have no reputation-related 
information (neither social nor institutional embeddedness) (Riegelsberger et al., 
2005). Hence, users attempt to develop institutional embeddedness by de-
anonymising the traders, or by reducing the risk of asynchronous transaction 
altogether through face to face meetings to perform synchronous two-way 
exchanges.   
4.3.4.5 Regulating Bitcoin  
In order to address the challenge of dishonest traders, many participants 
expressed the wish that Bitcoin becomes regulated: “I think we must demand to 
our politicians to regulate Bitcoin” [P1]. This is an important finding indicating a 
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higher level strategy which does not address the trading itself but the unregulated 
nature of Blockchain.   
 Theoretical Implication 4.4
Now the study reflects on the value of these findings for advancing the HCI discourse 
on trust. The study also discusses the specific tensions that unregulation and pseudo-
anonymity bring to trust. The implications are mostly relevant for Bitcoin users in 
developing contexts. They may also hold value for understanding and supporting trust in 
cryptocurrencies in general in both developing and developed contexts, but future work 
is required to explore this.   
 Towards a Framework of Trust among Bitcoin Users  4.4.1
The findings advance the understanding of users’ trust in Blockchain 
technology and in transaction partners. The study argues for the feasibility of the 
considered HCI theories (Corritore et al., 2003; Riegelsberger et al., 2005; Sas & 
Khairuddin, 2015) for identifying key Blockchain’s characteristics supporting users’ 
trust: decentralisation, unregulation, miners’ expertise, as well as transparent, easy, 
and low cost transactions. The main trust challenge experienced by Bitcoin users is 
the risk of insecure transactions and in particular that of dealing with dishonest 





Figure 4.3:  Framework of Trust in Bitcoin for Users 
 
The discussions begin with the findings in the light of Sas and Khairuddin’s 
(Sas & Khairuddin, 2015) Bitcoin trust framework (Figure 4.3). The findings 
suggest that technological trust of Bitcoin users in Blockchain technology is strong, 
as participants value its secure cryptographic protocol. This extends prior findings 
on the users’ challenges to secure their Bitcoins (Klontz, Britt, Mentzer, & Klontz, 
2011) with their willingness to take responsibility for their weak, easy to break 
wallet passwords.  
Findings also indicate novel insights into the social dimension of trust among 
Bitcoin users. The main challenge here relates to dishonest Bitcoin traders. With 
respect to different stakeholders, it is worth mentioning that the findings capture the 
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blurring of the boundaries between merchants and users when the object of 
transaction is Bitcoins. In fact, the study found little evidence that Bitcoin users 
engage with merchants to buy goods, indicating participants’ preferential use of 
Bitcoin as a store of value rather than currency. In order to mitigate this trust issue, 
findings indicate four different alternatives that users applied to enact Bitcoin 
transactions: trade with authorised exchanges, trade with socially authorised traders, 
trade with reputable individual traders and trade with de-anonymised traders. 
However, the latter method is reported to be the most unsecured. The outcomes also 
suggest extending this framework’s definition of institutional trust to include not 
only government trust in Blockchain technology, but also the trust of Bitcoin users 
in government and financial institutions. The study has also seen evidence on how 
the erosion of such institutional trust is crucial in users’ adoption of Bitcoin and 
acceptance of its algorithmic authority (Kow & Lustig, 2018).  
Probing further into the exploration of technological trust, the study applied 
the model of online trust (Corritore et al., 2003) to identify specific Blockchain’s 
characteristics impacting on trust. The findings provide support for extending the 
applicability of this model to Bitcoin technology. Blockchain’s characteristics 
supporting users’ credibility include: honesty ensured by decentralisation and public 
ledger’s transparency; expertise supported by miners’ competence and hard labour; 
predictability supported by the cryptographic protocol; and reputation supported by 
large companies’ interest in Bitcoin. Findings also identified Blockchain’s 
characteristics supporting the other dimensions of trust: ease of use grounded in 
ease and quick transactions; and limited risk due to transactions’ low cost and the 
decentralised, unregulated nature of Blockchain which limits the risk of institutional 
power abuse. Outcomes also suggest a specific technological characteristic 
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perceived as a risk factor: the Blockchain’s purposeful design feature for 
irreversible transactions. The study found the challenge of two-way transactions and 
in particular the offline one which is not captured by the Blockchain. The challenge 
of irreversible transactions is not grounded in people’s distrust on the transaction, 
but in potentially the dishonest part of the transaction, i.e., the payment of fiat 
currency for acquiring the Bitcoins. If this side of the agreement is not fulfilled, 
users would prefer to reverse the Bitcoin transaction, an operation which is not 
possible. An interesting design opportunity here would be exploring new ways of 
tracking this movement of fiat currency (currently not captured) in the Blockchain.  
As a means of exploring users’ support for trusting their transaction partners, 
the study applied the framework on mechanics of trust (Riegelsberger et al., 2005). 
This framework allowed the identification of different sources of trust for each of 
the risk mitigating strategies. Among these strategies for dealing with dishonest 
traders, Bitcoin users engage in decreasing order of preference with exchanges, 
authorised or reputable traders, and ultimately with unknown traders which they 
attempt to de-anonymise. Only the exchanges provide legal authorised services  
(Möser, 2013; Yermack, 2013) while trust in the other types of traders is supported 
mostly by the information about their credibility and reputation within the thick 
relationships (Hardin, 2002) of online user groups. The less reputation-related 
information users can gather about the traders, the stronger the need to de-
anonymise them. Most participants went even further suggesting the value of 
regulating the Blockchain (institutional embeddedness for all types of traders).  
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 Design Implications 4.5
This section discusses the design implications (Sas, Whittaker, Dow, Forlizzi, & 
Zimmerman, 2014) that the findings suggest. This study discusses the need to support 
the transparency of two-way transactions, tools for materialising trust, and tools for 
supporting reversible transactions. These design implications have been developed to 
address the identified trust challenges of dishonest traders, while respecting 
Blockchain’s main characteristics such as decentralisation, unregulation and pseudo-
anonymity. 
  Supporting Transparency of Two-way Transactions  4.5.1
All transactions reported in the study are two-way, most of them sequential 
and asynchronous, i.e., typically one party sends the fiat currency and after 
receiving it, the other party sends the Bitcoins. However, people can only track on 
the Blockchain the movement of Bitcoins. Sending fiat currency can be faked 
through fraudulent statements of transfer.  This coupled with the lack of legally 
authorised partners warranting one’s trust in them, i.e., institutional embeddedness, 
leads to increased risk of defraud from dishonest traders. Such traders are not 
known and cannot be made accountable for failing to complete their part of 
transaction, neither responsible for the retribution it entails. 
 One can imagine creative design methods (Salovaara et al., 2011) and new 
tools for digitally capturing the contents of transactions which is not Bitcoins, to 
ensure that their transfer is also verified, authorised and stored on the public ledger.  
The findings indicate that such content of transaction is often fiat currency. 
Blockchain already provides mechanisms for creating digital tokens backed by fiat 
currency, i.e., Colored Coin, Omni Layer (Tether, n.d.). Such mechanisms can also 
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be harnessed for creating digital tokens (metadata embedded in the Blockchain) 
backed by physical goods, such as the ones explored in the provenance context 
where tokens represent documents accompanying the transaction of goods or 
finances as means of tracking their ownership. Such mechanisms need to remain 
decentralised and to become integrated into the Blockchain interface so that end 
users with limited technical expertise can access and use them. 
  Tools for Materialising Trust in Blockchain  4.5.2
Findings indicate that in the absence of known and stable identities, Bitcoin 
users who engage in transactions with each other rely mostly on social 
embeddedness. As one of the properties warranting trust in another party, social 
embeddedness is reflected in users’ active effort to gather reputation-related 
information about unknown traders, either from people they already trust such as 
close friends, or from members of the online group where most of their social 
learning about Bitcoin technology takes place. One way to better support this data 
gathering is through designing mechanisms for capturing and visualising reputation 
as meta-data linked to a wallet address. Blockchain protocol already supports the 
creation of metadata within a transaction, by allowing the generation of a new 
secure address referencing the metadata. A reputation management system built on 
top of the Blockchain will strongly contribute to the social embeddedness for 
warranting trust among traders. This in turn, motivates traders to keep the same 
wallet address in order to grow their reputation, hence providing more stable, albeit 
still private, identities. For example, Carboni (Carboni et al., 2016) proposed 
vouchers attached to a transaction for the transfer of payment for a service. If the 
buyer is satisfied with the service, he can accept and co-sign the voucher which 
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contains an incentive fee paid by the service provider to the buyer for leaving a 
positive feedback. The reputation score of a service provider could be computed by 
adding the voting fees for that service across Blockchain’s relevant transactions. 
Alternative mechanisms for supporting also the caption of negative feedback are 
much needed.  
 Tools to Support Reversible Transactions 4.5.3
Findings indicate that in the case of dishonest traders, the irreversible Bitcoin 
transactions are problematic. This stems from the lack of transparency of the two-
way transactions: while the transfer of Bitcoins is captured by the Blockchain, the 
counterpart asynchronous transfer of money (or goods) for which people receive (or 
pay Bitcoins) is not. One way of addressing this is by exploring novel mechanisms 
for reversing individual two-way transactions on top of the irreversible Blockchain 
protocol (El Bansarkhani & Sturm, 2016). This is not a trivial issue, as in its current 
form, the Blockchain protocol does not allow reversing transactions which have 
been already confirmed and added to the ledger. One solution would be new tools 
for enabling the de-anonymisation of the owner of disposable wallet addresses 
(discarded after one use). Besides hindering dishonesty, such tools would allow 
users’ to protect their privacy on the Blockchain, while enabling them to contact the 
other party, and request reversing the Bitcoin transfer. This would also support 
social embeddedness, as the reputation of a given trader operating in a local online 
group can well extend beyond the lifetime of a disposable wallet. Other tools could 
leverage the support of multisignature transactions enabled by the Bitcoin protocol 
(El Bansarkhani & Sturm, 2016).  A common example is 2-of-3 transaction model 
where money is placed in a joint address owned by both parties and a third 
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arbitrator, to be signed off once each party is satisfied. If there is a problem, the 
arbitrator will investigate and decide to transfer the payment back to the buyer or to 
the seller. Once the transaction receives 2 out of 3 signatures, it is completed. The 
multisignature tools differ from the escrow services as the arbitrator receives a fee 
agreed by all three parties, but cannot defraud as he will need two signatures for 
this. Surprisingly, no participant mentioned the use of multisignature tools, probably 
because of the same reason they do not engage with the escrow services: perceived 
difficulty of use, or limited awareness of such tools. Future work could further 
explore this. 
 Chapter Summary 4.6
This empirical study investigated Blockchain’s characteristics which support and 
challenge users’ trust, alongside their motivation for Bitcoin use, and strategies for 
mitigating identified risks. The study advances the theory towards a model of trust 
among users of Bitcoin’s decentralised, unregulated and pseudoanonymous technology 
in developing context, and provides insights into the specific tensions around these 
characteristics. Study findings led to a number of design implications that would support 
Bitcoin users develop increased trust in each other, including support for the 
transparency of two-way transactions, tools for materialising trust, and tools for 
supporting reversible transactions. However, those findings and implications designs are 
not reflected to the other types of Bitcoin stakeholders such as miners. Hence, in the next 
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This chapter presents the report on the explorations of Bitcoin miners’ motivations 
and experience in mining the Bitcoin on Blockchain. Each of the enacted Bitcoin 
transactions was authorised by the Blockchain technology distributed ledger of nodes, 
which is known as miners. Its key actors are miners using computational power to solve 
mathematical problems for validating transactions. By sharing Blockchain’s 
characteristics, mining is a decentralised, transparent and unregulated yet profitable 
practice as miners are rewarded in Bitcoins for their successfully validated proof-of-
work. The reward together with the growing value of Bitcoins and their planned scarcity 
has attracted more miners to a practice which has become increasingly competitive and 
computationally demanding. However, apart from modelling-based security research on 
mining, there are limited explorations on miners’ practices from their first-person 
perspective, such as the study on Bitcoin users’ practices as described in Chapter 4. 
In this sense, a study (Study 2) on miners’ motivations, experiences, and how these 
may impact on Blockchain’s different dimensions of trust were conducted. These 
concerns were explored by addressing the following research questions: 
 what are miners’ motivations for Bitcoin mining? 
 what are Bitcoin Blockchain’s characteristics impacting on miners’ trust and its 
dimensions? 
 what is the social organisation of mining practices: are there different 
approaches and types of miners?  
 what are the main trust challenges and how do miners attempt to mitigate them? 
 
It reports on interviews with 20 Bitcoin miners in Malaysia about their practices and 
trust challenge. In the light of HCI theories of trust, Bitcoin mining protocols, and its 
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security threats, findings discuss miners’ motivations, the impact of Blockchain 
characteristics on miners’ trust, social organisation of mining practices and the types of 
miners. The study also discusses the trust related topic including the trust challenges of 
collaborative mining and the way to mitigate the risk of collaborative mining. It 
concludes with the theoretical implications by building a theoretical model of trust 
among Bitcoin miners, the paradox of decentralisation and the challenge of unregulation. 
Finally, it reports on the design implications that include the tools for monitoring has 
power and reward distribution, decentralised tools tracking data centres’ authorisation 
and reputation and tools for developing decentralised pools.  
 Research Method 5.2
For study 2, 20 miners in the age range 22-42 (Mean = 30.6) were recruited. They 
were all male, with different levels of mining expertise: 8 had over 4 years of mining 
experience, 8 had between 1 and 4 years, and the remaining 4 have less than one year. 
Participants had a wide range of professions, including 8 in IT, 1 in the legal services, 2 
engineers, 1 in the medical field, 2 teachers, 2 in the financial sector, and 1 in 
administration. In terms of education, 14 have Bachelor degrees, 4 have Master degrees, 
and the remaining 4 are school leavers. Participants were all Malaysian and the 
recruitment took place via Facebook and Bitcoin Malaysia Telegram group. Prior work 
had also focused on a Malaysian context for exploring Bitcoin-related practices. For 
example, (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017) argued that it offers a unique opportunity as a 
developing country with steady economic growth, increased interest in cryptocurrency 
(FMT Reporters, 2016; MIGHT, 2017; Zhe, Noordin, & Yong, 2016). Malaysia has the 
first Blockchain ledger for the public consortium in Asia (BCE, 2016) aiming by 2025 to 
fully utilise the technology in the whole country (MIGHT, 2017). 
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The recruitment process started by approaching the founder and administrator of the 
Bitcoin Malaysia group on Facebook, followed by his invitation to join the Bitcoin 
Malaysia Telegram group. From within this group, the study publicly posted invitations 
for participating in the study. The study also sent private invitations to the most active 
members of the Telegram group, based on their interest in mining as reflected in their 
contribution to the group’s discussion forum.  
The study conducted semi-structured interviews either face to face or on Skype in 
both English and Bahasa language between May 2016 and June 2016. The aim of the 
study was to explore the mining process from the miners’ perspective, their motivations 
and approaches to mining, as well as the main challenges of this process. The study also 
explored participants’ strategies for mitigating their trust-related risks. The interviews 
lasted between 60 to 90 minutes, were audio recorded and fully transcribed. Data 
analysis followed a hybrid approach with existing concepts being used for the deductive 
coding while new ones, grounded on the empirical data, informed the inductive coding 
(Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The deductive coding included concepts from 
literature on mining protocol such as the mining work process (Caetano, 2015; 
Nakamoto, 2008), mining trends (Acheson, 2007) mining threats (Bradbury, 2013; 
Buterin, 2013b; Corritore et al., 2003; Redman, 2016; Sapirshtein, Sompolinsky, & 
Zohar, 2015) and concepts from the HCI literature on trust such as technological, social 
and institutional dimensions of trust (Sas & Khairuddin, 2015), temporal, social and 
institutional embeddedness (Corritore et al., 2003). The codes were iteratively refined as 
new codes emerged under the theme of mining approaches, dishonest pool 
administrators, and strategies for risk mitigation.  
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  Findings 5.3
To report the findings, we discuss miners’ motivations, the main characteristics of 
Blockchain technology and their impact on miners’ trust. In particular, the study 
highlights the social organisation and competitiveness of mining practices and how it is 
reflected in different approaches to mining and different types of miners. We furthers 
outline the risks of collaborative mining due to centralisation and dishonest 
administrators, and emerging mitigation strategies for addressing them. 
  Motivations of Bitcoin Miners 5.3.1
In this section, we discuss the three sources of motivation for engaging in 
mining practice as highlighted by miners.   
5.3.1.1 Earning Potential through Fee-based Rewards 
Almost half of participants appreciated the earning potential of mining practice 
(Nakamoto, 2008) together with the increasing price of Bitcoins: “Until today I 
am still continuously generating profit from this activity; this is my motivation” 
[P14].  This steady revenue fosters miners’ willingness to continue to invest in 
such lucrative practice by upgrading the mining equipment. Such capital costs are 
needed to ensure competitiveness in the context of increasing mining difficulty.  
5.3.1.2 Experimenting with Bitcoin Blockchain Technology 
The complexity of the Bitcoin mining process is also attractive in itself, as 
mentioned by 3 participants. For example, from initial curiosity, people 
developed an interest in both mining and using Bitcoins: “I have the thought like 
“is this a real thing”? That was the initial direction. Then after mining Bitcoins, I 
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transferred mine to the wallet and tried to sell, thinking that if I can get USD for 
them then this is real” [P16].  In such cases, participants appreciate the hands on 
experience and the knowledge that they gain: “Even though it is considered a 
high capital investment [practice], mining is good in terms of learning” [P11].   
5.3.1.3 Lack of Regulation Regarding Taxation of Miners’ Fees 
Despite its potential to generate income, the taxation regulation of this activity 
is not yet regulated. As it stands, the discretion to pay tax remains with the 
individual miners: “[who may be] willing to pay tax whenever they get the 
Bitcoins from mining” [P1]. There is also a concern that in the future the mining 
practice may become subject to taxation: “if [governments] decide to monitor 
mining activities [like] gold or silver then [they] will ask all Bitcoin miners to 
register with the government” [P2]. This can also have implications with respect 
to the anonymity of that mining practice. 
 Blockchain’s Characteristics Impacting on Miners’ Trust 5.3.2
Blockchain’s key design features related to mining are decentralisation, 
transparency, unregulation, ease of use, and social organisation which have shaped 
mining approach and the emergence of different types of miners. 
5.3.2.1 Decentralised and Transparent Mining Protocol    
More than a quarter of participants valued the mining protocol both in terms of 
its complex validation process: “it uses the cryptographic hashing algorithm to 
secure the network so you cannot [fake] Bitcoins” [P7], and security: “I think it is 
rather difficult at the current computing power for people to hack it” [P10]. Key 
to the mining protocol is the proof-of-work (Nakamoto, 2008), reflecting miners’ 
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systematic and transparent competition for finding the quickest and longest 
solution to a block: “this technology is based on the proof-of-work, where 
everything is calculated mathematically and is transparent” [P18]. Participants 
also expressed appreciation for this cooperative work within the trustless 
Blockchain technology: “the platform is standard; everyone uses the same 
Blockchain, so I don't think there is a trust issue” [P2]. These quotes are 
illustrative of miners’ trust in mining technology: competitive, transparent, and 
decentralised protocol under no control of central entities, which strengthens the 
credibility dimension of online trust outlined in Corritore and colleagues’ model 
(Corritore et al., 2003).  
5.3.2.2 Non-Legally Binding Practice 
No institutional authority such as banks or governments control Blockchain 
and its mining protocol, which in turn limits the risks of their abuse of power 
(Rolnick & Weber, 1997). Although there have been attempts to regulate mining 
as an arguably lucrative and thus taxable practice (Biegel, 2018), in many 
countries including Malaysia, it is not considered illegal. Four participants 
expressed satisfaction with the unregulation of mining practice: “I don’t see any 
issues here: mining is just like you are running a software on a computer” [P17]. 
As a result, miners operate anonymously: “all nodes in the network only know 
each other pseudo anonymously and they have the same privilege but yet they can 
come to the consensus to agree on which record can be written in the database” 
[P11]. This unregulation limits miners’ perceived risks as a dimension in the 
model of online trust (Corritore et al., 2003), increasing their trust in mining 
127 
 
practice. As shown earlier, there is however an awareness that income generated 
through mining may become subject of taxation. 
5.3.2.3 Ease of Use 
Participants appreciated the ease of use of the mining protocol and the limited 
technical skills required. For example, four participants noted their casual 
experience of  Bitcoin mining:  “I just let it run and once in a while, I just check 
to see […] if it doesn't calculate or the block has been full, or if there is 
something to do with my wallet which does not allow to receive the Bitcoins” 
[P2]. Such quotes indicate an important dimension of the online trust (Corritore et 
al., 2003), ease of use of the mining protocol which further supports miners’ trust 
in it. 
 Social Organisation of Mining Practice: Competitiveness 5.3.3
This section explores the complexity characterising the competitiveness of 
Bitcoin mining practices to produce the proof-of-work (Figure 5.2). It focusses on 
different forms of mining and types of miners. The identified forms of mining vary 
across computational power, its ownership and maintenance which showed 
increased complexity over time. The study grouped these forms in individual and 
collective mining, taking place on miners’ home machines or those leased from data 
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Table 5.1: Mining Approaches 
5.3.3.1 Home-Solo Mining 
The first form of mining that has historically emerged consisted of individual 
miners working on their own home machines. A quarter of participants expressed 
appreciation for this cooperative and competitive work requiring limited 
computational power (Nakamoto, 2008). The findings indicate that most 
participants who mined during 2010-12 have engaged in this form of mining: “I 
started as a home miner in 2011, mining on my computer; and at that time 
Bitcoin was not as popular as now” [P5]. This quote is similar to others 
confirming the limited mining difficulty in those early days (Caetano, 2015). 
With this advantage, home miners worked solely enjoying the full rewards of 
their labor: “in early days people used to do solo mining and all profits will 
straight away go into your wallet” [P18]. With no intermediaries between the 
miners and the Bitcoin network, the trust consisted solely of trust in the mining 
protocol, as expressed by three of the participants: “They didn't have any problem 
to trust each other […] they mined by themselves and they were referring to the 
same ledger” [P3]. This quote reflects the characteristics of trustless Blockchain 
mining protocol which provides a transparent and fair competition among miners 
for processing transactions (Nakamoto, 2008). However, at the end of 2010, the 
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mining difficulty has considerably increased (Bitcoinity.org, 2019), This, in turn, 
affected solo miners, due to the small computational power of their individual 
machines. Two participants shared this view: “due to high difficulty, solo mining 
is now no longer relevant” [P12], and it paved the way for collaborative mining, 
and in particular for what the study calls home-pool mining. 
5.3.3.2 Home-Pool Mining 
From solo mining, home miners started to shift towards collaborative mining. 
Mining pools consist of geographically distributed home miners and their 
network of machines pooling together computational resources and share of the 
profits (Acheson, 2007; Caetano, 2015) by acting as a sole entity in the 
competitive solving of blocks problems. A quarter of participants expressed this 
view: “mining pool is actually the entity that controls the hash power in the 
network [and] the income that it generates is divided among miners, according to 
the hash power that they have contributed to that pool” [P4]. This indicates that 
in addition to end miners, a new type of miner has emerged: the pool 
administrator, who creates his own pool, collects the computational power of end 
miners and divides the mining profits to each miner according to their individual 
contributed power. As a home pool tends to be small in size (Morrow, 2014) 
usually consisting of 10-15 miners, the equity of profit distribution is not usually 
an issue. The home-pool mining offers increased the likelihood of success, as 
reported by two participants: “I shared with my friend back in the university to 
buy a second-hand computer and a powerful graphic card. Each of us spent 
around RM 1500 and we started to mine” [P19]. Apart from creating such pools, 
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people also started to join existing pools, as mentioned by four participants: “I 
mined in a pool because with solo mining it is difficult to get profit” [P10].  
 
Figure 5.2: Miner’s Real-time Proof-of-Work 
In late 2012, after the first halving period (Caetano, 2015), the difficulties of 
mining have further increased (Bitcoinity.org, 2019), negatively affecting home 
miners, as noted by almost half of the participants: “from normal CPU I upgraded 
to GPU. The difficulty level was increasing and my system did not generate 
enough coins. So I stop mining around 2012” [P5]. This indicates that even 
though the miners had taken the efforts to improve their machines’ computational 
power, this did not suffice as they faced additional challenges due to higher 
maintenance costs. For example, four participants noted that in order to continue 
to mine competitively, the computational power needs upgrading even during the 
halving periods: “for home mining, let’s say you bought the latest S7 mining 
machine and joined a pool, you can get a few Bitcoins for the first few months. 
[Then] you need to add more hashing power to your machine [because] the 
difficulty of mining keeps increasing. That’s why many home miners retire from 
doing this job” [P17]. In addition, maintenance also relates to high electricity 
cost: “machine is very expensive and the electricity bill can be around RM100k 
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per month. So you won't get your money back unless you go big scale” [P3]. 
Furthermore, three participants pointed to the challenge of locating the machines 
in their homes due to the generated heat: “because my house will be very hot” 
[P3]. Together, these challenges have led twelve of the participants [P1, P3, P4, 
P5, P7, P9, P10, P11, P15, P16, P17 and P19] to retire from home mining, three 
[P2, P12 and P18] to continue upgrade their home mining system by creating so 
called mining farms, with a cluster of machines owned by one person, and located 
outside one’s home, usually in a rented place. One participant considerably scaled 
up his mining systems so that “today I own a data centre company for mining” 
[P6]. The remaining four participants [P8, P13, P14, and P20] joined directly the 
cloud mining through data centres. 
5.3.3.3 Data Centre–Pool Mining 
The increasing challenges of Bitcoin home mining have radically transformed 
it into large scale mining, beyond the confines of miners’ own homes. As noted 
by three participants: “as the difficulty of mining is increasing every day, for now, 
you can only mine at bigger scale” [P10]. Data centres allow “cloud mining, 
where people buy computational power in return for the share of the profit” [P1]. 
As pointed out by one participant, data centres also need to mine in pools in order 
to sustain their profits: “if you want to mine as an owner of a data centre then you 
need to have large capital […] at the same time, you have to join a mining pool 
to make profit” [P1]. To address these challenges Bitcoin data centres have 
started to emerge (Maurer, Nelms, & Swartz, 2013): “the best option is joining 
the cloud mining, where you can buy a share from the owners of the data centre 
to do the mining for you” [P9]. Compared to the home mining, data centres 
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require much larger capital and maintenance costs. These include not only the 
cost of electricity but also of the monitoring equipment and manpower to 
maintain the centre as illustrated in this quote of a data centre administrator: “I 
used special software monitor [...] I can login from my mobile and I am able to 
gather data on the current temperature. I also hire a worker to ensure the cabling 
and network are well maintained” [P6].  
More than a quarter of participants valued the opportunity of data centre-pool 
mining because of the inability to setup their own mining pool: “the difficulty 
today is very high and the electricity cost is expensive too. So it is not worth 
mining at small scale. I think for today, cloud mining is the best way” [P13]. In 
addition, leasing the mining service does not require technical expertise: “data 
centres offer a 3-year contract, when I get my daily profit from the hired miner 
[…] When I joined the program, I got the id and password to access to the 
company website, they also give me a wallet so all profit will be straight away 
sent to my wallet” [P20].  Cloud mining is further appreciated because the 
challenge of machines’ maintenance is met by the data centre, as highlighted by a 
quarter of participants: “for the cloud miners, you don’t have the miner at home. 
It is all maintained in the data centre [so] you don’t have to pay any utilities. But 
you have to pay to the owner of the data centre usually around 20% of the total 
profit” [P5]. A similar quote: “I need to pay around 30% of my daily profit for 
the maintenance fee to the company” [P9]. These indicate that the skills of data 
centres’ administrators for setting and maintaining the mining machines comes at 
nontrivial cost for the end miners.  
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 Types of Miners 5.3.4
Findings indicate four main types of miners: end miners, pool administrators, 
data centre administrators, and Bitcoin core developers. These types differ in their 
expertise, power over the practice, approach to mining and numbers, with the largest 
number represented by the end miners (Figure 5.3). Each of these is further 
discussed.  
 
Figure 5.3: Pyramid of types of miners 
5.3.4.1 Mining Pool Administrators  
Pool administrators have emerged within collaborative mining in order to 
facilitate miners’ access to mining pools. Administrators’ technical skills are 
more advanced than end miners’ as they are required to set up, run and maintain 
the machines within the pools: “currently there are many pools and all miners 
[…] need to go through those pools which are created by the Bitcoin 
administrators” [P5], and “such pools are hard to set up and maintain” [P12]. 
Such specialised technical skills are not easy to master and have given 
administrators the advantage of controlling the mining activity and the 
distribution of reward. In addition, almost half of the participants also 
acknowledge the high level of skills required by administrators who act as pool 
manufacturers to develop more competitive mining chips. Mining pools could be 
 Mining pool administrators 
End miners  
 Data centre administrators 
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joined in by miners with different computational power from end miners owning 
own machines at home (increasingly unprofitable), to those owning mining farms, 
or data centres. 
5.3.4.2 Data Centre Administrators 
The increased mining competition demanded higher computational power. 
This has made room for data centre administrators to enter the scene. They 
provided end miners the opportunity of leasing machines hosted and maintained 
within the data centres: “my friend owns a data centre offering cloud mining 
service” [P5].  The data centres also join mining pools in order to increase their 
likelihood of successful mining, but the decision of which pool to join is made 
solely by the administrator: “the mining process is controlled by the mining 
pool” [P6]. The privilege of pool administrator to distribute rewards to each 
entity in the pool according to the computational power brought in, cascades 
down to the data centre administrator who further distributes such reward to the 
end miners within the centre. 
5.3.4.3 End Miners  
While miners, engaged in solo home mining, had to develop technical skills for 
setting and maintaining their own machines, the emergence of collective mining 
and of administrators supporting it, has led to end miners’ deskilling. More than 
half of the participants noted end miners’ limited technical expertise: “it is very 
easy: I download the software from the pool, I do the setup […] let my leased 
machine run for 24/7 [and]  I monitor it to make sure that it doesn't crash and is 
connected to the internet” [P10].  
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End miners have limited power, as they are at the discretion of pool 
administrators for distributing equitable profits. In order to remain competitive, 
they also have to follow the trend set by their pool administrator for upgrading 
their leased machines: “as a miner, we must regularly update our mining machine 
according to the latest chips produced by the manufacturer, to ensure we are able 
to maintain the reward” [P6].  
 Trust Challenges of Collaborative Mining 5.3.5
The benefits of collaborative mining are offset by some important trust-related 
challenges. These pertain to the risks of mining protocol and centralisation of 
mining practices, as well as the challenge of social trust between end miners and 
data centres/pool administrators.  
5.3.5.1 Risks of Mining Protocol 
An important finding is the three challenges of the mining protocol pointed out 
by most of the participants. These relate to the increased time for acquiring block 
confirmation, limited block size, and limited number of full nodes. Interestingly, 
each of these technology-related risks stems from the purposefully designed 
Blockchain protocol. For instance, multiple confirmations required for recording 
a block was intended to limit the risk of double spending (Acheson, 2007; 
Caetano, 2015), but their numbers increased from 3 to 6 leading to delays: “the 6 
confirmations waiting time is bothering me a lot” [P12], or unconfirmed blocks: 
“there were also cases when there was no confirmation for quite sometimes, and 
the Bitcoins were eventually returned back to you” [P19].  
The current Blockchain protocol also limits the size of each block to 1MB and 
about half of the participants expressed concerns: “this block size limits the 
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transactions acting as a bottleneck” [P18]. This challenge has received 
considerable attention in the security field (Hearn, 2015), and led to increased 
mining’s competitiveness and incentive-based fees: “people have to increase the 
mining fee to give a chance to their transactions to be included in the block; 
however, this removes the benefit of cheap transactions” [P12]. Not at least, there 
is a shortage of full nodes designed to host a full copy of the Blockchain: “we 
have about 6000 full nodes and the number is not sufficient to support the current 
demand” [P1].  
Although critical for the decentralisation of Blockchain, the full nodes are 
resource-demanding (Acheson, 2007), and many end miners lack the incentive to 
host them. Perceived risk in technology is one of the three factors in Corritore and 
colleagues’ model of online trust (Corritore et al., 2003). The findings point to 
these Blockchain design features as risks minimising end miners’ trust in the 
protocol, especially since they lack both control and high level expertise needed 
to address them. 
5.3.5.2 Dishonest End Miners: Selfish Attacks Unconfirmed 
A striking finding is our limited empirical evidence of selfish miners’ attacks 
commonly discussed in security research (Buterin, 2013b; Eyal & Sirer, 2014; 
Redman, 2016; Sapirshtein et al., 2015; Torpey, 2015). First, the majority of 
participants are not aware of such attacks. Second, for the few ones that were 
aware of selfish miners’ attacks, two out of three participants  expressed 
optimism: “for me, that is just a theoretical concern [because] such attack can 
only take place  only if one has [considerable] computational power [which] I 
would say it is not possible” [P1]. In addition, another participant extends this 
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argument claiming that even if selfish miners’ attacks occur, they can be detected 
by the protocol: “yes, this can happen […] but after a while, the system will know 
[…] then the system will put the mining server to one side,  so then other miners 
will know that they can't trust that particular mining server at this IP address” 
[P7].  
Thus, the findings support the theoretical perspective of Bitcoin core 
developers, as key stakeholders in the mining process (Kow & Lustig, 2018) on 
the reduced likelihood of such attacks (Buterin, 2013b; Torpey, 2015). Indeed, in 
his original white paper, Nakamoto (Nakamoto, 2008) mentioned that the Bitcoin 
network is secure, providing that the attacking power does not exceed the total 
collaborative power of the trust nodes. This may be different in the dystopian 
future suggested by two participants, where the advent of quantum computing 
may provide sufficient computational power to one pool for a 51% attack: 
“current computing power is too high to hack […] but with the future quantum 
computer […] there is a possibility that the Bitcoin network will be affected” 
[P18]. Although mining is an anonymous practice, the IP of the machine is visible 
online, acting as a proxy for its miner. While selfish miners can change their 
machines, this is unlikely to happen often, which means that the IP offers a 
history of the mining behavior’s trustworthiness. This provides support for the 
temporal and social embeddedness as contextual properties of the framework on 
mechanics of trust (Rolnick & Weber, 1997). 
5.3.5.3 Centralisation of Mining Practices 
Findings indicate that mining is a highly competitive practice which requires 
increasing investment in computational power so that miners could continue to 
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generate profit. This trend is consistent with the planned scarcity of Bitcoins 
(Bitcoinity.org, 2019). Figure 5.3 shows that the distribution of power among 
miners is not equal, but concentrated towards the top and middle level of the 
pyramid.  
Centralisation is critical with respect to miners’ social trust as it entails power 
imbalance between end miners on the one hand, and mining administrators and 
core developers on the other hand. It is also aligned with higher technical skills, 
so that end miners joining pools face the risk of deskilling and of lower profit 
distributed by the pool administrators.  
Centralisation of mining occurs both at pool level and between pools, with 
larger ones contributing with a higher percentage of computational power: “there 
is a lot of centralisation in a mining pool. Each of the larger pools controls like 
20-30% of the contributed hash rate. So miners were actually controlled by the 
pool that they joined” [P12].  
Findings also indicate centralisation by geography, with several participants 
acknowledging China’s massive growth in miners’ number [P6] and its 
dominance of Bitcoin mining practices: “it may have the authority to control the 
Bitcoins price because its largest Bitcoin market share” [P5]. This dominance is 
supported by China’s low cost energy supply (Wilson, 2016) and effective mining 
techniques: “they mine in a very professional way [through] lower and upper 
cooling systems and proper server racks [using] professional hydroelectric 
generator and water cooling system to reduce the cost” [P16]. China also 
considers legalising mining practice (Evander, 2016) and is an innovation leader 
in mining manufacturing: “capable of designing chips […] to shrink the size and 
improve the mining process” [P3]. These findings challenge the credibility of 
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mining behaviour, as a dimension of online trust in Corritore and colleagues’ 
model (Corritore et al., 2003) suggesting that end miners’ trust in higher level 
miners is negatively affected. It also indicates the perceived risk of centralisation, 
with risk being a limiting dimension of trust in the above model (Corritore et al., 
2003). 
 Dishonest Mining Pool and Data Centre Administrators 5.3.6
This section further unpacks the challenge of social trust between end miners 
and data centres/ pool administrators. For this, the study describes its main sources, 
stemming from the limited regulatory framework for sanctioning dishonest 
behaviour: lack of audit for the distribution of rewards, invisibility of data centres 
offering cloud mining, and administrators’ lack of accountability. 
5.3.6.1 Lack of Audit for the Distribution of Rewards 
The most common trust challenge of dishonest mining pools or data centre 
administrators relates to their privileged position of collecting the computational 
power of their end miners in order to proportionally distribute the rewards. 
Unfortunately, some administrators abuse this power, a trust issue mentioned by 
almost half of the participants: “a trust issue between miners and pool 
administrators may arise because the administrators are responsible for 
collecting all the hashing power and distributing the accurate rewards to all 
miners” [P3].  
This challenge is due to the limited shared knowledge or audit trail of the 
pool’s or data centre’s overall hash power, which in turn, allows the 
administrators to report inaccurately smaller profits for their end miners. Indeed, 
dishonest administrators may claim higher hashes power to attract miners to join 
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in, but report underperformance with respect to the targeted amount of blocks, 
which in turn allows them to deliver unfairly smaller rewards: “each [large] pool 
controls like 20-30% of the hash rate and this amount is not known by the miner” 
[P12].  
Prior work has confirmed this lack of transparency with respect to the pool’s 
hash power (Wirdum, 2016a). This outcome extends the value of online 
information for supporting website credibility (Beldad, Jong, & Steehouder, 
2010; Fui et al., 2002) to mining pools and data centres, particularly the need for 
information regarding the overall computational power and transparent 
mechanisms for reward distribution. 
5.3.6.2 The Invisibility of Data Centres 
An interesting finding relates to the lack of visibility of the cloud computing 
infrastructure underpinning data centres. Several participants pointed this out: “I 
don’t have 100% trusts in all mining programs that I joined because it is 
something that I cannot see. I don’t even know if the data centre really exists” 
[P8]. Even if the location of the data centre is known, the lack of visibility of the 
hired machine leads to additional trust challenges: “I have invested my money, 
but actually, I don’t even see the machine that I bought. It is all kept in the data 
centre and all I was told is that it is based in Iceland” [P20]. This lack of 
visibility of cloud computing is an important technology-based trust challenge 
which has started to be explored (Pearson & Benameur, 2010; Redman, 2016). 
The findings further highlight the importance of online information (Pearson & 
Benameur, 2010; Redman, 2016) to support trust in data centres, particularly in 
terms of their physical presence, contactable local representatives, testimonial-
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based reputation, and authorisation from the local administration. Data centres are 
service providers which arguably should operate within a regulatory framework, 
and it is surprising that the findings suggest otherwise.  
5.3.6.3 Mining Program Scams: Lack of Accountability 
A critical trust challenge relates to deceitful mining programs mentioned by 
two participants, one of whom has been a scam victim: “I have joined a mining 
program […] at first everything looked fine: I received Bitcoins every day for 2 
weeks, but then it stopped. I tried to contact the person who introduced me to that 
mining program but he couldn’t be reached and I realised that it was actually a 
scam” [P8]. This quite illustrates the concern for leveraging data centres’ 
unfunded reputation for attracting end miners, since there are no legal 
implications of such dishonest behaviour. From the perspective of mechanics of 
trust’s framework, these findings shed light into end miners’ limited trust on 
higher level miners because of the lack of institutional embeddedness 
(Riegelsberger et al., 2005) for legally sanctioning more powerful miners acting 
dishonestly. 
 Mitigating Trust Risks of Collaborative Mining  5.3.7
Findings indicate that end miners employ two strategies for mitigating the 
risks of social trust in pool or data centre administrators. These include selecting 
reputable major pools, and decentralising collaborative mining.  
5.3.7.1 Selecting Reputable Major Pools 
To address the risk of mining program scams and of unfair distribution of 
rewards, most miners engage in careful scrutiny of the pool to be joined: “you 
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must make sure to choose a reputable pool” [P3]. This is not trivial as findings 
indicate that the information provided by the data centres to support such scrutiny 
is limited which in turn adds to their invisibility challenge.  
Unsurprisingly, reputable pools are large and most miners select major pools: 
“the main thing is to make sure that the pool is good enough, by looking at the 
pool contributions and if it is about 30% of the overall, then I think it is good 
enough” [P18]. Through their proven history of acting in good faith, reputable 
major pools offer proxy ways towards reputation, through the motivation to 
preserve future behaviour. This strategy confirms the framework on mechanics of 
trust (Riegelsberger et al., 2005) on warranting end miners’ trust in pool 
administrators because of their reputation (social embeddedness and credibility), 
albeit not institutional embeddedness. Prior work has emphasised the importance 
of accountability in cloud computing to be supported both technically and legally 
(Riegelsberger et al., 2005). While reputable pools are perceived as fair, they are 
not necessarily regulated in terms of being accountable for failing to deliver their 
contracts with end miners. Indeed, pools do not divulge the identity of their 
administrators other than by their IP addresses. 
5.3.7.2 Decentralising Collaborative Mining 
A consequence of end miners’ preference for reputable large pools is their 
growth in size, to an extent that such pools could challenge the decentralisation 
principle of mining protocol (Caetano, 2015). A major concern here is that when 
largest pools are getting close to representing 50% of the network’s hash power, 
they can enable serious negative behaviours such as reversing transactions and 
double spending (Buterin, 2013b; Sapirshtein et al., 2015; Torpey, 2015). In an 
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attempt to address miners’ centralisation and circumvent pool administrators, 
miners have engaged in “initiatives to build decentralised pool such as the 
P2Pool” [P12]. Such pools benefit from the advantage of collaborative mining 
but without the need of a central administrator (Gervais, Karame, Capkun, & 
Capkun, 2014). This strategy strengthens the pool’s credibility and reputation, 
reducing the risk of administrators’ abuse of power. A limitation of these 
decentralised pools is that they are challenging to build, currently small with 
limited share of the network’s computational power and need time to grow 
(Gervais et al., 2014). An alternative strategy to address the challenge of 
centralisation of collaborative mining is its self-organisation, with miners 
voluntarily leaving those pools at the risk of gaining too much hash power, or 
administrators incentivising such behaviour by increasing the pool’s fees 
(Hajdarbegovic, 2014). These strategies strengthen the credibility dimension of 
online trust depicted in Corritore and colleagues’ model (Corritore et al., 2003), 
as well as the intrinsic properties warranting trust from the framework on 
mechanics of trust (Riegelsberger et al., 2005) such as benevolence and 
trustworthiness of end miners and pool administrators. 
 Theoretical Implication 5.4
This section discusses the value of the findings for HCI research on trust. Recent work 
has argued that the exploration of Bitcoin-related practices offers unique opportunities to 
understand trust, as they challenge common assumptions of financial transactions’ 
centralisation and regulation (Sas & Khairuddin, 2015). Given the study’s focus on a 
developing country, the implications are mostly relevant for mining in such contexts. 
They may also hold value for understanding and supporting trust in Bitcoin mining 
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practices worldwide, as future work in this emerging research area may focus on 
exploring.  
 Towards a Framework of Trust among Bitcoin Miners  5.4.1
The findings contribute towards a model of trust among Bitcoin miners. They 
extend previous outcomes on the feasibility of HCI trust theories (Corritore et al., 
2003; Riegelsberger et al., 2005; Sas & Khairuddin, 2015) and their application not 
only to Bitcoin users (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017) but also to miners (Figure 5.4). The 
study identified Blockchain’s characteristics impacting on trust. Those supporting 
trusts include the decentralisation, unregulation, and ease of use of the mining 
protocol, while those impeding trusts consist of specific protocol-related risks, the 





Figure 5.4: Framework of Bitcoin Trust for Miners 
 
According to Sas and Khairuddin’s (Sas & Khairuddin, 2015) Bitcoin trust 
framework, the findings indicate that the purposefully designed decentralisation and 
unregulation strengthen miners’ technological trust. With respect to social trust, 
outcomes suggest that the main challenge is not among end miners, but between end 
miners and dishonest pool and data centre administrators. In return, findings suggest 
that the end miners who decided to mine in a major pool also prefer to create a 
decentralised pool for mining. In terms of institutional trust, similar to Bitcoin users, 













     collaborative 
        mining 
 
Bitcoin miners value the  





practices mitigates their perceived risk of abuse of power (Subramanian & Chino, 
2015). Interestingly, because of the unregulation, governments’ trust in mining 
practice is lacking behind. 
The application of the model of online trust (Corritore et al., 2003) indicates 
miners’ ambivalence towards the technological trust in mining protocol. Findings 
highlight specific protocol related characteristics impacting on the three dimensions 
of trust: credibility, ease of use, and risks. In addition to decentralisation, the 
credibility of the trustless mining protocol is ensured by its transparency, social 
organisation, competitiveness, predictability, reputation, and embedded high level 
expertise of the core developers. Miners’ trust in the protocol is also supported by 
its ease of use, but challenged by the risks of increased time for acquiring block 
confirmation, limited block size, and number of full nodes. 
The framework on mechanics of trust (Riegelsberger et al., 2005) allowed the 
study to explore the social trust among different types of miners and in particular 
the end miners’ risk mitigation strategies for dealing with dishonest pool and data 
centre administrators. Interestingly, although the trust among end miners has not 
been flagged as salient, the continual use of a mining machine offers through its IP a 
proxy indicator for miner’s reputation (temporal and social embeddedness) (Pearson 
& Benameur, 2010). However, given the invisibility of cloud mining, 
administrators’ reputation is more critical and therefore mechanisms for signalling it 
are much needed. Additional reasons include the risk of scam due to administrators’ 
lack of accountability and lack of audit for the distribution of mining rewards. To 
address these risks, end miners’ select large pools which have been around for a 
while and have gathered a large number of end miners. Pools’ history offers a proxy 
for their reputation (social embeddedness and credibility), but their administrators 
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continue to lack the ability to be legally sanctioned for dishonest behaviour 
(Riegelsberger et al., 2005). The study also follows Sas and Khairuddin‘s (Sas & 
Khairuddin, 2015) Bitcoin trust framework which consists of three dimensions: 
institutional, social, and technological trust, to conceptualize miners’ trust. 
Institutional trust can be seen as capturing miners’ limited trust in the centralised 
financial system; social trust as describing the credibility of well-known, large 
mining pools, while technological trust as capturing perceived credibility of 
transparent mining procedures, perceived ease of use of such structured mining 
procedures, and perceived risk regarding for instance the timeliness of block 
confirmation, limitation of block size and that of insufficient number of full nodes. 
 Design Implication 5.5
This section discusses the design implications (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017) that the 
findings entailed. They highlight the value of new tools for monitoring hash power and 
reward distribution in data centres and mining pools, decentralised tools for tracking data 
centres’ authorisation and reputation, and authoring tools for supporting end miners’ 
development of decentralised pools. These design implications have been developed to 
address the identified social trust challenges of dishonest administrators, and the risk of 
centralisation of mining practices. 
 Tools for Monitoring Hash Power & Reward Distribution  5.5.1
Findings indicate that the most challenging social trust issue of collaborative 
mining is the unfair distribution of rewards that pools’ and data centres’ 
administrators are privileged to perform. This is rooted in a lack of audit of pool’s 
and data centres’ computational power. The contracts between miners and pool 
administrators state the fixed hash rate that the miner will contribute to the pool 
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over a period of time, for which s/he will be rewarded. The study knows little, 
however, about the legally bounding nature of such contracts or about the 
consequences for dishonest administrators. Moreover, because of anonymity and 
lack of regulation, miners tend to enjoy untaxed rewards, but this comes at the cost 
of limited opportunities to legally mobilize and unionize themselves as a workforce. 
Future work can explore miners’ and administrators’ contractual obligations and the 
feasibility of Blockchain smart contracts to support them and better protect miners 
from exploitative relationships. This opens up design opportunities regarding smart 
contracts to ensure fair rewards and to better support less regulated social contracts. 
Another way to address this challenge is to design monitoring tools to support 
such an audit and provide transparent mechanisms for the distribution of rewards. 
Such tools will automatically capture and report key metrics involved in the 
calculation of profits: overall percentage of pools’ or data centres’ computing power 
contributed to the network, the number of solved blocks within time unit, the total 
computing power used to solve each block (Buterin, 2013b; Wirdum, 2016b) as 
well as daily total reward, together with the percentage of profit due to each end 
miner based on their individual power contribution. Mechanisms to implement these 
have started to emerge, for instance, in Slush Pool’s transparent calculation of hash-
proof-rate (Slush Pool, 2017). This could be extended with open source monitoring 
dashboards accessible to end miners.  
 Decentralised Tools Tracking Data Centers’ Authorisation and Reputation 5.5.2
Study outcomes also highlight social trust challenges related to the invisibility 
of cloud mining and lack of accountability of data centers’ administrators. In 
addition to administrators’ willingness to share online information regarding their 
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data centre’s authorisation, their social and institutional embeddedness 
(Riegelsberger et al., 2005) can be further strengthened. For example, there are 
already attempts to centralise information on authorised data centres offering cloud 
mining services ( Adoga, Rabiu, & Audu, 2014). Data centres’ online resources can 
be aligned with heuristics for trustworthy websites (Sillence et al., 2006) that can be 
tailored to the data centres’ websites to increase their trustworthiness among the 
miners, i.e., trust cues. In addition, the data centres themselves can become 
authorised and recorded in the Blockchain through smart contracts containing 
details such as data centre’s physical location which will be transparent to all 
current and future miners. This again can open up opportunities to explore smart 
contracts and their affordances to better support communication of data centres’ 
trustworthiness. The study can also imagine tools included in database interface for 
supporting end miners to provide reputation feedback. This, in turn, can help miners 
to make informed choices for joining specific data centres. 
 Tools for Developing Decentralised Pools 5.5.3
Findings indicate the risk of mining’s centralisation in larger pools which conflicts 
with the decentralisation principle of Blockchain and mining protocol (Acheson, 
2007). A strategy for addressing this challenge is the development of fully 
decentralised pools with no central administrator. Although this has been previously 
suggested, the development of such pools requires technical competency not easily 
available among end miners (Gervais et al., 2014). One solution would be new 
authoring tools supporting and incentivising end miners to develop decentralised 
pools. Their design can benefit by drawing from research on the end-user 
development of open source software and their design tools (Sas & Neustaedter, 
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2017). The study can also think of opportunities to create design platforms to not 
only train but also to incentivize miners to create their own mining pools. This 
design implication also aligns with prior views, such as  Buterin’s (Buterin, 2013a) 
suggestion for open source cross-platform applications (Sharma, 2017) allowing end 
miners to create mining pools through simple user interfaces.  
 Chapter Summary 5.6
The interview study described in this chapter explored Blockchain’s characteristics 
fostering and hindering miners’ trust, and, in particular, the risks of collaborative mining 
and miners’ strategies for mitigating them. The study further advanced the theory 
towards a model of Blockchain trust by discussing how decentralisation, unregulation, 
ease of use, and social organisation impact on both technological and social trust among 
different types of miners. Findings also led to three design implications that will support 
Blockchain miners develop trust in pool and data centre administrators, or circumvent 
their role together. Advances the understanding of miners’ work practices on Blockchain 
in this chapter, offers the opportunities for materialising the Blockchain infrastructures 
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Blockchain is a disruptive technology which has significantly challenged assumptions 
that underpin financial institutions and has provoked innovation strategies that have the 
potential to change many aspects of the digital economy. However, because of its 
novelty and complexity, Blockchain had challenged people’s understanding of its inner 
working. Due to its complexity, different modalities have been explored to communicate 
the principles of the Blockchain, and support their understanding and learning primarily 
through visual representations in the form of infographics (Cartwright, 2018) or (The 
Guardian, 2014) video. In contrast, the value of physical objects for communicating 
about Blockchain has been limitedly explored, with some preliminary work suggesting 
the value of Lego blocks for Blockchain experts and novices to communicate and 
describe its entities (Maxwell et al., 2015). However, this study argues that there is an 
untapped potential of physical three-dimensional artefacts to not only communicate 
about Blockchain but also to support the understanding of the key properties of its core 
entities and the provision of a richer vocabulary to talk about them. 
Thus, building on the understanding of miners’ practices on Blockchain from  
Chapter 5, and the concepts of embodied cognition and material centred-design, this 
chapter reports an innovative approach to the design of BlocKit: a physical three-
dimensional kit for materialising Blockchain infrastructure and its key entities. Through 
an engagement with different materials such as clay, paper, or transparent containers, the 
study identified important properties of 11 Blockchain entities and materialised them 




 Designing BlocKit 6.2
The study employed the physical design framework (Wiberg & Mikael, 2014) to 
design the BlocKit and its objects. Based on literatures (Antonopoulos, 2010; Nakamoto, 
2008) and empirical findings(Khairuddin et al., 2016; Khairuddin & Sas, 2019; Sas & 
Khairuddin, 2015, 2017), the study identified 11 key entities of Blockchain 
infrastructure: Bitcoins wallet (Antonopoulos, 2010; Caetano, 2015; Sas & Khairuddin, 
2017), wallet password (Caetano, 2015) private and public key as elements involved in 
transactions (Caetano, 2015), miners’ computational power (Antonopoulos, 2010; 
Caetano, 2015; Khairuddin & Sas, 2019; Sas & Khairuddin, 2017), block 
(Antonopoulos, 2010; Caetano, 2015; Khairuddin & Sas, 2019) proof-of-work, and its 
timestamp (Antonopoulos, 2010; Caetano, 2015; Khairuddin & Sas, 2019), as elements 
reflecting miners’ work on Blockchain ledger, and Blockchain technology itself. The 
study now outlines the key properties of these Blockchain entities and the linguistic 
analysis of their relevant image schemata (Hurtienne, 2009). 
 Identifying the Properties of Blockchain’s Key Entities 6.2.1
The key properties of the identified Blockchain’s entities are outlined in Table 
6.1. A reflection on these concepts, grounded again on prior work, allowed the 
identification of their properties, briefly defined, alongside their rationale. For 
example, as a currency, the key properties of Bitcoins reflect traditional properties 
of money (Trivedi, 2018) such as fungible as Bitcoins are interchangeable (Hayes, 
2015.), divisible as each Bitcoin can be divided into 100 million smaller parts 
(Antonopoulos, 2010), and  scarce as the total number of Bitcoins is capped to 21 
Million (Trivedi, 2018). Bitcoins are also portable as Bitcoins’ ownership can be 
transferred and they can be hosted on multiple devices (Antonopoulos, 2010; 
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Caetano, 2015), and durable as Bitcoins are meant to last indefinitely (Trivedi, 
2018), verifiable as each Bitcoin transaction is recorded in the public ledger 
(Antonopoulos, 2010), safe as they are protected by their owner (Khairuddin & Sas, 
2019) and private as the ownership is private (IG Analyst, 2017). The wallet, its 
password as well as the public and private keys are also portable (Antonopoulos, 
2010; Caetano, 2015), verifiable, and safe because of cryptographic protection 
(Antonopoulos, 2010; Caetano, 2015; Khairuddin & Sas, 2019). While all these 
elements are visible to their owners, the wallet and public key are also visible within 
the Blockchain, or transparent (Antonopoulos, 2010; Caetano, 2015; Khairuddin & 
Sas, 2019). 
 
With respect to miners’ work, their consensus rule, block, proof-of-work and 
its timestamp are all transparent, verifiable, durable and safe, being protected 
Entities 
Properties 
Fungible Divisible Scarce Accepted Durable Transparent Portability  Verifiable  Safe Private 
Bitcoins 
 
     X     
Wallet    X X      
Wallet’s 
password 
   X  X     
Public key    X X     X 




   X X     X 
Consensus 
rule 
         X 
Block    X      X 
Proof-of-
work 
         X 
Timestamp    X      X 
Blockchain 
ledger 
         X 
  
Table 6.1: Properties of Blockchain's Key Entities 
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through a secure cryptographic hash function (SHA-256) (Antonopoulos, 2010; 
Caetano, 2015). Underpinning the commonly agreed consensus rules for block 
verification (Caetano, 2015), the specific block of transactions to be verified, 
miners’ proof-of-work and its timestamp are all publicly visible to be scrutinised 
(verifiable) by other miners before they are accepted (Caetano, 2015; Khairuddin & 
Sas, 2019).  
The Blockchain technology itself is also transparent and verifiable, as with the 
exception of wallet password and private keys, all its other entities are visible and 
open for public scrutiny, or verification (Antonopoulos, 2010; Caetano, 2015). 
Blockchain technology has been also designed to be safe given its mathematical and 
cryptographic foundation (Caetano, 2015; Khairuddin & Sas, 2019) and portable as 
the public ledger can be accessed on multiple devices in the network. Although 
theoretically, it is possible for a large amount of computing power to change the 
existing records in the Blockchain, the ledger has been proven as durable and 
protected by the consensus rules (Bitcoin Wiki, n.d.; Caetano, 2015; Khairuddin & 
Sas, 2019). 
 Image Schemata for Blockchain’s Key Entities 6.2.2
According to image schemata theory (Hampe & Grady, 2005; Johnson, 1987) and 
linguistic analysis, most entities can be best described as containers, while Bitcoins 
and blocks are described as part-whole schemata. For example, Bitcoins can be 
represented as a whole, i.e., 1 Bitcoin, or part, i.e., fractional Bitcoin amount in 8 
decimal points; while wallet can be represented as a container in and out of which 




Entities Linguistic Analysis of Entity’s Activities Image Schemata 
Bitcoins Whole  1 Bitcoin 
Part Any fractional Bitcoin amount in 8 decimal points 
Part-whole 
Wallet In  Bitcoins, Private Key, Public Key 




In  Wallet Credential  
Out  Wallet Credential 
Container 
Public key In  Wallet Identity 
Out  Wallet Identity 
Container 
Private key In  Unspent Bitcoins 
Out Spent Bitcoins 
Container 
Consensus rule In  New Bitcoins transaction, New Block 
Out Validated transaction, Confirmed block 
Container 
Block Full Unprocessed transaction in the memory pool 





In  New Unconfirmed block, Mining Difficulty 
Out New confirmed block Container 
Proof- of- work In  Mathematical Algorithm 
Out Solution to Mathematical Algorithm 
Container 
Time Stamp In Proof-of-work 




In New confirmed block and its’ metadata 
Out New Bitcoins’ ownership 
Container 
 
Table 6.2: Image Schemata of Blockchain Entities 
 BlocKit’s Objects 6.2.3
To identify the physical objects to represent Blockchain's key entities (Table 
6.2) and their image schemata, the study employed Wiberg’s (Wiberg & Mikael, 
2014) framework to inform the choice of their materials. For example, for Bitcoins 
the study first explored materials such as paper and magnetic sand this supports 
divisibility, i.e., splitting a unit into smaller parts. However, such material fails to 
provide support for other key properties such as durability, i.e., a paper is too 
fragile, and magnetic sand lacks firm structure. Hence, the study chose clay which is 
both divisible and durable, and shaped into small discs resembling coins with the 




Figure 6.2: BlocKit Representation of a Blockchain’s Entities 
 
For the wallet, the study started exploring materials such as wood or metal-
safe boxes, which can be locked. However, such materials fail to account for 
wallet’s transparency thus; the study chose to represent the wallet through a clear 
plastic box with a coin slot to allow for the visibility of depositing coins, as well as 
a toggle latch ensuring security. In addition, as each wallet is protected by a 
password which cannot be retrieved, if the owner loses the wallet’s key, the study 
chose a metal padlock and its physical key which can also be displaced and no 
longer found, but at the same time both the padlock and its key are made of durable, 
metal material symbolising the sturdy character of the password. To represent the 
public keys and their transient character, the study explored sticky notes which is 
made of paper is less durable or safe. Through their inherent ability to attach 
themselves to other objects, sticky notes are good candidates for communicating 
public keys’ ability to be attached to and travel with the wallet (portable). The study 
A B C D E 
G 
H 
I J K 
F 
A- Bitcoins  
B– Wallet’s Password 
C– Private Key  
D– Proof-of-Work 
I- Timestamp 
J- Blockchain Ledger  
K- Consensus Rules  
E- Public Key 
F- Block 





also provided an additional black envelope for the private key to communicate its 
privacy.  
To represent the consensus rules, the study started using a container for each 
rule. However, rules are interlinked, and so should be these containers, hence, the 
study chose a transparent drawer on whose compartments the study placed symbols 
representing the rules, such as verifying the digital signature, double spending and 
the block file format. For the block whose role is to hold a collection of 
unconfirmed transactions, the study chose a transparent plastic box that can be 
opened and closed (but not necessarily locked). Miners’ computational power is 
linked to their machines. At first, the study thought to represent it with a miniature 
model of a personal computer but realised that this fails to capture variation in 
miners’ computational power. Thus, the study decided to use a battery powered-
object such as candlelight whose variation in brightness level can be controlled and 
can metaphorically represent different levels of computational power, i.e., more 
bright is more power.  
As proof-of-work involves solving a numerical problem, the study used post-it 
paper and pen as metaphorical tools for solving the problem. Given the importance 
of assigning time-stamp to the proof-of-work, the study used a physical stamp. The 
representation of Blockchain ledger consisted of a clear plastic sheet overlaid with 
an additional clear plastic sheet of equal size on which the study drew confirmed 
blocks organised in a grid or two-dimensional array. This was intended as a 
metaphor for the interrelationships among blocks (Hampe & Grady, 2005) shows 
the representations of the Blockchain entities. 
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 Chapter Summary 6.3
BlocKit is a physical representation of Blockchain infrastructures that was built based 
on the entities properties, embodied cognition theories and material centred-design. The 
BlocKit was constructed as a new methodological approach to design on the Blockchain, 
in particular, with the aim to externalize the complex Blockchain infrastructure to 
facilitate the users’ understanding and communication in the exploration to design for 
trust in Blockchain.  However, it requires validations by the Blockchain’s’ experts as 






















7   Evaluation of BlocKit 
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The sophisticated technology of Blockchain was designed with core characteristics 
such as transparent and decentralised that support the users’ trust towards the 
technology, as reported in Study 1 (Chapter 4). However, the highlighted issue from the 
finding in Study 1 is on the social trust among the users in conducting peer-to-peer 
transactions for the exchange of Bitcoin and physical goods or fiat money. Although 
Bitcoin transactions are transparent on Blockchain, the process of sending the physical 
goods or fiat money is not. This leads to issues of trust such as dishonest trader, scams 
and fraud. Mitigating actions among users have been taken such as by trading with 
authorised exchanges
1
, socially authorised traders
2





. This study argues that there are opportunities to mitigate 
the issue on Blockchain. In making the efforts to explore the design for trust on 
Blockchain, it is hard to understand and communicate with the complex technology of 
Blockchain. Thus, the construction of BlocKit in Chapter 6 offers an exploration to 
verify the abilities of this DIY kit for design as well as to support the understanding of 
Blockchain. 
In order to evaluate the BlocKit, a study has been conducted (Study 3) with Bitcoin 
Blockchain experienced users. The participants were presented with the 11 objects of 
BlocKit with the aim of addressing the following research questions: 
 how can complex infrastructure such as Blockchain technologies be thought 
about and communicated through a physical kit?  
                                                          
1
 Authorised Exchanges – The registered company for Bitcoin exchange (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017) 
2
 Socially authorised traders – The well-known members who are active in Bitcoin trading in online groups (Sas 
& Khairuddin, 2017) 
3
 Reputable individual traders – Traders that are recognised by few members in online group who had 
experience trading with that particular trader  (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017) 
4
 De-anonymised individual traders – completely unknown trader and deanonymised actions are taken for the 
transactions, such as face to face meet up. (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017) 
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 how does the development and engagement with a physical kit support 
understanding of Blockchain entities and their key qualities? 
 how can trust among Bitcoin users be materialised and designed for through 
BlocKit?  
 what are the requirements to design for trust among Bitcoin users? 
The findings describe the Bitcoin Blockchain experienced users’ experience in 
interacting with the kit and its value as a model materialising Blockchain. In the light of 
this evaluation, the findings discussed the suggestion for objects revisions, as well as the 
BlocKit’s impact on conforming, strengthening, or even challenging Bitcoin Blockchain 
experienced users mental models of Blockchain infrastructure. Their engagements with 
BlocKit to explore the design for trust are also reported, as well as their suggestions for 
the principles and requirements to design for trust in Bitcoin users.  
 Research Method  7.2
Study 3 reports on a workshop with 15 Bitcoin Blockchain experienced users, 12 
males, 3 females, and (mean age 29, range 21-39). All participants had at least 2 years of 
engaging in Bitcoin transactions: 9 had between 2 and 3 years, 4 had between 4 and 5 
years, 2 had more than 6 years. All participants have at least graduate education, i.e., 6 
BSc, 7 MScs, and 2 PhD Participants were recruited through the mailing lists of two 
universities, and through a local Bitcoins meetup group.  
The workshop involving the use of the BlocKit and consisted of two parts to explore 
the mental models of the Bitcoin Blockchain experienced users, also how they 
materialise trust. The study started by asking them how Bitcoins transactions take place 
on the Blockchain after the study showed them the BlocKit’s 11 objects to simulate 
transactions while thinking aloud. 
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The participants were also been asked questions about challenges of identifying 
objects’ and their role in Blockchain: “what are you looking for”, “why do you think this 
object does not work for you” or “how should this Blockchain entity be better 
represented”. In the second part, the study provided two round-shaped pieces of clay, 
one green and one red representing trust and distrust token, respectively, and asked 
participants to include them in Bitcoin transactions while thinking aloud. The whole 
workshops lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, were video recorded, and fully 
transcribed. 
Data analysis involved a hybrid approach with concepts from the deductive coding 
and new ones emerging from the empirical data, contributing to the inductive coding 
(Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The deductive codes included concepts such as 
functional and structural mental models (Hegarty & Just, 1993; Jack, Chen, & Jackson, 
2017; Lowe & Boucheix, 2008) as well as the concepts related to image schemata 
(Hurtienne & Israel, 2007; Johnson, 1987) and elements required for the development of 
physical design kits (Wiberg & Mikael, 2014). The coding list was iteratively revised in 
the light of the interview data, as new codes emerged under the themes of properties of 
Blockchain’s entities, and their materialisation. 
 Finding 1: Understanding BlocKit  7.2.1
This first finding section describes the outcomes from the study interviews focusing 
on the subjective experience of interacting with the kit, and its value as a model 
materialising Blockchain. For the latter, the study looked at BlocKit objects’ 
effectiveness in conveying the appearance and meaning of the represented entities. 
In the light of this evaluation, the study also discussed the revised objects, as well as 
the BlocKit’s impact on conforming, strengthening, or even challenging 
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experienced users’ mental models of Blockchain’s infrastructure and how the 
BlocKit supported the revision of some of its assumptions. 
7.2.1.1 Experienced Users’ Experience of Interacting with BlocKit 
A striking finding was the overwhelmingly positive experience supported by 
BlocKit. Findings show that 10 participants deeply enjoyed physically touching 
its objects and enacting their movement in space while talking about Blockchain 
processes: “there is going to be other transactions from other people essentially, 
so let’s put a few Bitcoins in that box. I love this stuff, this is amazing” [P12]. 
Participants suggested that BlocKit could be a valuable tool for learning about 
Blockchain: “I think this all makes sense and would be fine to explain to the 
novices. It is cool, this is really an interesting kit” [P7]. Other participants 
suggested leveraging gamification principles for learning about Blockchain: “It's 
almost like you could turn this into some kind of cool game like a monopoly” 
[P5]. 
Findings show that the enjoyment is due to the powerful analogies used as 
examples to represent miners’ computational power [P1, P2, P3, P6, P7, P10, 
P13, P15], the timestamps [P1, P3, P4, P6, P7, P8], the Bitcoins [P1, P2, P3, P4, 
P6, P7, P8, P9, P12] and the wallet [P2, P4, P5, P6, P7, P9]. For instance: “I like 
the analogy with different shades of lights. It means like this miner has higher 
computing power and more chances to solve the block” [P15] and “cool! I think 
that’ this [wallet] is a perfect analogy. Yes, you can’t think of anything really to 
physically represent it” [P7]. Such strong positive responses to BlocKit were also 
reflected in participants’ facial expressions while using it, such as intense smiling 
accompanied by utterance such as “wow” [P1, P2, P14], or “this is pretty cool” 
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[P7]. Such positive emotions lasted throughout the entire study, peaking when 
holding or moving the objects. 
7.2.1.2  Immediate Recognition of Kit’s Objects 
The study now reports participants’ ability to immediately recognize each 
Blockchain’s entity and the ways in which they interacted with them. In other 
words, the study explored the kit’s ability to communicate affordances for 
gesture-based interaction with the artefacts. The study also reports participants’ 
feedback on the kit and its objects.  
 
 Recognition Based on Objects’ Properties and Appearance  
Findings indicate the importance of transparency as a key Blockchain property. 
Twelve participants recognised the objects because of the translucent materials 
that the study used, especially for the Bitcoin wallet and block: “yeah, it is 
transparent [plastic box] and you can see the Bitcoins […] I would rather go for 
this one for the wallet [compared to a wooden box]” [P8]; and “[the block] is 
transparent because you can see all transactions held in one block” [P7]. This 
provides support for the choice of transparent materials representing entities with 
transparent properties.  
Portability was clearly recognised as participants were engaged with the 
objects and moved them around. This worked particularly well for miners' 
computational power, as mentioned by more than half of participants: 
“[computational power] can be arranged in a group to show that miners work in 
a pool, or it can be moved out from the group to work as a single miner” [P11]. 
This suggests the value of artefacts for externalising and more importantly for 
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interacting with the mental models, which non-interactive models represented by 
either static or animated visual material cannot support. More importantly, with 
respect to computational power, portability allows for ad-hoc reconfiguration of 
miners’ work, which in turn highlights different types of miners. Arguably, 
portability is supported by each physical entity – which can be held and moved in 
space – however, the study can see how it becomes even more relevant for 
representing entities which are shaped by spatial relationships, i.e., miners are 
geographically distributed. The study argues that portable objects are particularly 
important for representing infrastructures such as Blockchain, as their spatial 
organisation help reveal the distributed work of different stakeholders and their 
types.  
Divisibility becomes apparent while handling the coins and simulating their 
movement in space during transactions. The clay material chosen to represent 
Bitcoins was found particularly evocative in supporting the affordance of 
divisibility: “obviously this yellow plasticine is Bitcoins and I can pinch in 
whatever size, to show the amount spent” [P6]. This quote is illustrative of most 
participants’ perception and appreciation for the choice of clay, and its adequate 
support for the part-whole image schemata. The only security property recognised 
by most participants was the wallet: “I presume this padlock would represent 
some form of security mechanism, so perhaps for the Bitcoin wallets, say the 
password” [P2].  
Findings also indicate the value of container as image schemata, whose 
affordances for interaction further supported such recognition: “there is this hole 
on top [of the wallet box] for you to put in the Bitcoins, and you can open the lock 
to take out the Bitcoins” [P10]. This quote illustrates similar views shared by the 
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other five participants. Container schemata also provided support for the 
recognition of the block: “I put the transaction in the box [and] once it is 
confirmed, I can open the box to take out the Bitcoins and send them to the 
receiver’s wallet” [P5]. 
 Object recognition was also facilitated by their physical appearance (Wiberg 
& Mikael, 2014) designed to mirror the characteristics of their counterpart 
entities. For instance, the rubber stamp was easily associated with the proof-of-
work’s [P1]. More than half of participants appreciated the sticky notes paper that 
was used to represent the public key: “this is the public key, it [alphanumeric on 
the sticky notes] matches the address on the wallet address here” [P15].  
 
 The Role of Gestures in Understanding Connections among Objects 
In order to enact a transaction, most participants combined all the tangible 
objects involved in a transaction (Figure 7.2: D): “let say I want to send one 
Bitcoin; I have the public key and private key and I need [receiver’s] wallet 
address” [P15]. The collection of these objects was temporarily placed in the 
small transparent cube representing the block (Figure 7.2: E), mirroring the 
Blockchain’s protocol: “now the miner selects this transaction [holding a set of 
public and private key] to be put in the block” [P2]. Such actions were performed 
by nine participants, seven of whom continued to move the whole block near the 
miners in order to reflect the stage of working to process the block: “the miner 
needs to process the block by solving the complicated mathematical problem in 
the block” [P15]. Subsequently, two of them took on the miners’ role by writing 
on the provided paper the binary code mimicking miners’ work to solve the 
block’s puzzle, confirmed by stamping the time (Figure 7.2: G).  Another 
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interesting finding is the similar gesture performed by all participants to mark 
completion of a Bitcoin transaction, by taking out the Bitcoin as yellow clay coin 
from the block’s small cube and slotting it into the receiver’s wallet represented 
by a larger transparent box: “now the Bitcoins are saved in the receiver’s wallet” 
[P1] (Figure 7.2: H).  
 
Figure 7.2: Experienced Users Interacting with BlocKit Objects 
As shown by the quotes above, another important finding is that through its 
ability to support a bird’s eye view of the Blockchain, the kit allowed participants 
to spontaneously take on different roles, enacting, for example, the actions of the 
Blockchain and its protocols (Figure 7.2: D,E,H), the miners’ proof-of-work 
(Figure 7.2: F,G), and users’ interaction with their wallets (Figure 7.2: A,B,C). 
Such changes between roles were surprisingly swift, indicating a surprising value 
of the kit to facilitate them. 
 
  
A- Placing Bitcoins in the wallet 
B- Securing the wallet with password 
C- Logging in to the wallet 
D- Creating a Bitcoin transaction  
 
A B C D 
E F G H 
E- Placing the transaction in a block  
F - Solving the block puzzle through miners’ computational  
G - Recording the time for the proof-of-work 




 Kit’s Challenges and Opportunities for Revising the Physical Kit 
While most objects were immediately recognised as representing Blockchain’s 
entities, a few were less so. These are described below together with the attempt 
to unpack the reasons for participants’ uncertainty. Such difficulties relate to 
objects themselves or relationship among them. The former includes 
inappropriate or incomplete representations, while the latter relates to the 
perceived distance among connected objects.  
Almost all participants face difficulties identifying the consensus rule, mostly 
because the symbols chosen which were inspired from Google Images to 
communicate the rules, such as the symbol of Bitcoins with two arrows pointing 
out to resemble the double spending, was not easily recognised: “I know this is 
the signature [sender’s digital signature], but how about this symbol?” [P11]. An 
interesting finding regards the representation of Blockchain ledger itself, arguably 
the most abstract entity of Blockchain infrastructure. Even though most 
participants successfully recognised this object based on its properties, some 
disagreed with this representation: “I understand that you want to show that the 
Blockchain is transparent. But I don’t think that it is appropriate to arrange it in 
this grid” [P10]. The reason for choosing the grid was to metaphorically 
represent Blockchain’s nodes at the intersection of two grid’s lines and to allow 
the placement of the completed blocks on such nodes. However, some 
participants argued that a more adequate representation of the Blockchain is 
through links in a chain: “it should not be this way, if you want to use the grid 
then you just put one row, Blockchain should be represented like a chain not 
grid” [P3]. This view was shared by 7 participants and was particularly important, 
as it highlighted different image schematas. The initial image schemata for the 
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Blockchain were that of a container holding all metadata of the confirmed 
transactions that reflected the change Bitcoins’ ownership. What the experienced 
users suggested was a different image schema, that of a Link which belongs to the 
family of Force schematas, i.e., the force that links two objects together. Such 
finding argues for a shift in the underlying metaphor of Blockchain infrastructure, 
not so much as a container but as a force creating links (Geiger, 1993).   
Findings regarding incomplete representations concerned mostly the private 
key and were noted by almost half of the participants. Although they agreed with 
the metaphor of black envelope and post-it note, they also noted that these were 
not sufficient as an additional representation was needed to illustrate how the 
private key is used when the transaction is created: “That’s perfect but how about 
the permission to use the private key?” [P9]. The hidden private key needs a 
representation for showing that the owner of the Bitcoins grants the transfer of the 
Bitcoins ’ownership. 
The second type of challenge relates to understanding relationships among 
objects. In this respect, findings indicate that an important challenge was the lack 
of cues for bringing and/or merging objects together, i.e., bringing together two 
distinct objects in order to create a new one. For example, seven participants 
failed to connect the black envelope of the private key with the set of numbers 
written on a sticky note representing the private key. In this respect, the study 
used two different objects; one capturing the key entity, while another one as an 
added-on sleeve to capture its privacy quality. Although the link between them 
was less obvious for 9 participants, once provided with a cue, the connection was 
easily made: “how about this tiny black envelope [maybe] we need something to 
cover up the number” [interviewer]. A similar challenge concerned the proof-of-
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work, where more than half of participants failed to link the permanent pen for 
writing the proof of work with its allocated piece of paper. Once again, upon the 
provision of a clue, the connection was easily recognised. These findings suggest 
the importance of reducing the physical distance between objects which are 
logically connected, either by bundling them together, or by providing visual cues 
for their connection.  
7.2.1.3 Revising the BlocKit’s Design 
In the light of these findings, the study identified several directions for revising 
the kit to better represent the experienced users’ mental models of how 
Blockchain works. To more accurately represent the objects, one important 
suggestion was to avoid less common graphical symbols such as those used to 
represent the consensus rule. Six participants suggested a more direct approach of 
naming the rule as such: “the best way is to label the drawer with rules” [P2]. 
Such labels could be extended to other objects which would provide an advantage 
to novice users to better understand the Blockchain, as mentioned by three 
participants, “as for people who want to learn Blockchain, I think it is better if all 
objects here are labelled properly” [P13]. A related outcome is the suggestion for 
a kit’s description, which was advanced by six participants: “I think you would 
probably have to give a lot of context around what those things actually represent 
[…] you are not necessarily always there to explain where everything is. Say you 
send me all this stuff and I was going through a project meeting and have to use 




Findings indicated that the Blockchain should be represented in a single chain 
and five participants suggested keyring as a representation for linking the blocks 
within the Blockchain: “the ledger should be in a chain; like it is connected from 
one block to another. You can use something like a keyring to connect them” 
[P6]. Such suggestion to represent the Blockchain as a single long chain can be 
materialised through a metal keyring. With respect to incomplete representations, 
findings indicate that the representation of private key should be extended to 
include Bitcoin’s owner permission to transfer the ownership of the Bitcoins, as 
mentioned by four participants: “it is the user’s responsibility to protect the 
private key which is to keep in this black envelope; but when the owner wants to 
transfer their Bitcoins they need to give permission [to receiver] to use their 
private key, this can be represented through the sender’s signature [to show the 
agreement to transfer the ownership of the Bitcoins]” [P8].  
In terms of representing relationships, a few suggestions have been made 
concerning objects such as the private key and the proof-of-work which involved 
more than one object. Five participants suggested placing such objects closer in 
space: “I think the [private key] envelope should not be separated from [post-it 
notes with private key’s] numbers” [P14]. Participants made similar suggestions 
for the proof-of-work: “it is better to put the pen and paper [for writing the 
proof] together” [P5]. Grouping connected objects together is a valuable insight 
for improving the presentation of the kit, which is also supported by an important 
gestalt principle (Caillot & Nguyen-Xuan, 1995). The only concern is that once 
people interact with these objects they may not place them back in each other’s 
proximity. An alternative way to address this is by digitally embodying spatial 
awareness in such connected objects. For example, one approach to represent the 
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connection between related objects could be through small sensors embedded in 
these objects, i.e., when one is picked up, a small light on both objects switches 
on.  
Apart from revising some of the kit’s existing objects, two participants also 
provided suggestions for including a new object to represent the concept of a 
pool, i.e., transparent container box. Even though the memory pool holds a 
temporary unprocessed transaction, there is an argument that it is important to be 
included in the kit: “I think you missed the object representing memory pool that 
holds the unconfirmed transactions before they are selected to be put in a block” 
[P3]. The memory pool works as a waiting place for the newly created 
unconfirmed transactions to be chosen by the miners to include in a block. It 
should be transparent so that miners could select these transactions and put in a 
block: “a transparent box should be fine to represent the memory pool as it works 
transparently for the miners to select the transactions for a new block” [P6]. 
These quotes describe the properties of the memory pool as transparent and 
temporarily holding the unconfirmed transactions matching the container image 
schemata (Hampe & Grady, 2005; Johnson, 1987).  
7.2.1.4 The Kit’s Impact on Experienced Users’ Mental Models 
A significant finding is the value of the kit in supporting experienced users to 
materialise and reflect on their understanding of Blockchain infrastructure and its 
inner working. The study argues that through its materiality, the kit allows 
bringing the mental models into question, which in turn helps experienced users 
confirm their understandings, develop more nuanced understandings, or even 
revise some previously held, less accurate assumptions.  
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The latter is a particularly important finding, as challenging such assumptions 
is notoriously difficult. The kit’s ability to not only support this but to also engage 
an enjoyable experience is a surprising and much valuable outcome. More 
specifically, with respect to revising assumptions, findings indicate two 
ideologies about the block’s confirmation on the Blockchain. Six participants 
mentioned that such confirmation is made at the end of the mining process, just 
before the block is recorded on the Blockchain: “let say, this miner is able to 
solve the block, then the miner will inform other miners and show his proof-of-
work, and let’s say that there are more than three miners confirming that the 
work is correct; only then the block can be recorded in the Blockchain” [P2].  
The other 3 participants described a more nuanced understanding of these 
processes, extending the above explanation beyond the three miners’ 
confirmation of a block, to multiple blocks’ confirmation: “let's say this is the 
Blockchain (arranging a few blocks cubes in a single line), and this new block has 
just received the consensus from other miners to be recorded in the Blockchain. 
[…] In order to be fully secured and confirmed, the new block needs awaits the 
confirmation of six more blocks following it” [P3]. These quotes are important as 
they illustrate the kit’s ability to support experienced users to communicate and 
reflect on their mental models. Findings further reveal the importance of waiting 
for 6 confirmations and its link to transaction’s security: “if the user doesn’t wait 
for 6 confirmations […] then there is a possibility for somebody else to double 
spend it. Let’s say this block has only 1 confirmation block ahead (arranges 2 
cubes in a row). Then one mining entity with enough [computational] hash power 
(gathers 7 lights in one place) would be able to record another few blocks here 
(creates a new branch from the previous row by adding 3 additional cubes). So 
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what happened to this [initial] block? It will be removed from the Blockchain 
(took out the first cube)” [P3]. This quote alludes to a known security concern 
related to the Blockchain, namely the double spending attack (Eyal & Sirer, 2014) 
whose understanding, however, is not trivial.  
In order to further test this understanding, in subsequent interviews with 4 
participants who shared the first model of block confirmation, the study enacted 
through the kit this alternative second model and elicited feedback. Surprisingly, 
all 4 participants have changed their understanding of the confirmation process: 
“I thought that the confirmation processes were done at the miner’s part […] But 
I agree with the double spending attack and I can clearly see the reasons why as 
you said the confirmation [ultimately] stands for the number of confirmed blocks 
ahead and not by the [three] miners [confirming it initially]” [P15]. This finding 
indicates that the physical kit is not only able to communicate about the complex 
system (Jansen et al., 2015) which is Blockchain infrastructure, but to support 
learning about it. At least what’s important is that the kit also supports reflection 
on and even changes in experienced users’ mental models. 
  Findings 2: Designing for Trust with BlocKit  7.2.2
The anonymity principle is central to design for trust in the Blockchain 
protocol, which in turn raises significant trust challenges for both users and miners 
(Khairuddin & Sas, 2019; Sas & Khairuddin, 2017). Hence, designing for trust on 
Blockchain is an important challenge to be explored with experienced users. In the 
second part of the workshop, we provided tokens to explore experienced users’ 
design solutions for materialising the flow of trust on Blockchain. Findings indicate 
three themes consisting of rewarding honest transaction partners with trust token, 
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penalising dishonest ones with distrust tokens, and accounting for the mining fee 
associated with the flow of trust. Participants iteratively identified six ways of 
materialising trust flow on Blockchain by (i) placing the token of trust within the 
Bitcoin transaction (P1, P3, P7), (ii) ensuring 2 way transparent transactions (P1, 
P2, P4, P5, P7), (iii) centralised mediator (P2, P4, P6, P8, P10, P15), (iv) 2-of-2 
multisignature address (P3, P4, P5, P6, P8, P9, P11, P12, P13), (v) 2-of-3 
multisignature address (P8, P9, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14, P15), and (vi) 
crowdsourced, decentralised mediator (P8, P9, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14, P15).  
Each of the first five solutions was discarded as they challenged Blockchain’s 
assumptions of decentralisation, unregulation, or anonymity. The first solution was 
enacted by placing the green clay trust token together with the other objects 
representing a transaction, i.e., Bitcoin clay, sticky notes with wallet address and 
signature, but failed to recognize that Bitcoin transactions are often accompanied by 
transactions of fiat currency or goods in the physical world, whose trust is 
problematic to capture on Blockchain (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017). 
The second solution resembles the existing Omni layer approach (Omni Layer, 
2017) allowing two or more parties to trade transparently over the Bitcoin 
Blockchain,  but fails to acknowledge the asynchronous nature of 2 way transaction, 
and that in case of fraud, transparency is not sufficient to reverse a fraudulent 
transaction nor to sanction the fraudulent user.  
The third solution suggests centralised mediator: “both parties have to commit 
[…] and when both money and Bitcoins arrives in here, both will get it at the same 
time” [P4], and participants represented it through the object of a transparent 
container holding all the objects involved in a transaction. This solution resembles 
the current escrow or exchange services, addressing the asynchronous problem of 
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two-way transaction, but failing to account for the decentralisation, unregulation, or 
anonymity principles of Blockchain. Indeed, escrows prevent fraud by requiring 
both parties to register their identity (Local Bitcoin, n.d.). 
One way to address the risk of de-anonymisation is through 2-of-2 
multisignature address which requires both parties to co-sign for a newly created 
third address to temporarily hold the Bitcoins before released to the destination 
wallet (Electrum, 2017; MultiChain, n.d.). This solution fails in case of dispute or 
fraud, and therefore 8 partisans suggested the 2-of-3 multisignature where a third 
party assists the dispute by signing the transaction (Lerner, 2015; WeiDex, n.d.). 
This solution was represented by placing 2 sticky notes with a different wallet 
address in the novel transparent container representing the third address: “you can 
have it signed as two of two to receive the Bitcoins and trust token). […] However, 
if you have a disagreement then it’s obviously stuck in here [and you need a 2-of-3 
signature]” [P12].   
To address this limitation, more than half of participants proposed placing the 
transaction in a smart contract and the novel approach to use a crowd-sourced 
mediator or witness for the contract. To represent it, participants extended the 
previous transparent container with 2 sticky notes, by placing an additional sticky 
note on the transparent container: “you can add another user that is randomly 
assigned in a contract to validate the transaction […] and signed by 2-of 3 […]  At 
the end of a successful transaction, this trust token can be sent by the buyer and 
seller (mimic the movements of green clay from buyer to seller, vice versa) […] and 
appreciation token to the other user who helps to witness the transaction” [P9]. 
This is a novel design solution, extending smart contracts and multisignature 
accounts (Horda, 2018; Lerner, 2015; Matzutt et al., 2018) which have started to be 
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used on Ethereum Blockchain (Horda, 2018) for instance for decentralised exchange 
such as WeiDex (WeiDex, n.d.). However, the development for a fully decentralised 
exchange for Bitcoin Blockchain is limited (Cuen, 2018), as it also the idea of trust 
token and witness token. In the case of dishonest transaction partner, the witness 
“needs to take charge to verify the transaction by requesting the agreed quality of 
the offline transaction’s proofs as stated in the contract from both seller and buyer. 
[…] the witness will decide whether to move the Bitcoins (from multisignature 
wallet) to the buyer’s or reverse it to the seller’s wallet […]. It also reflects the 
increments of trust and distrust token for both wallets as specified in the contract” 
[P10].  
All participants agreed on the associated cost related to trust, suggesting that 
both parties should have an agreement regarding the fee, before enacting any 
transaction. In addition, 8 participants also suggested a small fee for incentivising 
the witness. 
7.2.2.1 Principles to Design for Trust of Blockchain 
This section discusses the suggested design principles for trust in peer-to-peer 
Bitcoin transactions. Findings identified four important suggestions such as a 
valid contract, transparent transactions, decentralised mediator, and reputation 
token which are further described. 
 
 Valid Contract  
Prior to enacting a peer-to-peer Bitcoin transaction, an agreement between the 
seller and buyer to decide on the details of the transaction is vital.  Indeed, our 
previous findings reported fraud cases caused by one of the parties not fulfilling 
179 
 
their promise (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017), One way to overcome this risk, is by 
creating a valid agreement between seller and buyer before enacting the 
transaction: “write a proper contract for the transaction […] so you don’t have to 
trust them (buyer) and they (buyer) don’t need to trust you as the seller, it is 
because the contract says everything and it is valid” [P13]. Hence, with a valid 
agreement, both buyer and seller are bonded with the contract. The suggestion to 
create a contract is an extension to the usual practice by making the negotiation 
and agreement. These include their details of bank account for fiat money and 
wallet address for receiving Bitcoins. But those are just word-of-mouth and there 
is no guarantee they will follow the agreements. By having an agreement in a 
contract, they are not able to escape as they have to agree to bear the penalties if 
they commit frauds. This mentioned by 6 participants: “if let’s say any of them 
break the contract, the Bitcoin is sent to the honest party […] or any other 
punishments they can write in the contract […] and there is no way to run (from 
fulfilling the contract)” [P13]. Although there is no central authority that governs 
the transaction, by having a valid contract will permit a trustless transaction 
between both parties.  It is because the social trust among buyer and seller is no 
longer required as the transaction is protected with the rules in the contract that 
have been agreed by them.  In the framework on the mechanic of trust that 
facilitates the trust between people with mediated technology, which can be 
classified as institutional trust (Riegelsberger et al., 2005). 
 
 Transparent Transactions 
In normal practice for peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions, it will begin with one 
party (buyer) sending money followed by the seller enacting the Bitcoins 
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transaction (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017). Regarding this, more than half of the 
participants described the possibility of fraud facilitated by this common practice: 
“(the) buyer can claim, he has sent the (fiat) money although he actually did not 
and (the) seller can also cheat by claiming that she did not receive the buyer’s 
(fiat) money even though she did” [P8]. Fraud can also happen in the transactions 
between Bitcoins exchanged for goods: “Let’s say you want to buy a product 
from a Bitcoin merchant. You are lucky to get the correct product […] but how if 
they fool you?[…] and yet you have sent them your Bitcoins?” [P1]. Such 
challenges contribute to distrust towards the anonymised peer-to-peer transactions 
among Bitcoin users.  
In order to mitigate these issues, 6 of participants suggested to create the rules 
for fair and transparent transactions between the seller and buyer through a 
multisignature wallet: “it begins with the seller sending the Bitcoins to a created 
multisignature wallet address. Then when the buyer sees the Bitcoin is available 
in that wallet address, he will send the money to the seller’s offline account and 
immediately sign on that multisignature wallet to request to release the Bitcoin. 
[…] Once the seller received the money in the bank, he or she will also sign on 
the wallet, and the Bitcoin will be released to the buyer’s wallet” [P11]. This 
quote mirrors that Bitcoin’s transaction should begin by sending Bitcoin to a 
multisignature wallet address. Hence, this will create a fair and transparent 
transaction, as both parties have access to the Bitcoin multisignature wallet as 
well as the control over it. In other words, once the Bitcoin is sent to the 
multisignature wallet, it will not able to move to another wallet address, unless it 
gets the approval or signature from both seller and buyer. This algorithm will 
facilitate the trust between the buyer and seller in the credibility of the systems 
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assisting peer-to-peer transaction in such decentralised, unregulated 
infrastructure, such as Blockchain (Corritore et al., 2003). 
 
 Decentralised Mediator  
Findings also indicate a challenge in facilitating the transaction between buyer 
and seller through multisignature wallet: “However if you have a disagreement 
then it’s obviously stuck in here (multisignature wallet) [P12]. Such view is 
shared by 6 participants, and they suggested an interesting solution to mitigate 
this issue: “Another wallet address (Bitcoin user) from the network can be 
randomly assigned to validate the transaction” [P14]. This reflects on 
crowdsource mediator functions that help to validate the peer-to-peer transaction. 
This, in turn, made the multisignature wallet now consist of three parties: seller, 
buyer and the crowdsourced mediator or also known as a witness for the 
transaction.  
This is a novel finding as unlike most of the Bitcoin exchanges’ wallet, they 
embedded escrow service
5
 in their system. This service acts as the third party for 
buyer and seller’s transactions by temporarily holding their money and Bitcoin in 
the escrow’s account then disburse to the respective wallet and bank account for 
the transactions. The similarity of escrow service
5
 and crowdsourced mediator is 
that both are the mediator for Bitcoin and offline counterpart transactions. But the 
difference consists of being centralised and decentralised for the latter mediator. 
This in turns shows that the use of mediator is essential to facilitate trust in a 
transaction. In the framework of trust, the role of decentralised mediator supports 
                                                          
5
 Escrow service – the third party that manage Bitcoin transactions for buyer and seller  (Local Bitcoin, n.d.) 
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the social trust for the peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions (Riegelsberger et al., 
2005).  
 
 Reputation Token 
Blockchain is originally designed with the anonymity concept. However, due 
to the issue of trust, people tend to de-anonymise themselves for enacting peer-to-
peer transactions (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017). In this study, findings suggest to 
build a wallet reputation system: “although the wallet is anonymous, the number 
of ratings received for that particular wallet, can reflect the credibility of the user 
(owner)” [P10]. Seven participants shared similar opinion. The rating scores of 
the wallet will indicate the credibility of the wallet’s owner which the identity of 
the owner is remain anonymised. However, there may be an issue of one person 
handling more than one wallet and keeping on sending the rating to each of their 
accounts, as concerned by most participants. In order to mitigate this issue, seven 
participants suggested the initial date of the wallet creation is visible: “the 
reputation for the wallet can also be seen on the date of the wallet created. So 
people will know how long the wallet exists and (will be) able to compare with 
the number of transaction made and reputation level” [P10]. This reflects that the 
length of the presence of the wallet and the rating scores could also contribute to 
the paradigm of trust. 
The findings further highlight the importance to know the regularity of 
transactions in between the same wallets, as mentioned by 5 participants: “there 
should not be a limitation of transactions in between two wallets, but create a 
mechanism to show the sender of each trust token received.  So people can see the 
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frequency of transactions between two wallets” [P15]. This transparent reputation 
system is essential to monitor such transactions.  
Meanwhile, for the new user, there is also a possibility for them to build the 
trust associates from a wallet: “Yes the problem will be for the new user. But I 
think they got to start with a small amount I suppose […] which is similar to 
other reputation systems […]. The idea is to have the reputation sign that you can 
link with your wallet id” [P12]. For a new user, if they perform an honest 
transaction, the trust token will be rewarded to her wallet.  The tokens gained 
should also be accompanied in a form of ratio, as mentioned by more than 7 
participants: “The new account will start from zero tokens. Let say for one trusted 
transaction, she will get 1 token, then maybe next transaction she gets another 
trust token. But for the third transaction, she gets distrust token. So it will 
calculate the average of trust token that she received in a form of percentage for 
instance” [P14]. A trust ratio associated in a wallet should reflect on total trust 
and distrust token gained by the user.  
Participants also suggested ways to incentivise the decentralised witness of a 
transaction: “the buyer and seller can also send him (witness) a witness token as 
an appreciation for them. This token will be showed in his wallet and visible to 
others. This will give an added advantage to the witness to build his reputation” 
[P8]. Referring to the trust model, the element of reputation is one of the 
principles for the trust system that is supported under the social trust dimension 
(Riegelsberger et al., 2005). 
184 
 
7.2.2.2 The Requirements for the Principles to Design for Trust Bitcoin 
Transaction 
In this section, the study will describe the capabilities of Blockchain to build 
the identified principles to design for trust transactions. The findings had 
identified four important characteristics of Blockchain which are storing 
information in Blockchain, smart contract, multisignature wallet and low-cost 
transaction that will be further described in this section.  
 
 Storing Information in Blockchain  
One of the unique characteristics of Blockchain is the ability to store valid 
information as well as to make it transparent for users (Khairuddin & Sas, 2019; 
Sas & Khairuddin, 2017; Swan, 2015). Other than storing the Bitcoins 
transactions, Blockchain is also capable to store other types of information, as 
mentioned by seven participants: “you can send Bitcoins and include some 
arbitrary information with the transaction […] and it will be recorded in the 
Blockchain. […] For instance this token (trust token) or whatever information 
can be recorded in the Blockchain” [P3]. This quote reflects the ability of 
Blockchain to be the underlying technology for the decentralised reputation 
system for the Bitcoin transaction. Moreover the unique characteristics of 
Blockchain for being decentralised, irreversible and permanent transactions 
(Khairuddin & Sas, 2019; Sas & Khairuddin, 2017; Swan, 2015) enable the 
development of reputation systems to be reputable compared to the ordinary 
reputation systems in most e-commerce website: “trust could be seen as a form of 
value that can be exchanged and enhanced people’s trustworthiness. So, I think 
somehow being able to use the Blockchain to do that is interesting, because 
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again, you can’t tamper with it like eBay that you can affect the rating” [P5]. By 
building a reputation system in the Blockchain, it will enable the process of 
sending and receiving the reputation tokens to be transparent for not only between 
the seller and buyer but the entire world. It is because, decentralisation and 
transparency are among the core principles of Blockchain (Khairuddin & Sas, 
2019; Sas & Khairuddin, 2017; Swan, 2015). 
 
 Smart Contract 
The details of agreements between seller and buyer could be sealed in the form 
of a valid contract in the Blockchain. Four of the respondents suggested building 
the contract using the Etherum smart contract: “Etherum Blockchain has this 
concept called smart contract, so a smart contract is essentially a self-executing 
piece of code which only executes when certain conditions are met. For example, 
after the transaction, you could ask each party for feedback on whether they 
thought that the transaction went smoothly or […] something was wrong. So, if 
they both say yes, it went smoothly on the smart contract you could say well this 
wallet address and this wallet address gets token of trust” [P6]. This in turns 
allows the buyer and seller to write their agreements in the smart contract. In the 
contract, they should state all the related details of the transactions including the 
agreed selling price, method of offline payment, trust tokens and penalties for 
being dishonest, such as to receive the dishonest token. The smart contract will 
automatically set specific computational algorithms to run the contract as 
mentioned in the quote. Thus, if they both met the details in the contract, the 
smart contract will execute the contract by sending trust tokens for both and if 




 Multisignature wallet  
Findings also suggest to include the crowdsource validator or witness as a 
mediator for each transaction. This can be built by using the multisignature 
features mentioned by two of the respondents: “Yes, of course, you can add the 
multisignature function in Blockchain. I know Bitcoin Blockchain has the 
multisignature and Eetherum also do” [P9]. This shows that the design of the 
trust system in Blockchain can be supported with multisignature features that 
include 3 parties, buyer, seller and witness. The function of multisignature wallet 
can be found in several exchanges wallet such as Coinbase  (Khatwani, 2018). 
There also some Bitcoin wallet includes administrative mediator, which is 
centralised in the multisignature wallet to manage disputes (BTC.com, 2017). 
However, to combine buyer, seller and the crowdsourced mediator for a 
transaction in the multisignature wallet is a novel design. 
 
 Low cost of transaction fee 
In order to record contract also trust and witness token in Blockchain, the seller 
and buyer need to commit a small mining fee, almost ten of the respondents 
shared this view: “it costs the transaction, they (buyer and seller) spend a very 
small amount of money, but apart from that, they can include that kind of token 
information in that transaction and build their own credibility” [P3]. The 
minimum fee for the contract would be worth for the seller and buyer to build 




Sections 7.21 and 7.22 report on the findings from the workshop with the Bitcoin 
Blockchain’s experienced users on BlocKit. The theoretical and design implications 
will be discussed in the following section. 
  Theoretical Implication  7.2.3
Now we report on the significance of the findings, and the main contributions 
while addressing the initial research questions. Findings indicate that BlocKit has 
leveraged participants’ expertise and structural mental models (Doane, 1982; 
Greeno, 1983) of Blockchain’s inner working by materialising its abstract and 
intangible key concepts (Fischer, 2008; Pierce & Paulos, 2012b, 2012a). The 
outcomes mark a shift towards understanding and communicating about mental 
models, as well as for technology design away from the traditional focus on 
artefact-based systems, towards infrastructure-centric technologies. In particular, 
study findings shed light into the affordances of physical design kits such as BlocKit 
for exploring and supporting these models.  
The work also contributes to the emerging HCI interest in understanding 
sociotechnical infrastructures (Zhang, Sas, Lambert, & Ahmad, 2019) such as 
Blockchain (Jabbar & Bjørn, 2017; Jack et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2019) with the 
aim to support deeper understanding of, and designing for them. This, in turn, has 
the potential to support the development of Blockchain-centric business models that 
have started to be explored in the corporate world (IEEE Innovation, 2019; Mettler, 
2016). 
In designing the BlocKit, the study integrated findings from two research areas 
which have been limitedly integrated such as material-centred design approaches 
(Wiberg, 2014) and TUIs and embodied cognition theories (Hampe & Grady, 2005; 
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Hurtienne, 2009; Johnson, 1987; Santibáñez, 2002). From here, the study proposed 
an innovative approach to understand and design for Blockchain infrastructure, 
leading to BlocKit’s physical design. BlocKit also advances the state-of-the-art of 
HCI work on physical kits, away from existing artefact-centric approaches (Hardy 
& Alexander, 2012; Jack et al., 2017; Kuznetsov, Hudson, & Paulos, 2013; 
Kuznetsov et al., 2011; Sas & Neustaedter, 2017). 
The study provides an initial vocabulary to talk about the designing of such 
kits including, for example, the image schemata of container, part-whole, and link, 
and entities’ properties such as transparency, durability, verifiability, safety, and 
privacy. The study argues that this approach and its initial vocabulary could guide 
the design of other physical kits for materialising the understanding of other 
sociotechnical infrastructures, i.e., IoT, healthcare, governance. 
Findings also indicate BlocKit’s value for user engagement. The Bitcoin 
Blockchain experienced users confirmed BlocKit’s ability to engender surprisingly 
high levels of engagement and delight, which in turn supported communicating, 
understanding, reflecting on basic assumptions of Blockchain infrastructure, as well 
as designing for it. This is an important finding suggesting that people’s enjoyment 
of working with their hands in the making of artefacts from DIY research in HCI 
(Pierce & Paulos, 2012a, 2012b) extends to the interaction with such crafted objects 
provided by BlocKit. This is also a significant outcome given that the exploration of 
user mental models of technological artefacts is notoriously challenging.(Caillot & 
Nguyen-Xuan, 1995; Fischer, 2008; Sas & Neustaedter, 2017) 
Besides communicating and learning (Borgman, 1999; Kieras & Bovair, 1964) 
about the complex system (Jansen et al., 2015) such as Blockchain infrastructure, 
BlocKit also supports reflection on, and even changes in experienced users’ mental 
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models (Gibbs, 1998) which are a particularly important outcome. By interacting 
with the BlocKit’s objects, participants explored a range of solutions for 
implementing trust in Bitcoin Blockchain, which they critically reflected on and 
revised. For example, they discarded the available escrow  (Local Bitcoin, n.d.), and 
multisignature (BTC.com, 2017; Lerner, 2015; WeiDex, n.d.) solutions because of 
these challenge Blockchain’s’ assumptions of decentralisation, unregulation, or 
anonymity. An important outcome is the novel final solution consisting of 
crowdsourced, decentralised mediator or witness.  
Findings indicate that in addition to materialising the understanding of 
Blockchain, BlocKit also supports designing for it. The study chooses to focus on 
trust since it has been identified as an important challenge of Bitcoin users and 
miners (Khairuddin & Sas, 2019; Sas & Khairuddin, 2017). For this, the study 
applied the developed approach to design two additional objects such as the trust 
tokens, illustrating thus the generative power of BlocKit. Arguably, other aspects of 
the social infrastructure such as resilience, diversity, or value creation can be 
considered and represented in BlocKit through physical objects, to support design 
solutions on Blockchain.  
Future work could explore the potential of BlocKit in specific domains such as 
health. For example, the challenges of manually filling medical records may be 
addressed on Blockchain (IEEE Innovation, 2019). In designing such solutions, 
designers may start by looking into the properties of the entities involved in the 
design. For instance, in order to create new medical records on Blockchain, one may 
start with the qualities that these records should have, some of whom are already 




7.2.3.1 Principles to Design for Trust in Peer-to-Peer Bitcoin Transactions 
The findings advance the theories of trust in HCI (Corritore et al., 2003; 
Riegelsberger et al., 2005; Sas & Khairuddin, 2015)  as well as the trust 
challenges in Bitcoin transactions (Khairuddin & Sas, 2019; Sas & Khairuddin, 
2017) to frame the findings for the principles to design for trust for the peer-to-
peer Bitcoin transactions.  
In the light of the Bitcoin trust framework (Sas & Khairuddin, 2015) and the 
technological trust model (Corritore et al., 2003), the findings suggest the 
principle to design transparent transactions in multisignature wallet is able to 
leverage users’ technological trust. This is important to avoid fraud in the offline 
transaction. Underlying the uniqueness of the transparent Blockchain 
characteristic (Swan, 2015) the integration of the design principles and 
multisignature wallet (Horda, 2018) enable the seller to make the first move by 
sending the Bitcoin to the multisignature wallet address securely. It is because the 
wallet is transparent to both parties in the transactions as well as protected by the 
signature of seller and buyer. Hence the Bitcoin will not be able to transfer to the 
counterpart’s wallet until the offline transactions with fiat money or product are 
completed. This opposed the usual practice of Bitcoin peer-to-peer transactions 
that had caused multiple fraud cases (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017). 
The principles to design the transparent transaction is supported with a contract 
between the seller and buyer in the Blockchain smart contract (Horda, 2018) that 
stand as the legal evidence for the transaction (Huillet, 2018). The evidence in the 
smart contract did not involve the governmental support but interestingly it can be 
applied as a valid legislative document. This finding extends dimensions of 
institutional trust in the Bitcoin trust framework (Sas & Khairuddin, 2015),  as it 
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proofs that the user’s trust in Bitcoin transaction is not only relying on the 
government to legalise the transaction but also may depend on the decentralised 
evidence such smart contract. The similar arguments are used to stand as novel 
findings for the framework of trust in between users mediating the technology 
(Riegelsberger et al., 2005). 
Findings also indicate novel insights into the social dimension of trust. Instead 
of applying technology to strengthen the social trust, findings indicate that the 
decentralised witness could act as the mediator for the transaction between seller 
and buyer, which replaced the centralised escrow service (Local Bitcoin, n.d.). 
This has transformed from using technology to mediate trust to the human 
capabilities as a mediator for trust. Hence this study argues that the decentralised 
witness is an extension characteristic of social trust dimension in the framework 
of mechanic trust (Riegelsberger et al., 2005).  In addition, the findings also 
suggest to include the reputation system as one of the principles of trust to 
support the social trust (Riegelsberger et al., 2005) in peer-to-peer Bitcoin 
transactions.  
 Design Implication  7.2.4
The study now reflects on three design implications intended to inspire HCI 
researchers to engage in designing for infrastructures.  
7.2.4.1 Novel Approaches to Design Infrastructure-based Kits  
Findings suggest the value of the innovative approach to the design of BlocKit, 
which draws from both embodied cognition theories (Lakoff, 1987; Maurer et al., 
2013) and material centred-design (Wiberg & Mikael, 2014). The three iterative 
design activities underpinning this approach consists of (i) identifying the key 
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concepts or entities of the sociotechnical infrastructure and their properties, (ii) 
identifying their image schemata through linguistic analysis (Hurtienne & Israel, 
2007), and (iii) engaging in the material exploration for materialising these 
entities and relationships among them (Wiberg & Mikael, 2014). The study 
proves the combination of these three theories as BlocKit helps experienced users 
to facilitate their cognitive work in designing the protocol of trust in Blockchain.  
7.2.4.2 Novel Tools for Infrastructure Design 
BlocKit’s holds value for designing for Blockchain infrastructure, a much-
recognised need in the corporate sector. BlocKit is an illustration of novel design 
tools which could contribute to the call to move beyond the traditional artefact-
centric design and towards infrastructure-centric design (Jansen et al., 2015; Jung 
& Stolterman, 2012). The study argues that such a shift of emphasis will be 
valuable in both developed and developing contexts, and that novel design 
approaches such as BlocKit will be much needed to support it. To better support 
the representation of logical, spatial and temporal relationships among the key 
entities, one may consider augmenting such kits with smart objects (Alexander, 
Lucero, & Subramanian, 2012). One way to represent the connection between 
related objects could be through small sensors embedded in these objects, i.e., 
when one is picked up, a small light on both objects switches on. A smart tangible 
object such as Sifteo cubes (Wikipedia, n.d.) which are small, spatially-aware 




7.2.4.3 Sensitizing Cards to Augment BlocKit  
Findings indicate the importance of consistently checking that the explored 
solutions align with the Blockchain’s design principles such as decentralization, 
unregulation, or anonymity. The study revealed that these principles can be easily 
overlooked and that external prompts may be beneficial to interrogate and revise 
the proposed solutions. For this, the study can think of augmenting BlocKit with 
external aids such as flash cards containing sensitising questions regarding 
Blockchain’s design principles. Similar to InspiredDesign cards (Remy, 2017), 
these cards can be used alongside BlocKit, to prompt its users to the importance 
of reflecting on the fit between their proposed design solutions and Blockchain’s 
principles.  
7.2.4.4 Novel Approach  to Design the Decentralised Bitcoin Transaction with 
Trust 
Findings highlighted four important principles for decentralised trusted 
Bitcoins transactions that consist of (i) transparent transactions (ii) a valid 
contract, (iii) decentralised mediator, and (iv) reputation system. Findings also 
indicate that these four elements can be applied to develop a decentralised Bitcoin 
trust application underlying the Blockchain technology such as Etherum. It is 
argued that Etherum Blockchain consists of a unique tool that is not supported in 
Bitcoin Blockchain, which is named as the smart contract (Horda, 2018; Vujicic 
et al., 2018). The smart contract could be integrated with the multisignature 
wallet as well as capable to be customised with an identified algorithm by the 
users including for releasing reputation tokens to users’ wallet at the end of each 
successful transaction (Davenport, 2015; Horda, 2018). Other than that, Etherum 
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Blockchain is able to store beyond the cryptocurrency transactions, such as 
storing the real estate documents (Karamitsos et al., 2018; Matzutt et al., 2018). 
Hence it is capable to store the contract as well as the reputation tokens. We argue 
that although the proposed design for trust is draw for Bitcoin cryptocurrency, it 
can also be built by advancing the Etherum smart contract technology and utilise 
the bridge tool such as BTC Relay (BTC Relay, 2016) to link Bitcoin Blockchain 
and Etherum smart contract. 
 Summary for Study 3  7.2.5
This study reports on the evaluation of the design of BlocKit, by 15 Bitcoin 
Blockchain experienced users. Findings indicate BlocKit’s ability to engender 
surprisingly high levels of user engagement which in turn supporting 
communicating, understanding, reflecting on basic assumptions of Blockchain 
infrastructure, as well as designing for it. In addition, the experienced users also 
suggested a few revisions to improve the usability of BlocKit to support the use as a 
learning tool.  
 The Revision of BlocKit 7.3
Based on the experienced users’ overview suggestions in Study 3 (7.2.1.3), there five 
physical representations of Blockchain entities have been revised and in addition, a new 
object has been constructed to represent newly identified important entity for Blockchain 
that will be discussed in this section.  
 Minor Revisions of the Objects 7.3.1
For f objects, most of the initial representations are to be kept unchanged. with 
only one  object requiring minor revisions, namely the one representing the 
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consensus rule. As reported in the findings, the experienced users argued that , the 
icons pasted on the drawers to represent the rules could lead to confusion as the 
icons failed to help people recognise the rules. To address this concern,  we 
followed the experienced users’ suggestions to replace the icons with labels 
mentioning the descriptions of the rules (Figure 7.3 – A).  
 




A: Labelled Drawer as Proof-of-work 
B: Sifteo Cubes with attached Sticky-Notes and 
     Pen as Private Key 
C: Linked Transparent Cubes connected with 





D: Open-transparent Container as Memory 
      Pool 
E: Attached Pen and Sticky-notes as Proof of 
      work 
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 Major Revisions of the Objects 7.3.2
Major revisions are much more complex as the object representation has been fully 
discarded by the experienced users. They argued that the presentation of the 
Blockchain ledger does not match its functions. They suggested that instead of using 
the concept of container schemata
6
 (Hampe & Grady, 2005; Lakoff, 1987), the 
Blockchain should be designed based on the link schemata
7
 (Hampe & Grady, 2005; 
Lakoff, 1987). Thus, each set of transaction block should be linked to the one before 
and the one after within the Blockchain ledger. Hence, the findings led to a major 
revision of the representation of Blockchain ledger from a translucent paper grid to 
the transparent cubes that are connected with keyrings. For each cube, 2 pieces of 
keyrings are stick at the front and back of the cube. The cubes are chained with one 
to another by using it's front and back of the keyrings (Figure 7.3 – C). 
                                                          
6
 Container schemata – The boundaries to prevent what is outside from affecting the entity or entities inside 
the container (Lakoff, 1987) 
7
 Link schemata – It  consists of two or more entities, connected physically or metaphorically, and the bond 




Figure 7.4: Organised Presentation of BlocKit's Objects 
 Replacing the Static Objects with Smart Objects 7.3.3
The initial design of the object to represent a private key is sticky notes written 
with the alphanumeric and black envelope to hide the sticky notes. The problems 
with this representation are that the experienced users are not able to relate the 
envelope and sticky notes as those were not positioned together. Due to this, the 
experienced users faced some difficulties to articulate the relationship between the 
two objects. To address this issue, the researcher refined the object by replacing a 
smart object, named Sifteo to increase the visibility of objects connections 
(Wikipedia, n.d.). The Sifteo cubes were programmed by a programmer. The actual 
private key is displayed as 64 characters in the range 0-9 and A-F (Caetano, 2015) 
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and for the Sifteo cubes, each of the cubes’ screen display 32 characters. This is to 
represent ways to protect the offline private key that commonly used for Bitcoin 
paper wallet. The paper wallet is not stored in any online devices. The owner of the 
wallet printed the private key on a piece of paper and stores it securely in a safe 
place. Then if they need to use the Bitcoin, they will activate the private key in the 
online device such as through a mobile wallet app.  
Thus, for the new design of private key with Sifteo cubes, in order to use the 
private key, the users have to combine both cubes by arranging the cubes next to 
each other. Once they connect the two cubes, the alphanumeric on both screens is 
hidden. This is to represent the analogy for the private key as it is protected and 
cannot be revealed. In order to give a sign to users that both cubes are related, is the 
cubes are programmed as if one of the cube is lifted up, then the other cube will 
lighten up. In addition, the representation of the private key has been extended by 
adding the sticky notes and pen to resemble the signature action by the owner of the 
private key (Figure 7.3 – B). 
 Structuring the Arrangements of the Object 7.3.4
The arrangements for the presentation of all objects in BlocKit are also more 
organised and structured. All the related objects representing one entity such as the 
pen and paper to represent proof-of-work, are grouped into one place. Each group of 
objects are numbered from 1-12 to ensure that the participants will be able to see all 
the 12 objects of BlocKit (Figure 7.4). 
 The New Object for the Newly Identified Blockchain’s Main Entity 7.3.5
The experienced users also had identified memory pool as an important 
Blockchain entity that needs to be materialised in BlocKit. Memory pool 
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temporarily holds all the verified broadcasted Bitcoin transactions while waiting to 
be selected by the miners to group in a block for the confirmation works. Hence, 
this describes the memory pool as part-whole image schemata (Hurtienne, 2009; 
Hurtienne & Israel, 2007) as the miners can either select all of the transactions in 
the memory pool or just part of it. The properties of the memory pool are described 
as transparent, durable, portability, verifiable and safe. Thus, as suggested by the 
experienced users, a transparent and uncovered container is chosen as the new 
object of BlocKit to represent memory pool (Figure 7.3 – C). 
 Chapter Summary 7.4
This chapter reports the findings on the evaluation of BlocKit. Study 3 reflects the 
capability of BlocKit to provide the vocabularies to communicate as well as giving the 
impact on conforming, strengthening, and challenging experienced users’ mental models 
of Blockchain’s infrastructure. They also use BlocKit as a design tool to explore the 
principles and the requirements to design for trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions 
Bitcoin. Other than that, the outcomes of the workshop also suggest the revisions on 
BlocKit objects to support a clear representation of Blockchain’s entities. On the other 
hand, based on the experienced users’ suggestions for the principles and requirements to 
design for trust in Bitcoin users, a set of algorithmwas developed and validated, which 
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By engaging with BlocKit in Study 3 (Chapter 7), the Blockchain experienced users 
are able to suggest four principles to design for trust in Bitcoin peer-to-peer transactions 
in Blockchain. The principles are to create a valid contract between buyer and user, 
transparent transactions, decentralised mediator and reputation tokens. These design 
principles could be supported by using Ethereum smart contract to validate the 
agreement between seller and buyer, such as Bitcoin price, payment method and the 
reputation tokens. Based on the validated agreement, a customised protocol in Etherum 
smart contract will be generated from self-execution code to release the reputation 
tokens of trust and witness. In addition, a smart contract (Hertig, 2018) could be 
connected with the multisignature wallet to manage the disbursement of Bitcoin in the 
wallet. The application of a multisignature wallet (Khatwani, 2018; Lerner, 2015) is to 
support the transparency and fairness of the transactions between buyer and seller also to 
allow a decentralised mediator to join the transactions as a witness. However, Bitcoin 
Blockchain and Ethereum Blockchain are two different decentralised public ledgers. 
Thus, in order to link Bitcoins transactions in the Ethereum smart contract, a bridge tool 
such as BTC Relay (BTC Relay, 2016) could be applied to facilitate the connections.  
In this chapter, the design principles will be described precisely in the form of 
algorithms. There are five main steps in the algorithms: pre-transaction between seller 
and buyer, creating a smart contract, enacting online transaction with the witness, 
enacting offline transactions, and finally sending reputation tokens. All these steps of 
algorithms will be explained for two types of transactions: Bitcoin with fiat money and 
Bitcoin and product. Finally, the complete algorithms were presented to the Blockchain 
experienced users for validations. 
202 
 
 The design of algorithms for trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions 8.2
Four principles for designing for trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions have been 
outlined by 15 experienced Bitcoin Blockchain users in Study 3: a valid contract, 
transparent transactions, decentralised mediator, and reputation token. Hence, based on 
those principles, the design of the algorithms in the Blockchain platform will be further 
discussed in this section. 
 The design of valid contract in Ethereum smart contract supported with BTC 8.2.1
Relay tool 
The Ethereum Blockchain offers a unique tool that allows users to write a set 
of contract that are automatically executed  whenever the conditions in the contract 
are met (Horda, 2018). In order to execute the contract, users are required to pay a 
transaction fee in Ether for the miners. However, for Bitcoins transactions, the 
application of the BTC Relay allows Ethereum smart contracts to securely verify 
Bitcoins transactions including the contract execution fee that can be paid in Bitcoin 
instead of Ether (BTC Relay, 2016). The combinations of Ethereum smart contract 
and BTC Relay are novel design solutions for Bitcoin Blockchain. Meanwhile, as 
for Ethereum Blockchain, the smart contract has been widely applied in various 
apps such as CryptoKitties (CryptoKitties, n.d.). 
 Therefore, the design for trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoins transactions, the 
agreement between seller and buyer for the transactions of Bitcoins with fiat money 
or products could also be written in a smart contract. The details of the agreement, 
such as the selling price, method of payment for offline transactions, and timeframe 
for the transactions should be included in the contract. Both buyer and seller must 
also agree on the transaction fees for executing the contract. The smart contract is 
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connected to BTC Relay to verify the payment fees, made by users in Bitcoins. 
Once the payment is verified, the contract will be executed (Figure 8.2). 
 
Figure 8.2: Algorithm design to create a valid contract for Bitcoin peer-to-peer 
transaction 
 The design of Bitcoin transparent transactions between buyer, seller and 8.2.2
decentralised mediator with multisignature wallet contract 
The multisignature wallet has been used in several Bitcoin wallets and 
exchanges, such as Coinbase and BTC.com wallet (BTC.com, 2017; Khatwani, 
2018). The aim of using the multisignature wallet is to provide a transparent 
mechanism for all parties involved in the transaction. In addition, the Ethereum 
smart contract could also be linked with the multisignature wallet. Therefore, in 
order to write and execute a contract, all parties involved in a particular transaction 
would have the authority to sign the contract. These mechanisms have been applied 
in several types of system including the system for managing real estate documents 
(Karamitsos et al., 2018). 
  In addition, in Bitcoinpeer-to-peer Bitcoins transactions, although the 
multisignature wallet enables transparent transactions between seller and buyer, 
who could also write the agreements for the transactions in the smart contract, there 
are still possibilities of conflicts among the buyer and seller which are beyond the 














contract. Hence, as suggested by the experienced users in Study 3, together with the 
buyer and seller, we included the decentralised mediator in the smart contract 
embedded with the multisignature (multisignature wallet contract). The mediator is 
randomly appointed among the owners of Bitcoin wallets. Then the Bitcoin wallet 
owners that accept the offer to be the mediator will be responsible to witness that 
particular transaction between seller and buyer as well as to manage the dispute 
between them. In return, the decentralised mediator will be rewarded with a witness 
token and for any dispute managed by them, they will get some incentives. This is a 
novel design solution as currently there are plenty of Bitcoin wallets embedding the 
centralised administrators to monitor the dispute for each Bitcoin transaction 
(BTC.com, 2017) in their wallet system, however, there are limited findings for the 
type of Bitcoin wallet that embed a decentralised mediator in their system  (Figure 
8.3). 
 
Figure 8.3: Algorithm design to create a transparent peer-to-peer Bitcoin transaction 
with decentralised witness 
 The design of reputation token in Blockchain ledger 8.2.3
The reputation system management model has been widely applied in various 
areas such as e-commerce, peer-to-peer system and social networks (Rahimi & 
Bakkali, 2014). The aim to apply reputation system is to provide the long term 
reputations records to inspire future interactions, and also to capture feedbacks on 
Join to 
witness the 











present interactions and to allow other users to access the reputation ratings for trust 
decision (Janiszewski, 2017). The design of the reputation management system is 
commonly designed as centralised, which is managed by the website administrator 
(Resnick et al., 2006). Nevertheless, distributed reputation systems (Kinateder & 
Rothermel, 2003) have also started to be applied in website design. For example, 
OpenBazaar an online platform for vendors to sell their products in Bitcoins allows 
their buyers to send reputation ratings to vendors and the ratings are transparently 
recorded in Blockchain (Open Bazaar, 2015). 
 The novel design of our reputation system is that the trust token is not only 
awarded to the seller and buyer, but also to the decentralised mediator who 
witnessed the enacted transaction. These reputation tokens are also recorded 
transparently in the Blockchain as an added advantage to the users to build their 
credibility.  
 The Main Stages of Algorithms for Trust in Bitcoin Transaction 8.3
The design of the algorithms consists of five main steps briefly described as follows: 
Step 1: Pre Transaction between Buyer and Seller 
The offline preliminary processes that connect the buyer and seller to communicate, 
negotiate and have a set of the agreement for the transaction. This includes the 
agreed Bitcoin price to sell, payment method, trust token fees and the expected 
completion time for the transactions.  
 
Step 2: Creating a Smart Contract  
This step describes the processes to transform the agreement from the previous step 
into the smart contract to make it valid in Blockchain. By having an agreement in 
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the form of a smart contract, it will support the first suggested design for trust 
principle, which is a valid contract. The contract is also linked with the 
multisignature that consists of the buyer and seller. 
 
Step 3: Enacting the Online Transaction with Witness  
Once the contract has been validated, a witness will be randomly invited to join the 
multisignature wallet as a decentralised mediator. Then, the seller will send the 
Bitcoin to the multisignature wallet. This will make the Bitcoin in the wallet is 
transparent to the buyer, seller and witness. To release the Bitcoin from the wallet 
requires at least two signatures. Thus, neither seller nor buyer could release the 
Bitcoin easily from the wallet without the approval from both of them. This 
contributes to fair and transparent transactions. 
 
Step 4: Enacting the Offline Transaction 
The offline processes involve the transaction of sending the fiat money to the bank 
account or product through a shipping company. The valid proof of the offline 
transaction is essential for the transaction’s evidence.  
 
Step 5: Sending the Reputation Tokens 
Finally, once the offline transaction is accomplished, the buyer and seller may sign 
to release the Bitcoin from the multisignature wallet. Then the contract will 
automatically releases the trust tokens to the seller and buyer’s wallet as well as 
witness token to the witness’s wallet. These trust and witness tokens will be 




Please refer to Appendix D for the details of the algorithms for trust in peer-to-peer 
Bitcoins transactions.  
 
 Validations for the Design of the Trust Algorithms for Bitcoin Transaction 8.4
The design of the algorithms for the trust on Bitcoin transactions is based on the 
principles that have been suggested by the Bitcoin Blockchain experienced users in 
Study 3. Hence, this section describes (Study 4) the feedbacks of Bitcoin Blockchain 
experienced users on the developed algorithms. 
 Validation Method 8.4.1
In order to verify the algorithms, 10 Bitcoin Blockchain experienced users that 
were involved in the previous Study 3 (Chapter 7) participated in this validation 
study. They were presented with the complete diagrams of all five steps for both 
types of transactions (Bitcoin and fiat money, as well as Bitcoin and product) and 
provide with explanations on the processes. At the end of the presentation, they 
were asked to give their comments and suggestions for the algorithm design: “What 
do you think about the algorithm?” and “Which part that needs to be improved and 
why?” The entire validation study took about 30 - 40 minutes. Participants’ 
contributions were audio recorded and transcribed. The data analysis reports the 
algorithms’ improvement suggestions from the experienced users. 
 Validation Findings 8.4.2
The algorithms received positive feedback from all participants. They were 
pleased that the algorithm design fulfilled their initial suggestions. Most of them 
were delighted with the crowdsourcing witness concept and the witness token, also 
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suggested a few minor changes on the algorithms to improve the design which will 
be further described in this section. 
8.4.2.1 The Uniqueness of Crowdsourcing Witness with token incentives  
Findings indicate that all participants were satisfied with the appointment of an 
independent witness to manage the disputes on the transactions: “I think the bold 
of the system is the function of the witness […]  they do not hold any of the money 
like those escrows […] but they are more like a referee to ensure the transaction 
is done correctly”[P4].  This quote reflects on the uniqueness of the decentralised 
mediator role, able to verify the transaction with human assistance, compared to 
most of the centralised Bitcoin exchanges that use the technology of escrow to 
validate the transactions  (Local Bitcoin, n.d.). The incentives provided to the 
witness token will motivate users to participate as witnesses in the two-way 
transactions both online and offline: “this token (witness token) is important to 
encourage people to be the witness” [P9].  
8.4.2.2 Recommendation for Revising the Design of the Algorithms 
Findings indicate that seven of the participants argued for the authenticity of 
the evidence provided for the money transaction: “there is no problem with the 
tracking number (for the product) because is from the shipping company [...]. But 
the problem is for money transaction […] what type of evidence they provide? 
[…] Everyone can make a fake bank slip and claim that they sent the money. This 
will also give a burden to the witness to verify the transaction” [P8]. This is a 
similar finding in Study 1 (chapter 4), the printed bank slip is not strong evidence 
to verify the transaction. Alternatively, 5 participants suggested to use the 
intermediary company for bank transfer: “if they send the money with PayPal 
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then it would be no issue as the receiver can make the money request straight 
away to the sender” [P5]. Although this is a trustless offline transaction method, 
the transaction fee may remain costly (PayPal, 2015).  
On the other hand, four participants suggested to provide real-time evidence: 
“I suggest the money sender should make a video recording of the money 
transfer, starting from typing the bank URL, typing in the receiver’s bank account 
number till the money is sent, in a single loop without breaks but of course there 
are things that cannot be enclosed and need to be covered” [P2]. The real-time 
video proof of the offline transaction is a form of evidence accepted by legislation 
(Advocaten, 2017). Hence, it would be reliable to support offline transaction. 
Although the witnesses were given the witness tokens, the findings argue that 
the effort and time for the witness to manage the disputes are not reasonable. Six 
participants suggested to introduce a reward mechanism for the witness who 
manages disputes: “This will consume a lot of time and effort for them to retrieve 
the proof and make a report for the dispute […] other than the token, they should 
also be paid for the work they had done” [P5]. In the current design of the 
algorithms, although the witnesses had joined the contract, they are required to 
monitor the transaction until the end of the contract. If there is a dispute, then 
they will be invited to get in touch with the seller and buyer and make a report for 
the dispute. Hence, 4 participants suggested all parties involved in the transaction 
(buyer, seller and witness) to send a deposit to the multisignature wallet before 
enacting the transaction as a guarantee of honesty: “I suggest that the buyer, 
seller, and witness pay a small percentage of deposit based on the amount of 
transaction to the multi-signature wallet. This is to ensure that they are serious 
and responsible for the transaction. So at the end of a trusted transaction, 
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everyone will get the deposits back to their wallets. But, for the fraud case, the 
dishonest trader will not only lost their money and get the distrust token but also 
will lose the deposit. His deposit will be sent to the witness wallet as a reward for 
managing the disputes” [P4]. This is a striking finding for advising the issue of 
witness’ work incentives as well as to encourage them to perform honest 
transactions. Although it requires additional payment to enact the transaction, it is 
a good precaution to prevent fraud transaction also to ensure that the witnesses 
are more responsible. 
  Revisions of the Design for Trust Algorithms for Bitcoin Transaction 8.4.3
Findings also suggest the importance of the type of proof for the offline 
transaction, in order to ensure that the transaction is protected from scams. Hence, 
for the algorithms revision, it is compulsory for the seller and buyer to include the 
type of evidence for the offline transaction with the bank or shipping company in 
the contract. These will allow the independent users, who will be offered to be the 
witness of the transaction, to view the details of the contract including the type of 
proof for the offline transaction as well as allow them to examine the format of the 
proof. If they are not familiar with the format of proof, they may decline the 
invitation for the witnessing. 
The findings also suggest including a new mechanism as a guarantee of honesty in 
the algorithms that requires the buyer, seller, and witness to pay a deposit for the 
transaction. This would encourage them to be responsible, but also to be a reward 
for the witness who is in charge to manage the dispute.  
211 
 
 Chapter Summary 8.5
This chapter describes the algorithms for trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions with 
fiat money and product exchanged in the real world. Those algorithms have been 
validated by Bitcoin Blockchain experienced users that initially suggested the principles 
to design for trust in Bitcoin peer-to-peer transactions. Thus, these validated algorithms 
will be used as the reference to design the user interface of a mobile Bitcoin wallet as 
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The algorithms to develop trust in terms of peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions have 
been described in Chapter 8. The algorithms were validated by the Bitcoin Blockchain 
experienced users who initially suggested the principles to develop trust in Study 3 
(Chapter 7). This chapter aims to design the user interface for the prototype of a mobile 
Bitcoin wallet application, named BitXFps by adopting the validated algorithms. Prior to 
the design of this app, a set of guidelines to design for trust was identified. The 
guidelines were adopted from the existing frameworks (Seckler et al., 2015; Wang & 
Emurian, 2005) to evaluate trust in designing interfaces for websites and mobile apps 
(Hasslacher, 2014), which consist of five characteristics, namely graphic design, 
structure design, content design, social cue design and personal social proof. Based on 
the suggested design from trust principles in Study 3 (Chapter 7), another characteristic 
known as peer-to-peer transaction cue is also added to the guidelines. Thus, the guideline 
is used as the reference to design the BitXFps Bitcoin wallet app user interface. This 
chapter begins with the descriptions of the guidelines to gain trust in designing Bitcoin 
mobile wallet apps. 
 Proposed Trust-Inducing Features for the Bitcoin Application Design Interface 9.2
Wang and Eumarian (Wang & Emurian, 2005) designed the framework of trust-
inducing features for websites consisting of four characteristics, namely structure design, 
graphic design, content design and social cue design. Graphic design refers to the design 
factors on the website that influence the first impression among consumers, which 
include the use of colour, layout design and photo quality in the website (Karvonen & 
Parkkinen, 2001; Kim & Moon, 1998; Seckler et al., 2015; Wang & Emurian, 2005). 
Next, the structure design relates to website organisation which depicts the overall look 
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of a website and the information accessibility. This includes the website usability in 
terms of the design effectiveness, ease of website navigation and lack of pop-up 
advertisements in the design. Also, the structure design is related to the website requests 
in persuading users to share their URL with others, to register an account or download a 
software via the website (Eremeev, 1999; Karvonen & Parkkinen, 2001; Nielsen, 1998; 
Ping et al., 1999.; Seckler et al., 2015). Content design refers to the format of 
information provided by the website providers, either graphical or textual, which 
includes security signs, website branding, expertise, privacy policy related to personal 
data collection and the secondary use of data, web address, implausible promise and 
website policy (Belanger, Hiller, & Smith, 2002; Egger, 2001; Eremeev, 1999; Hu, Hu, 
Lin, & Zhang, 2001; J Nielsen, 2000; Seckler et al., 2015; Shneiderman & Ben, 2000; 
Wang & Emurian, 2005). Another one is the social cue design, which relates to social 
signs that reduce the gap of social distance and increase intimacy. The integration of 
social media with the website is common to connect the users with web providers and 
enhance the communication between users (Basso, Goldberg, Greenspan, & Weimer, 
2001; Riegelsberger et al., 2005; Seckler et al., 2015; Steinbrück, Schaumburg, Duda, & 
Krüger, 2002; Wang & Emurian, 2005). 
Secklar et al. (Seckler et al., 2015) extended the framework after looking at many e-
commerce and finance websites. Thus, the initial framework was modified with new 
characteristics, in terms of personal and social cue aspects. The new characteristics are 
related to the social proof among friends, which is identified through the connection 
between the website and social media channels, that enables users to view their mutual 
friends who are engaged with the website and share experience with other users (Seckler 
et al., 2015). 
215 
 
However, there is a limited exploration of the framework to explore trust in the 
Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies’ mobile app interface. Hence, the extended framework 
of trust-inducing features by Secklar et al. (Seckler et al., 2015) was Bitcoinadopted to 
design BitXFps.  
In addition, from the outcomes of Study 3 (Chapter 7), the four principles to gain 
trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions were identified, they are transaction 
transparency, contract validity, decentralised mediator, and user reputation. Transaction 
transparency is defined as the app design that guarantees the visibility of two-way 
transaction for both seller and buyer. Contract validity is defined as the signs in the 
design that ensure the agreement between the two parties is valid in Blockchain’s public 
ledger through smart contracts. Next, the decentralised mediator is defined as the third 
party involved in a transaction, who manages the two-way transaction to prevent failure 
or dispute in the case of claimed unfairness. Another one is user reputation that can be 
captured through trust tokens, to indicate users’ honesty in the previous transactions. 
These four elements are also applied to evaluate the existing Bitcoin mobile applications. 
Hence, the trust-inducing features (Seckler et al., 2015), along with the principles for 
trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions, were adopted as a new proposed design 







Uses of Colours 
1. Suitable colours for Bitcoin Application  
Appropriate site layout 
1 Easily accessible of the functions within the app 
Moderate layout complexity 
1. Moderate arrangements of contents for all pages 
Uses of photographs 
1. Appropriate quality of photos used in the app 
Structure Design 
Usability 
1. Effectiveness and efficacy with the task flow 
2. Easy navigation 
Broken Links 
1. No broken links throughout the app 
Demand 
1. Provide links to share the wallet app with friends and family 
2. Did not require an additional application to support the function of the app. 
3. Require users to create a wallet account  
Content Design 
Security signs 
1. The signs that the wallet account is protected 
Image/brand 
1. The features in the design that reflects the image of the wallet app 
Expertise 
1. Page that provide a comprehensive user guide for the users to use the app 
Privacy: Data Collection 
1. Page that stated the details of privacy policy related to users’ data collection and storage 
Privacy: Secondary use 
1. Page that stated the details of privacy policy related to the uses of the collected users’ data 
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Credibility of Content 
1. Updated contents for the app 
 Implausible Promises 
1. There is no information that is not making sense  
Policy 
1. Page of details of terms and conditions of using the app 
Social Cue Design 
Customer Service 
1. Page for user’s support service for the app 
Real-World Link 
1. Supporting links that is related to the development of the app 
Personal and Social Proof 
User’s Social Proof 
1. Link or page for users to leave feedback and review 
Friend’s Social Proof 
1. Users can connect with their friends and family that used the same app 
Shared User’s Prior Experience 
1. Users can share their experiences with other users. 
Peer-to-peer Transaction Design Cues 
Unbiased Transaction 
1. The steps to create the transaction is fair for both side of users (seller and buyer) 
A Contract validity 
1. A page to show that the mutual agreement is stored in the smart contract 
Verifiable Transaction 
1. There is a mediator that verify the transaction between both parties 
User’s Reputation 
1. Show the rating scores of the users 
Table 9.1: The Proposed Checklist in Designing and Evaluating the Trust in the Bitcoin 
Mobile Application Interface  
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 Navigation overview of the BitXFps 9.3
The app navigation diagram can be viewed in two layers of interface, which are the 
pre-access to the app and homepage. The pre-access is divided into three parts; create a 
new wallet, create a passcode, and backup wallet. For the users to access the homepage, 
they are required to create the wallet and passcode. The homepage consists of six parts; 
settings, Bitcoin trading, merchant, my wallet, multisignature wallet and witness. All 
these are accessible from the homepage and each of the main will be further explained in 
the following sections. (Figure 9.2).  
While navigating between pages on the app, users can see a menu bar at the bottom 
of the page which links to other functions (Figure 9.12: B). The menu bar consists of 
icons similar to the homepage. When users enter a page, they can see an idle icon on the 
menu bar, which shows the current page. There is also a back button on each page to 
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 Design Overview of BitXFps  9.3.1
Now, the design of the BitXFps prototype user interface will be described 
according to the algorithms identified in Chapter 8 (Appendix D). 
9.3.1.1 Creating a new wallet 
To get access to the wallet, users are required to have a valid BitXFps Bitcoin 
wallet. For new users, they can register by verifying the 12 random word phrases. 
The words are important for wallet backup. This means in the future, if users lose 
their mobile device, they can still recover the wallet by using the 12-word 
phrases, which resemble their private key. In the meantime, if someone is able to 
retrieve those words, he or she can log in to the wallet. Hence, it is vital for the 
users to keep those words a secret. This is one of the design security measures, as 
the mobile app does not manage or store their owner details (Figure 9.3). This is 
in contrast with most of Bitcoin exchange apps, which require the owner to 
provide personal details such as proof of ID and address to create the wallet 
(Coinbase, n.d.). 
 
Figure 9.3: Wallet Backup Phrase 
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9.3.1.2 Set Wallet Passcode 
Once the wallet is successfully created, users are required to set a passcode as 
another security measure. The passcode will be queried when the users try to gain 
access to the wallet, conduct a transaction, sign an agreement, or accept an 
invitation to join a multisignature wallet. Once the passcode has been set and 
verified, the user is allowed to access the wallet home screen (Figure 9.4). 
 
 
Figure 9.4: Setting the Wallet Passcode 
9.3.1.3 BitXFps Home Screen 
Once the users have verified their wallet, they can view the BitXFps 
homepage. The logo and the main functions are available on the homepage via 
icons and labels. The icons are labelled so that users can get familiar with the 
terms in Bitcoin transactions. The wallet background colour is similar to the 
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previous page. Blue is chosen because this colour is suggested in the checklist 
besides being deemed to initiate trust (Alberts, Van Der Geest, & Thea M., 2011; 
Labrecque & Milne, 2012). For any Bitcoin wallets, the most important function 
is to send and receive Bitcoins. In addition, the setting function is essential to 
enable users to customise their preference in using the app. Hence for the 
BitXFps design, these three functions are placed on the homepage. Moreover, 
five wallet functions such as Bitcoin trading (trading between Bitcoin and fiat 
money), merchant (trading between Bitcoin and goods), my wallet, multisignature 








9.3.1.4 Send and Receive Bitcoin 
The “SEND” and “RECEIVE” labels on the main screen allow users to send 
and receive Bitcoin instantly. These functions are available in most Bitcoin wallet 
apps, as users are required to key in the amount of Bitcoin to be transferred and 
the receiver’s wallet address. The latter can be keyed in, pasted or scanned from 
the QR code. Users can also set the transaction fee at low cost with lower priority, 
or choose faster transaction with a higher fee. There are two ways for users to 
receive Bitcoins. First, they can just share the copy of their wallet address or QR 
code to other users, and second, they can set the Bitcoin amount needed. The QR 
code is customised for each transaction accordingly. On the screen header, there 
is the app’s logo, title and down arrow to allow users  return to the main screen. 










Besides sending and receiving Bitcoins, BitXFps main screen also features 
setting icons for users to customise the app based on their preference. Under the 
Settings menu, there are 6 submenus, which are “Preference”, “Invite Friends”, 
“Security Settings”, “Privacy Policy”, “Rate Us”, and “About”. At the bottom of 
the main setting page, there is a menu bar that consists of all the icons similar to 
the main screen. This allows users to navigate between pages or return to the 
home page. Each submenu will be further described. 
The first submenu under the Settings menu is “Preference”, which allows users 
to choose the preferred fiat currency to be displayed on the app and set the 
transaction fee either high or low. The second submenu is “Invite Friends”, where 
users can share the link to the app with their friends and family, for them to use 
the same app to send and receive Bitcoins. This helps to increase the level of trust 
in transactions among the new users. The link can be shared with Facebook 
friends, Twitter followers, or via instant message applications. The third submenu 
is “Security Settings”, where users can change their passcode to enable touch ID 
function. So instead of keying in the passcode, they can use their fingerprint for 
quicker access. Besides, the users can retrieve the 12-word phrases to back up 
their wallet. 
The fourth submenu under Settings is “Privacy Policy”. It consists of the app’s 
privacy policy in detail, while the next submenu allows users to leave feedback 
and rate the app. As the app is designed for iPhone, the rating page is then linked 
to the Apple Store. Another submenu is about the terms and conditions, and for 
users to connect with the social media community channels such as Twitter, 




9.3.1.6 Bitcoin Trading 
 
Figure 9.7: Bitcoin Trading Pages 
 
On the Bitcoin trading page, buyers and sellers can advertise, sell and buy 
Bitcoins between each other. The list of buyers and sellers are listed with 
different colours in a table to enable users to distinguish them. The details such 
the Bitcoin’s price, reputation score, payment method or payment window of the 
sellers or buyers can be browsed from the list. To proceed with transactions, users 
have to key in the Bitcoin amount and send the trade request. The application 
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sends the request to the seller’s email. Then, the seller and buyer may further 
negotiate the transaction via email before enacting the transaction.  
9.3.1.7 Merchants 
 
Figure 9.8: Merchant Pages 
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BitXFps app also supports users who want to be the product merchants and 
trade using Bitcoin. The merchant page is accessible from the merchant’s icon on 
the main screen, the icon is also located at the bottom of most of all pages. Users 
can browse the products either by category or preferences such as price, colour 
and brand. There is also a search bar, where users can key the item name that they 
wish to search. The searched items are listed with details such as the item name, 
price, and merchant’s reputation score. To view additional details, users can click 
on the item and the screen will show the page for the item. This includes the 
product images, specifications and delivery details. Users can also send messages 
to the merchant to ask about the item.  
Once the users have agreed to purchase the product, they can click the “add 
cart” button, where the shopping basket page will appear. To proceed with the 
purchase, the user needs to choose the quantity, shipping mode and delivering 
country. Then the total price will be automatically calculated. If users agree with 
the price, then they may proceed with the transaction, and the screen will be 
directed to the terms and conditions page. This page describes the details 
regarding the transaction such as the witness, reputation score and deposit fee. If 
users agree with the terms and conditions, they can key in their contact address, 
and send the product purchase request to the seller. Once the merchants receive 
the email, they will contact the buyer and finalise the transaction details before 




9.3.1.8 My Wallet 
 
Figure 9.9: The Function of My Wallet in Detail 
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“My Wallet” function entails transactions in one’s personal wallet. The “My 
Wallet” main page shows the wallet address, and the total Bitcoins in the wallet. 
There are five “My Wallet” submenus, which are “Send Bitcoin”, “Receive Bitcoin”, 
“Personal Reputation Scores”, “Transaction History”, and “Backup Wallet”. To send 
and receive Bitcoins, the steps are similar to the ones on the home screen. Also, the 
backup wallet is a function which is accessible from the Security Settings. 
Reputation score shows the total trust tokens, witness tokens, and the number of 
successful transactions with details in the transaction history sub-menu (Figure 9.9). 
9.3.1.9 Multisignature Wallet 
The multisignature wallet in BitXFps is designed with a smart contract. Hence, it 
enables the buyer and seller to write the agreement details including the penalty if 
either of them fails to be honest in the transaction. The seller is responsible to draft 
the contract and invite the buyer to join the contract. Both signatures are required. 
Then they will pay the contract fee, as well as Bitcoin to sell, tokens fees and 
deposits. Then they have to wait for the app to randomly invite the witness of the 
transaction. Once the witness joins, the seller and buyer may proceed with the 
transaction as stated in the contract and sign the wallet to release the Bitcoin. Once 
the wallet receives signatures from both parties, it will automatically release the 
Bitcoin to buyer’s wallet and send the trust token to both wallets belonged to buyer 
and seller, while the witness will receive the witness token. All of them will also 
receive their own deposit. (Figure 9.10). However, if the wallet does not receive the 
signatures from both seller and buyer, it will alarm the witness to verify the 





Figure 9.10: Details of the Multisignature Wallet Function 
9.3.1.10 Witness 
The witness function is the most unique feature of BitXFps as it offers a 
decentralised mediator for peer-to-peer transactions. There are no other Bitcoin apps 
with this kind of witness function. The witness is crowdsourced from the BitXFps 
users. If a wallet ID is selected to be the witness, the owner will receive a notification 
of invitation. Before accepting the invitation, the owner may view the contact details 
including the type of offline proof to be used in the transaction such as video 
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recordings. If the owner is willing to act as a witness, he/she may accept the 
invitation and pay the deposit as stated in the contract. The deposit is sent to the 
multisignature wallet as a guarantee of honesty and responsibility. In the event of an 
honest transaction between buyer and seller, witness is not required to do anything 
during the transaction and will have the deposit returned in full at the end of the 
transaction besides being rewarded with a witness token. However, if there is any 
dispute, the witness will receive an alert to manage the dispute. To manage that, the 
witness has to check the contract and the proof of offline transaction from the seller 
to the buyer before making a decision regarding the dispute. The witness also has to 
sign the multisignature wallet to release the Bitcoins to the honest party. Once the 
wallet is verified with the signatures, it will release the Bitcoins, trust tokens, witness 
token and deposits according to the witness decision. In the case that the witness 
needs to work on the dispute, he/she will receive the full amount of his/her deposit, 














 Reflections from the BitXFps User Interface Design according to the Proposed 9.3.2
Guideline of Trust-Inducing Features for Bitcoin mobile applications 
This section describes the trust cues of the BitXFps mobile application.  
9.3.2.1 Graphic Design 
Graphic design is described as the use of colours, layout compatibility, moderate 
layout complexity, and use of pictures. BitXFps app uses blue as the background 
colour for the wallet design like most of the Bitcoin applications. There are also other 
colours used BitXFps interfaces such as red, blue, green, and yellow Figure 9.12. 
For the wallet layout, the content in all pages is placed in a single column, and the 
height of the pages is kept short so the users no need to scroll for long. There are 
additional links to other social media such as Facebook because BitXFps is 
accessible via the app layout, as well as a link for users to exit from the app (Figure 
9.13: A). Besides, pictures in BitXFps are displayed on the merchant page to 
describe the advertised products. The app allows merchants to upload up to three 
images for each product. The photo quality being uploaded must be good enough to 
attract users to purchase the product (Figure 9.13: B). This can strengthen the 
















Table 9.2: The Use of Colours in the BitXFps Design 
 
 
Figure 9.12: The Elements of Trust in the BitXFps Graphic Design 
 
 
Background     
Buttons      
Text       
Icons       
Tables       
B: The photos of merchant’s product 
A: The link to the BitXFps Facebook 





9.3.2.2 Structure Design 
For structure design, there are three elements outlined in the checklist. First, in 
terms of usability, BitXFps app provides familiar icons and labels in the form of 
buttons to allow users to access the correct content before carrying out any tasks 
(Figure 9.14: A). There is also a menu bar at the bottom of pages and a back button 
at the top of pages. Those are navigation buttons to assist users to browse the app 
(Figure 9.14: B). Second, there is no broken link and the BitXFps app provides links 
for users to share the app with their friends (Figure 9.14: C), this requires the new 
users to create an anonymous wallet account (Figure 9.14: D). 
 





A: Example of buttons and icons used  
    in BitXFps 
 
B: Back button and the menu bar used  
    in BitXFps 
 
C: Invite links for sharing BitXFps app  
     with family and friends  
 
D: The request for user to create the 




9.3.2.3 Content Design 
There are eight elements under content design. First, regarding the security design, 
BitXFps uses phrases to resemble the wallet’s private key for backup so that the app 
is fully managed by the wallet owner (Figure 9.15: A). BitXFps also enables users to 
activate the passcode, providing touch ID functions for wallet protection (Figure 
9.15: A). Second, the brand is reflected throughout the app via the theme interface 
and colour (Figure 9.15: B). Third, the novel feature of the transaction method in 
BitXFps includes witness crowdsourcing from the large pool of Bitcoin users for the 
transaction to take place (Figure 9.15: C). In terms of privacy, BitXFps allows users 
to create the wallet anonymously and does not store any user details. There is also a 
specific page under “Settings” that describes the app’s privacy policy (Figure 9.15: 
D). In terms of content credibility, since BitXFps is decentralised, there is no updated 
news but there are regular version updates to fix bugs and introduce new features 
(Figure 9.15: E). Then, the app terms and conditions are described in the “About” 





Figure 9.14: The Elements of Trust in the BitXFps Content Design 
9.3.2.4 Social Cue Design 
The social cue design describes the elements that develop trust among the users to 
the developers, for example via a link between the app and the developers’ personal 
blog. However, due to the BitXFps decentralisation concept, such connection is 
trivial. However, BitXFps fulfills the customer service criteria by providing the 
developers’ team contact email (Figure 9.16: A) and social media to connect users to 








A: Security signs for BitXFps 
  
B: Logo of BitXFps 
  
C: Witness function in BitXFps 
  
D: Privacy Policy for BitXFps 
  
E: Version updates for BitXFps 
  





Figure 9.15: The Elements of Trust in the BitXFps Social Cue Design 
9.3.2.5 Personal and Social Proof Design 
The personal and social proof is defined as the connection between users in the 
BitXFps app. BitXFps supports user social proof by providing rating and feedback 
functions through the app store and social media channels (Figure 9.17: A). Via 
social media, users can share their experience in using BitXFps. The app supports 
social proof design by providing users with links to the app to be shared with their 
friends and family (Figure 9.17: B). This extends the adoption of the app via social 
networks. 
A B 
A: Support email address for BitXFps 
  





Figure 9.16: The Elements of Trust in the BitXFps Social Proof Design 
9.3.2.6 Peer-to-peer Transaction Design Cues 
The aim of the BitXFps design is to facilitate trust between users in enacting peer-
to-peer transactions. The app is designed to support the multisignature feature that is 
embedded with a smart contract. This enables transparency in the transfer of Bitcoins 
in and out of the wallet according to the agreement between both parties (Figure 
9.18: A). In addition, BitXFps allows users to send reputation token to symbolise 
their trust level of the parties involved in the previous transactions. Both smart 
contract and trust token features are designed to make peer-to-peer Bitcoin 
transactions transparent (Figure 9.18: A). In BitXFps, the written smart contract has 
to be verified by both seller and buyer to ensure that they both agree with the 
transaction details including the penalty imposed for being dishonest. Hence, the 




A: Channels for the users to give 
     feedback and reviews for BitXFps 
  
B: Invite links for sharing BitXFps app  






Figure 9.17: The Elements of Trust in the BitXFps Peer-to-peer Transaction 
Design Cues 
The transactions via BitXFps app are mediated by a decentralised witness who is 
randomly appointed from the app users. The witness plays a role to manage any 
dispute between the seller and buyer (Figure 9.18: C). At the end of the transaction, 
the app allows users to send a trust token to each other. In addition, they are required 
to send a witness token to the witness as an appreciation for being willing to mediate 
the transaction. However, if the witness is not responsible and does not respond to 
the dispute alert, the witness will receive penalty with zero witness token, and the 
witness’s deposit will be transferred to another appointed witness. The trust and 




A: Multisignature wallet and reputations 
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B: 2-3 signatures of the wallet 
 




(Figure 9.18: A). Hence, this indicates the wallet owners’ credibility and 
trustworthy. 
 Chapter Summary  9.4
The outcomes in this chapter come from the list of guidelines to design for trust for a 
Bitcoin wallet app. Such guidelines are useful to examine the trustworthiness of Bitcoin 
wallet app interface designs, as well as for other types of cryptocurrency. In turn, the 
evaluation checklist is further applied in designing the user interface of BitXFps prototype. 
To better understand and explore the value of the BitXFps interface and its embedded trust 
elements, the app needs to be evaluated by Bitcoin users. So in the following Chapter 10, 
the BitXFps interface design will be evaluated by experienced Bitcoin users who can help to 
















10    Evaluation of BitXFps Mobile Wallet 
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A list of guidelines to design for trust for Bitcoin mobile application user interface has 
been identified in Chapter 9. The guidelines are also used as the reference to design the 
mobile wallet app user interface for peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions (BitXFps). The 
uniqueness of BitXFps is the app interface which is designed based on the algorithms for 
trust elements in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions and its underlying design principles; 
transparent transactions, valid contract, decentralised mediator, and system reputation. The 
algorithms were identified and validated by the Bitcoin Blockchain experienced users in 
Study 3 and Study 4 (Chapter 7 and 8). However, it is essential to conduct the trust 
validation test among the BitXFps users when they are using the wallet app. In this chapter, 
a prototype of BitXFps is built and evaluated (Study 5) with 12 Bitcoin users to address the 
following research questions: 
 which elements of the BitXFps user interface design develop trust for peer-to-peer 
Bitcoin transactions?  
 how does the design of the BitXFps interface mitigate the trust issues in peer-to-peer 
Bitcoin transactions? 
This chapter reports on the interviews conducted with 12 Bitcoin users while using the 
BitXFps app prototype. The study advances the theory of trust-inducing features of the 
interface design to highlight the important trust elements in BitXFps app besides identifying 
the new trust elements for peer-to-peer transactions and the trust-related risks in BitXFps 
and ways to mitigate them. The chapter is concluded with the framework of trust-inducing 
features for peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions. It also proposes new features such as the 
Blockchain real-time communication to capture the proof of offline transaction for delivery 
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of goods and fiat money transaction as well as the revised BitXFps app interface to develop 
a higher level of trust. 
 Research Method 10.2
Twelve Bitcoin users were recruited in this study, 7 male, 5 female, (mean age of 31.4 
with age range of 23-41). Five participants had experience of less than a year in using 
Bitcoins, three of them had 2 to 3 years of experience, while the remaining four had used 
Bitcoins more than 4 years. In terms of educational background, five of them have 
Bachelor’s degree and the rest have Master’s degree. Participants have a variety of career 
paths; 2 were in financial and marketing sector, 2 in the engineering field, 2 in the academic 
line, and 6 of them were students. 2 participants were recruited from Study 1 (exploring the 
Bitcoin practice among the users) and 3 were from Study 3 (evaluating BlocKit with the 
Bitcoin Blockchain experienced users). Then the study applied snowball sampling that 
seven more participants were introduced in the interview sessions.  
Participants were asked to select the dates they are available in a Doodle pool and 
were grouped into 4 groups (3 for each group). The participants were instructed to engage 
with the BitXFps prototype in a workshop. The BitXFps app was developed using the 
Mockuplus Software (MockupPlus, 2019). The aim of the mock-up session is to evaluate 
the trust level to its interface among the users. In each group, the participants were given a 
role as the Bitcoin witness, seller or buyer. They were also given an iPhone 6 installed with 
the BitXFps customised designs specific to their role. Participants were asked to enact two 
types of Bitcoins transactions using the app. Firstly, they had to purchase a MacBook using 
Bitcoins, and second was to sell 0.0779 Bitcoins at the price of 500USD. Prior to the 
transaction, they were briefed with the BitXFps application, especially on the witness 
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function, as this new feature is not available in the typical Bitcoin wallet apps. Due to the 
fact that BitXFps is only a prototype, the interviewer assisted participants to use the app and 
manage their turns doing the transactions for each participant, for example, once the buyer 
has signed the multisignature wallet, they need to wait for the seller to sign to receive 
Bitcoins from the multisignature wallet. Once both transactions are completed, participants 
were asked about their perceptions of the interface design in app. 
Then, they were interviewed based on the design for trust guidelines as described in 
Chapter 9 with the following questions: “are there any important functions that are not 
included in the app?” and “do you find any difficulties while navigating the functions within 
the app?” They were also asked with questions related to the app’s content and design: “do 
you think that the security signs are good in building trust among users?”, “what else can 
be done to improve trust via the app image and branding?”, and “what kind of additional 
contents that are relevant to develop trust to be included in the app?” There are also 
questions on graphic design; “what choice of colours that can boost the trust?” and “what 
type of photos should be included in the app to improve trust?” Personal and social Proof 
was explored through questions such as; “do you think social media pages can help to 
increase personal and social proofs?” while social cue design was explored via questions 
such as: “do you have any suggestions to improve the social cue design for the app?” Then, 
the questions related to trust elements in peer-to-peer transactions; “do you think that the 
transparency in the transaction can improve trust?”, “do you agree that any agreements 
between the buyer and seller included in the contract will facilitate trust?”, “do you think 
the witness can be a good mediator to mitigate trust issues in the transaction?”, and “do 




The workshops lasted between 45 and 60 minutes, the sessions conducted were video 
recorded and fully transcribed. Data analysis involved a hybrid approach with the deductive 
coding, and new ones from the data, contributing to the inductive coding (Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006). The deductive codes include the trust-inducing features such as graphic 
design, content design, structure design, social cue design and personal and social proof 
design (Seckler et al., 2015; Wang & Emurian, 2005), and the principles to design for trust 
in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions that have been highlighted in the findings in Study 3 
with the experienced Bitcoin Blockchain users (Chapter 7)The codes were iteratively 
revised based on the interview data, thus resulting in new codes under the theme of Bitcoin 
wallet app design for trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions. 
 Findings 10.3
This section outlines the elements of trust embedded in the BitXFps design, followed 
by the descriptions of the trust-related risks perceived in relation to the app’s interface and 
ways to mitigate them. 
 The Elements of Trust Embedded in the BitXFps Interface Design 10.3.1
This section describes the trust elements associated with the BitXFps user interface 
such as graphic design, structure design, content design, personal and social proof, 
social cue designs, and peer-to-peer transaction design cues.  
10.3.1.1 Graphic Design  
It was found that the choice of blue for the app’s layout is appropriate as all 
participants are satisfied with the selection; “the colours suit the app” [P12]. The 
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blue colour was selected based on the findings in previous research on users’ 
trustworthiness towards corporate websites, where the blue scheme is perceived as 
the most trustworthy (Alberts et al., 2011). In addition, blue is also associated with 
competence as this colour signals intelligence, communication, trust and efficiency 
(Fraser & Banks, 2004; Mahnke, 1996; Shneiderman & Ben, 2000; Wright, 1988) 
Hence, the use of blue in the Bitcoin wallet app can contribute to the user’s initial 
trust.  
The findings also show that all participants appreciated the app layout interface: 
“all the icons (in the homepage) are similar with the menu (at the bottom of all 
pages), […] it helps the users to get familiar with the functions in the app” [P11]. 
Every BitXFps functions were designed in the form of icons and the same icons are 
used in the site menu throughout the app. This enables users to navigate from one 
function to another (Figure 10.2). In addition, three participants liked the table 
summarising the ongoing transaction updates on the wallet page: “it is transparent 
because we can see everything coming in and out as well as the signatures in this 
table” [P5]. This allows all users that are involved in a transaction to have similar 
information regarding the transaction status. This is to prevent the attempts of scam 
or fraud that usually occur in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions with fiat money or 
goods. The main reason such fraud attempts take place is due to lack of transparency 
in the offline transaction. Hence, this reflects the importance of the transparency 




Figure 10.2: Icons on the homepage and the bottom menu of the BitXFps 
interface 
3 participants suggested improving the table design: “it is better if you 
differentiate the seller and buyer (in the active wallet table) by using different 
colours or icons. […] The new users may get confused because they may mix up the 
(wallet) address with another” [P7]. This suggests the icon’s design to be revised so 
that users can easily read the summary table. This, in turn, will increase the app 
information visibility and ease-of-use thus contributes to the credibility of the app.  
10.3.1.2 Structure Design 
It was found that all participants are familiar with the BitXFps functions; “it has 
the common functions like other Bitcoin wallets” [P2]. To design the user interface, it 
is important to ensure that the organisation of the interface is not too different from 
other Bitcoin wallet apps. This to make the users get familiar and comfortable in 
using the app to send and receive Bitcoins, allowing them to create simple 
transactions within the app: “that’s easy […] Click send (from the homepage) (then) 
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just type in 1 here (the Bitcoin amount in the text box) and paste or scan the 
receiver’s address here (address textbox). I want it to be fast (transaction fee button) 
and send (send button)” [P4]. Similar actions were performed by all participants to 
send Bitcoins via the BitXFps app. This demonstrates that user familiarisation is 
essential in organising the structure within the app. 
 
Figure 10.3: Invite friends page 
3 participants suggested to improve the witness function efficiency: “I don’t want 
to be a witness anymore. Can I stop from receiving the notification to be a witness? 
[…] I think you should do this or else it will annoy the users” [P12]. This suggests 
the value of privacy in the app interface. This in turns highlights the importance to 
change the design for trust in Bitcoin apps. 
Other suggestions are related to the design structure of the witness function, as 
mentioned by 6 participants: “how long do we have to wait for the witness to join the 
wallet? […] It is better if the user can see the timer for them to estimate the waiting 
time” [P9], while 9 participants commented on the notifications: “what happened if I 
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don’t check my email […] there should be another way to alert the users such as text 
message” [P1]. This highlights the importance of users to be aware with the design. 
The timer is relevant for users to estimate the waiting time for the transaction, as well 
as the additional notification mechanisms to alert users to take actions in the 
transactions. This will help to enhance the app usability.  
It was found that the suggestions to create an anonymous wallet account in 
BitXFps was well received by 6 participants: “I need to take my picture while 
holding a paper written with my name and passport ID. This is ridiculous. […] this 
app does not even ask about my email to create an account […] It means they don’t 
have my personal data, which is good” [P5]. This reflects the importance to protect 
user personal details. In the most centralised Bitcoin exchange app such as, users are 
required to provide their personal details so that their identity can be verified. This is 
important to avoid fraudulent transactions. However, the exchange verification 
processes are tedious and the exchanges companies gain access to the user personal 
details. This is indeed inconvenient for the users.  
10.3.1.3 Content Design 
It was found that all participants are satisfied with the app security aspect. By 
providing the backup wallet features for the users to keep and protect their own 
private key, the app, in fact, does not store any user credentials. This reflects the app 
protects its users’ privacy. Most of the participants agreed that the design in the app 
establishes positive image and branding: “the app colour theme and logo are 
synchronised and consistent throughout the app” [P10]. However, 3 participants 
argued that the app main characteristic is not properly highlighted: “I can say the app 
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main selling point is the decentralised witness for the offline trade. However, it is not 
been highlighted (as a unique tool), making the app just like other Bitcoin apps” 
[P8]. This reflects the importance of the design in the Bitcoin wallet app so that users 
can differentiate it from other wallet apps. This, in turn, reflects the credibility of the 
app. 
Also, three participants suggested the developer to include documentation to 
strengthen the app credibility and its contents: “it is good if you can provide a link to 
the white paper of the app development […] or the source code in GitHub […] this 
will definitely give a good impact to build credibility and trust towards the app” 
[P10]. This suggestion is important as BitXFps is designed as an open source and 
decentralised Bitcoin mobile application. Hence, the source codes with supporting 
documents in the app are essential for the app developers and community to enhance 
its performance. 
10.3.1.4 Personal and Social Proof 
The feedback for the friend social proof is also positive, as mentioned by three 
participants who share this opinion: “when I join the (BitXFps) Facebook page, I can 
see my mutual friends who are using the wallet as well. So in the future we can trade 
between each other” [P6]. This shows that the app design has a strong proof for 
friends’ connections via BitXFps social media channel (Figure 10.4), which allow 




Figure 10.4: Link to Social Media in BitXFps 
10.3.1.5 Social Cue Design 
The trust elements related to social signs reduce the gap of social distance and 
increase intimacy. The integration of social media and website is common to connect 
the users with web providers and enhance communication between the users (Basso 
et al., 2001; Riegelsberger et al., 2005; Seckler et al., 2015; Steinbrück et al., 2002; 
Wang & Emurian, 2005). It was shown that participants are not satisfied with the 
BitXFps customer service that provides an email address to reach the support team 
(Figure 10.5). Six participants suggested to create an in-app discussion channel: “I 
can only find the team email address […] There should be a channel for all users 
and developers to interact within the app like in-app discussion forum” [P10]. This 
indicates that additional support function is important to strengthen the app’s 
credibility. Since BitXFps app is not centralised, the option to have an in-app 





Figure 10.5: Support Service Email 
 
One of the criteria under social cue design is the real-world link, which is defined 
as the link to the website owner life or link to the real world such as a shop (Seckler 
et al., 2015). It was shown that participants are less satisfied with the real-world link 
of the app because it only uses social media. Therefore, nine participants suggested 
to create a website to support the app: “although it is a crowdsourcing app, I think it 
would be good if there is a proper website to provide detailed explanations of the 
app, including its development, besides allowing the community to contribute and 
interact with the developers [in order] to enhance the app performance” [P5]. This 
shows the demand for additional information to support the app. By connecting the 
users with the developer’s website, this enables users to contribute to app 




10.3.1.6 Peer-to-peer Transaction Design Cues 
To conduct peer-to-peer transaction, the trusts cues in the BitXFps interface are 
vital. In this aspect, all participants are satisfied with the BitXFps interface design. 
Three participants claimed that the transaction transparency involving cryptocurrency 
transfer such as Bitcoins and Ether are better than the offline transactions involving 
Bitcoins and fiat money or goods; “the transaction between Bitcoin and Ether can be 
conducted synchronously […] as you can track the crypto movements from one 
wallet to another through Blockchain. The same goes for Bitcoin and fiat money, but 
you need an exchange company to do it” [P2]. This reflects the ability of centralised 
exchanges in managing the transactions transparently and synchronously, provided 
the users pay the fee to use this service.  
BitXFps offers similar options in enacting peer-to-peer transaction transparently. 
Six participants like the decentralised quality of transactions supported by the app; 
“it is brilliant to create the transaction in a multisignature wallet with a contract 
[…] we can include penalties for those who are dishonest” [P11]. This shows that 
users appreciate the wallet app design that integrates two important elements to build 
trust, which is the multisignature wallet and smart contract. Although it is partially 
transparent, the use of both elements in BitXFps ensures the Bitcoin movements take 
place once the consensus involving the buyer and seller in the transaction is reached. 
Hence, the offline transaction needs to be completed before Bitcoin is released from 
the multisignature wallet. This enables users to enact two-way peer-to-peer Bitcoin 
transactions in a trusted way. 
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The next element under the peer-to-peer transaction cue is a valid agreement 
between buyer and seller. All participants agreed that BitXFps app is satisfactory and 
stressed the importance of the contract: “the contract is important to protect users 
from scammers and fraud”. [P2]. In the convention peer-to-peer transaction between 
strangers, they usually communicate via text messages and agree on terms of the 
transaction (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017). However, such terms are not legalised and no 
action can be taken against dishonest traders. So to prevent this, the agreements are 
sealed with smart contact in BitXFps. Six participants mentioned the validity of this 
approach in the Blockchain: “everything that is included in the Blockchain is 
considered as a legal document, including the contract between seller and buyer” 
[P3]. Hence, the contract can protect both parties during the transactions.  
 
Figure 10.6: Design for the BitXFps User Reputation Score 
 
Another element in the BitXFps design is the user reputation score, reflecting user 
trustworthiness in the previous transactions. BitXFps is designed with three 
reputation tokens, each for the seller, buyer and witness. For each wallet, the total 
reputation score is calculated as the average sum of the three tokens (Figure 10.6). 
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Findings indicate that all participants emphasise the importance of the reputation 
system; “in a peer-to-peer transaction it is important to know whether the person we 
are dealing with is reputable or not. […] This reputation score is a good indicator” 
[P1]. This, in turn, supports the user reputation design to facilitate them in future 
decision while engaging in Bitcoin transactions with the respective user.  
 New Trust Elements for Peer-to-peer Transaction Design Cues 10.3.2
Interestingly, six participants identified a new element to develop trust in peer-to-
peer Bitcoin transactions: “if the witness finds that this person (buyer) is a scammer, 
then he will sign here (dispute page) to reverse the Bitcoin back to the seller […] so the 
transaction is safe. […] I think a reversible transaction is also important in peer-to-
peer transaction” [P3]. This indicates the ability to reverse transaction is essential in 
peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions. Although in the original Bitcoin Blockchain 
reversible transaction is not allowed since the transactions are recorded in the ledger, 
the reversible transaction feature provided by BitXFps still maintains the Blockchain 
core characteristic, which is to be decentralised. Hence, the reversible transaction 
feature extends the core concept of Blockchain to develop trust in Bitcoin transactions 
because the transactions can be reversed before being recorded in the Blockchain 
ledger.  
 Risks Related to Trust 10.3.3
This section describes the trust issues related to the witness function in BitXFps.  
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10.3.3.1 Concerns about the Role of Witness  
Nine participants are not confident with the witness function to manage dispute; 
“the problem arise when, let say, the witness says the seller is a scammer, but 
actually the latter is innocent and it is the other way around (the buyer is the real 
scammer)” [P7]. They raised concerns regarding the witness’s credibility in making 
the decision during the dispute. In BitXFps, the witness has to take decision during 
dispute based on the proof of transaction, as stated in the contract. The contract is 
written by the seller, and the details include the proof of offline transaction as has 
been agreed by the buyer. The proof can be in the form of a video file or image file 
of the offline transaction, which needs to be sent by the buyer to the seller via email. 
However, 6 participants questioned the authenticity of the proof; “how can the 
witness prove that the evidence is not fake” [P11]. This is similar to the findings 
from the workshop with the Bitcoin Blockchain experienced users on the algorithm 
design. Based on the experienced users’ feedback, the design of the algorithms is 
revised by introducing a new field in the contract for the users to mention the type of 
offline transaction proof that used in the transaction. However, the revisions still do 
not solve the issue. In other words, although the type of offline proof is recorded in 
the smart contract, the buyer or seller who performs the offline transaction can still 
provide counterfeit proof of transaction, such as fake bank slip. Thus, this issue needs 
a better solution and will be further described in 10.3.4.1. 
10.3.3.2 Deanonymising Confidential Details to the Witness 
On the other hand, six participants expressed concerns about sharing their personal 
data with the witness: “I would rather give my details to the exchange because I 
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know they are bonded to the legislative body instead of giving them to the witness 
who I know nothing about” [P9]. In BitXFps, to enable the witness to make a 
decision in the event of dispute, he/she can request the proof of transaction from both 
seller and buyer, as stated in the contract. Although no personal details are recorded 
in this contract, the witness may request additional information from the seller or 
buyer, such as passport number as the supporting evidence to make decision for the 
dispute. This challenges the Blockchain anonymity feature and the witness may take 
advantage to misuse the buyer and seller’s personal details. A proposed solution to 
support this issue will be further discussed in 10.3.4.2. 
 Suggestions to Mitigate the Risk 10.3.4
This section describes ways to improve the witness function in BitXFps to 
develop trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions. 
10.3.4.1 Standard Format of Proof of Evidence for Offline Transaction 
Six participants propose for the format of offline proof to be standardised: “I think 
the type of evidence should be standardised” [P1]. At the moment in the BitXFps 
design, there is no specific type of proof for offline transaction is set for the app. The 
seller and buyer are free to decide on the type of proof and include it in the contract. 
By having a standard format of proof for the app, this enables the offline evidence to 
be managed in more systematically.  
It is important to ensure a standard format of proof for offline transaction is 
properly used by the witness in managing dispute. Three participants suggested the 
use of video call to capture the offline transaction for fiat money and goods as the 
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proof of transaction; “they (seller, buyer and witness) can make anonymous group 
video call while enacting the offline transaction by only showing the important parts 
of the transaction […] At the end of the conversation, the witness must ensure that 
both parties are happy with the offline transaction” [P10]. Instead of witness only 
plays a role in the event of dispute, this suggests that the witness joins the seller and 
buyer to verify the proof of offline transaction real-time. The anonymised video call 
can also overcome the issue of disclosing personal information to the witness thus 
protect both seller and buyer’s details.  
In contrast, transactions involving the exchange between Bitcoins and goods, the 
format of evidence will be in the form of video file, as suggested by three 
participants: “when they receive the parcel they can record a video, starting from 
unboxing until the product is examined in a single video” [P6]. For the exchange of 
Bitcoins involving products, the delivery process involves the third party, so the 
courier company can provide proof of delivery. There is a possibility of dispute 
between seller and buyer involving the quality of goods being delivered. In BitXFps, 
it is compulsory for the seller and buyer to add in the detailed specifications of the 
goods in the contract. Thus, the video of unboxing goods from the original packaging 
on the same day of delivery can facilitate the witness to verify the transaction.  
10.3.4.2 Standard Guidelines for the Witness to Manage Dispute 
The witness makes decision based on the proof of transaction. Nine participants 
mentioned the importance of a standard guideline to be referred by the witness while 
working on the dispute: “if there is no proper SOP for the witness to do their work, 
this will cause a problem […] Different people have a different thoughts and views” 
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[P4]. By having a standard guideline to manage the dispute, the decision will be 
made consistently, that involves a checklist for witness to analyse the proof via the 
video. 
Three participants suggested a checklist to be referred by the witness while 
engaging in the video call “the checklist can be used by the witness to ensure that 
there is no disagreement between seller and buyer […] Similar checklist should be 
used by the seller and the buyer” [P12]. This supports that the transactions are 
required to be verified consistently. A standard guideline to enact Bitcoin 
transactions in BitXFps should be created and all parties involved have to play their 
role according to the guideline. This, in turn, will prove the integrity of the users and 
transaction transparency. 
 Theoretical Implications 10.4
The findings are from the evaluation of BitXFps interface in developing trust among 
users. The evaluation was conducted based on the theories of trust elements for the website 
and mobile application interfaces (Hasslacher, 2014; Seckler et al., 2015; Wang & Emurian, 
2005). The findings in Study 3 and Study 5 (Chapter 7 and 8), as well as Chapter 9, serve as 
a guideline in the evaluation study. The guideline consists of six characteristics namely 
graphic design, structure design, content design, personal and social proof, social cue 
designs, and peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions design cues. The use of trust elements on 
BitXFps interface are acknowledged by the users based on those characteristics and further 
described in the following section.  
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 Towards a Framework with Trust-inducing Features for Peer-to-peer Bitcoin 10.4.1
Transactions 
According to the Wang and Eumarian’s (Wang & Emurian, 2005) framework of 
trust, as well as its value in the graphic design element, the study found that blue is 
preferable to be the BitXFps layout. This is similar to the colour selection for the top 20 
Bitcoin mobile applications, in which blue is the most frequently used in the app 
background (Chapter 9). The literature also supports the use of blue can develop 
trustworthiness (Labrecque & Milne, 2012). In addition, blue is also linked to 
competence as this colour is associated with intelligence, communication, trust and 
efficiency (Fraser & Banks, 2004; Mahnke, 1996; Shneiderman & Ben, 2000; Wright, 
1988). Hence, this extends the suggestions by Wang and Eumarian (Wang & Emurian, 
2005) to consistently use moderate to low brightness and cool tone to induce trust 
among users. 
Another finding for the graphic design characteristics is the design of the app 
layout to ensure transaction transparency. In peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions, 
transaction transparency between buyer and seller is crucial to develop trust (Sas & 
Khairuddin, 2017). Since the transactions are not governed by any centralised party, 
BitXFps aims to ensure that the design is transparent for both parties. For example, user 
reputation score allows people to know one’s history in Bitcoin transactions. This 
information is available (i.e. transparency) to help other users to make decisions while 
engaging in a transaction with a particular user (Gutscher, 2007). This extends the 
graphic design characteristics (Wang & Emurian, 2005) by adding transparency 
element in the app design besides other elements such as colour, layout and photo. 
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Also highlighted is the importance of content visibility for Bitcoin transactions in 
app design. This includes the selection of icons commonly used by other wallet apps to 
enhance the visibility of this function. This is because users are familiar with those 
icons. This allows them to capture and understand the app contents as well as reflect on 
the app credibility in initiating users’ trust. Hence, information visibility is another 
graphic design element in the app (Wang & Emurian, 2005). 
For structure design, the findings suggest the familiar features of Bitcoin 
functions such as to send and receive Bitcoins to support the app as the experienced 
Bitcoin users can easily adapt with the functions in the app. In addition, it is important 
to design the app by providing users with the flexibility to customise the app based on 
their preference. This extends the suggestions on the trust elements for structure design 
(Wang & Emurian, 2005), by adding Bitcoin function familiar features and flexibility 
for users to customise the app.  
Looking at the demand to create an account, it was found that the identity of 
anonymous wallet account in the app can develop trust among users as their 
confidential details are not revealed to any parties. This is in contrast to the centralised 
Bitcoin exchange websites or mobile apps that require identification verification before 
users can create their wallet (Coinbase, n.d.). Nakamoto (Nakamoto, 2008) designed 
the Bitcoin Blockchain protocols that permit Bitcoins to be transferred from one owner 
to another pseudoanonymously using the users’ wallet addresses. However, due to 
issues related to trust while dealing with transactions, users tend to prefer 
deanonymisation than the central exchanges, as they are governed by legal bodies (Sas 
& Khairuddin, 2017). Also, the user identity verification processes via exchanges are 
complicated. Hence, the app design that requests users to create their wallet 
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anonymously will address this issue, provided that the app supports additional features 
to protect users from dishonest parties. Thus, the anonymous wallet creation extends 
the demand elements for the structure design characteristic (Wang & Emurian, 2005). 
Moving on to the content design, the app security design enables users to manage 
their wallet account private key. This is a trusted feature for peer-to-peer app, in 
contrast to the centralised apps or websites that store user passwords, as well as 
authentication questions and answers for password retrieval (Seckler et al., 2015). The 
findings also suggest that the content trustworthiness in peer-to-peer app can be 
improved by adding contents from the developers such as the app source code that 
explains the BitXFps back-end architecture. This helps to support the credibility of app 
development. The trust elements for content design (Wang & Emurian, 2005) is added 
by adding the wallet backup features as additional security elements as well as 
documentation from the developer to support the credibility of the app content. 
It is also important to create a website for BitXFps that is linked to the app as 
support, this contributes to the social cue design characteristic. The integration between 
website and mobile app is to support the app social presence. The concise information 
in the mobile app is explained in details on the website. Hence, this is essential to 
develop trust among users. Besides, for decentralised applications, the customer service 
feature can be driven by the community. The introduction of a new in-app forum to 
facilitate community engagement helps to support customer service elements under the 
social cue design characteristic. In turn, this provides a room for social interaction 
between users, for them to share ideas to improve the app performance.  
Furthermore, social media accounts linked to the app are important for personal 
and social proof. By engaging with app social media pages such as Facebook, users can 
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know their Facebook mutual friends who are using the Bitcoin app as well. This will 
help to develop the social trust (Seckler et al., 2015) among users. 
The peer-to-peer transaction design cues are derived from the findings in Study 3 
(Chapter 7) which consist of four elements; transaction transparency, contract validity, 
mediator decentralisation, and reputation system. Interestingly, the findings highlighted 
the importance of reversible function in peer-to-peer transaction. In the original 
Blockchain protocol, Bitcoin transactions are irreversible (Nakamoto, 2008), which 
leads to dishonest transaction between parties. Findings in Study 3 are extended by 
introducing the reversible transaction feature as the trust element in peer-to-peer 
Bitcoin transactions cues. This is done by holding the transaction in the multisignature 
wallet until the transactions (offline or online) are successfully completed. In the event 
of dishonesty, transactions can be reversed and not recorded on the ledger. So this 
justifies the use of irreversible transaction feature.Table 10.1 summarises the six 
characteristics of trust-inducing features tailored to the BitXFps mobile application 
interface (Seckler et al., 2015; Wang & Emurian, 2005); Study 3 (Chapter 7); Study 4 




Dimensions Key Elements Source 
Graphic Design  
 
Definition:  
The mobile application 
graphical elements that 
trigger users’ first 
impressions. 
Visual Design 
 Appropriate site layout 
 Moderate layout complexity 
 Uses of photographs 
 Uses moderate pastel colour 
 Apply blue colour in the design layout* 
 Provides transparent information for all 
users* 
 Increase visibility of the information for 
all users* 
(Karvonen & Parkkinen, 
2001; Kim & Moon, 1998; 
Seckler et al., 2015; Wang 
& Emurian, 2005) 
Empirical Findings in 
Study 5 
Structure Design  
 
Definition:  
Users’ accessibility to 
information displayed 
on the mobile app’s 
interface and how it is 
organised. 
Usability 
 Effectiveness and efficacy with the task 
flow 
Flexibility users to customise the app 
according to their preference* 
 Easy navigation 
Users’ friendly structure for common 





 Anonymous wallet account creation* 
 
(Karvonen & Parkkinen, 
2001; Kim & Moon, 1998; 
Seckler et al., 2015; Wang 
& Emurian, 2005) 
 
Empirical 
Empirical Findings in 
Study 4 




that are placed on the 
mobile app’s interface 




 Enable users to manage the private key of 





Privacy: secondary use 
 
Content 
 Include resource documents related to the 




(Belanger et al., 2002; 
Egger, 2001; Eremeev, 
1999; Hu et al., 2001; 
Nielsen, 2000; Seckler et 
al., 2015; Shneiderman & 
Ben, 2000; Wang & 
Emurian, 2005) 
 
Empirical Findings in 
Study 4 
Social cue Design 
 
Definition: 
 Social cues that are 
integrated into the 
mobile application 
showing the assistance 
provided by the mobile 





(Basso et al., 2001; 
Riegelsberger et al., 2005; 
Seckler et al., 2015; 
Steinbrück et al., 2002; 
Wang & Emurian, 2005) 
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Social remarks such as 
comments and rating 
scores for the app from 
other users 
 
User’s social proof 
Friend’s social proof 
Prior experience 
 
(Seckler et al., 2015) 
Peer-to-peer Transaction Design Cues 
 
Definition: Trust elements that are embedded in the BitXFps application to support users’ decision to 
enact a transaction without the governance from a centralised authority. 
Elements Descriptions Sources 
Transparent 
transactions 
The design cues that guarantee the two-way 
transaction is conducted transparently by 
both parties.  
Empirical Findings in 
Study 3 and Study 4 
Valid contract The remarks in the design that ensure that the 
mutual agreement between the two parties is 
valid for in the Blockchain smart contract 
Decentralised mediator The sign in the design to show that the 
transaction between two parties is validated 
by the crowdsourced mediator 
User’s reputation The indicator to show users’ performance in 
previous transactions. 
Reversible transaction The sign to show that the identified dishonest 
transaction is reversible in a provable way 
Empirical Findings in 
Study 5 
Table 10.1: Trust-inducing features for the Bitcoin Peer-to-peer Transaction Mobile 
Application Interface Design 
 
 Design Implications 10.5
The design implications focus on the Blockchain real-time communication to capture 
the proof of offline transaction for the delivery of goods or fiat money transactions as well 
as the revised BitXFps app interface to develop better trust. 
 Blockchain Real-Time Communication Tool 10.5.1
The findings suggest that the role of witness as the decentralised mediator 
between seller and buyer can be improved by adding an anonymised video call feature 
to ensure the reliability of the offline transaction proof in terms of fiat money 
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transaction and delivery of goods. The video call feature ensures that the offline 
transaction of fiat money or goods is transparent between the seller, buyer and witness. 
Using the standard guideline to monitor the transaction via group video call, the witness 
is responsible to ensure both parties are satisfied with the transaction. The anonymised 
video call is recorded and stored as the offline transaction proof for delivery of goods or 
fiat money transaction. This mechanism is implemented by integrating the BitXFps 
design with decentralised Blockchain video call feature (Steemit, 2017). This feature 
can protect the data related to the offline proof for delivery of goods or fiat money 
transactions by storing it on user device rather than on the centralised server (Lucas, 
2018). This will further protect the confidentiality of parties involved in the offline 
transaction. 
 Revision of the BitXFps Mobile App Design 10.5.2
The findings provide some directions in revising the BitXFps design according to 
the six characteristics of trust-inducing features in the following section.  
10.5.2.1 Revision Based on Structure Design 
The additional witness function enables users to select their preference for a 
witness, including the minimum amount of deposit to guarantee honesty and 
responsibility in a transaction, the way for them to receive notifications of invitation 
to be a witness or manage dispute (Figure 10.7). In addition, BitXFps design can be 
improved by adding timer alert to let users know the exact waiting time for the 






Figure 10.7: The Witness Interface Design Settings 
 






10.5.2.2 Revision Based on Content Design 
The findings highlighted the limited emphasis on the unique features of the app, 
which is important for branding. To address this, the app’s logo has been revised by 
adding the “decentralised witness” tagline (Figure 10.9). In addition, a new GitHub 
icon is added at the ‘About’ page to show the link to the BitXFps source code in 
GitHub (Figure 10.10). GitHub is the repository platform where developers store 
their projects and network with like-minded people (Orsini, 2013). 
 
Figure 10.9: The Revised Design of the App Logo  
 




10.5.2.3 Revision Based on Graphic Design 
The icons for seller and buyer in the multisignature wallet table page are revised 
by introducing new colours (purple and yellow) to distinguish the buyers and sellers 
in transactions (Figure 10.11).  
 
 
Figure 10.11: The Icons for Sellers and Buyers are differentiated with Colours 
10.5.2.4 Revision Based on Social Cue Design 
A new function was introduced to the BitXFps interface, which is the community 
forum to support interaction between users (Figure 10.12). To increase the app social 
presence, a website to support BitXFps will be created and the URL website link is 





Figure 10.12: Interface for the In-app Community Support Channel 
 
Figure 10.13: The Official BitXFps Website URL 
 
10.5.2.5 Revision Based on Peer-to-peer Transaction Design Cues 
The group video call button is introduced in the active multisignature page to 





Figure 10.14: The Interface for the Group Video Call 
 Chapter Summary 10.6
This chapter presents the evaluation of trust elements via the mobile wallet interface to 
support peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions between users for fiat money or goods based on 
the heuristic guidelines for trust elements in Bitcoin mobile applications (Chapter 9). The 
findings suggest a theoretical framework for the trust-inducing features in peer-to-peer 
Bitcoin transactions on BitXFps mobile application. From the evaluation study and findings, 
the framework was extended from the initial framework of the website trust-inducing 
features, by adding a new element customised to peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions, via the 
interface design. The main characteristics of the framework include graphic design, structure 
design, content design, social cue design, personal and social proof, and peer-to-peer 
transaction design cues. There are also five elements under peer-to-peer transaction design 
cues namely transaction transparency, contract validity, mediator decentralisation, 
reputation system, and reversible transaction. Besides Bitcoin, the framework can be 
extended to evaluate trust features in other cryptocurrencies’ peer-to-peer transaction and 
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This thesis presents five studies with 92 Bitcoin Blockchain’s stakeholders to explore 
trust problems of people engaging with this technology, and ways to mitigate them. These 
studies were conducted in four different phases, focussing on problem identification; 
methods to explore the opportunities to mitigate trust problems; design of the proposed 
solution; and evaluation of the designed solution. Each of these phases consists of different 
but interrelated studies which aim to address the objectives and research questions of the 
thesis. This chapter discusses the main findings of the thesis and also revisits the main 
research questions of the thesis while highlighting the key findings and the novelty of the 
thesis’ contributions. Figure 11.2 is the diagram represents the connections and the 











exploring level of 
trust in Bitcoin 
technology across 
the stakeholders 
 (Sas and 
Khairuddin, 2015) 
Study 1 
User’s trust problem 
 
 Risk due to users’ 
challenges of handling 
passwords 
 Risks due to hackers’ 
malicious attacks 
 Risk due to failure to 
recover from human error 
 Risk related to dishonest 
traders 
(Sas and Khairuddin, 2017) 
  
Study 2 
Miner’s trust problem 
  
Risk of mining protocol 
Dishonest end miners 
Centralisation of mining 
practices 






and Speed, 2019) 
Study 3 and 4 
Principles to design for trust 
in peer to peer Bitcoin 
transactions 
 (Khairuddin, Sas and 
Speed, 2019) 
Design for trust 
solutions 
Study 4 
Validated algorithms for 
trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoin 
transactions 
Designed 
algorithms for trust 
in peer to peer 
Bitcoin transaction 






Framework of trust-inducing 
features for Bitcoin peer-to-peer 





 Problem Identifications  11.2
To identify the problem, a theoretical framework has been developed to explore people’s 
trust in Bitcoin Blockchain technology, and their associated trust challenges. This 
theoretical framework is one of the references used to inform our next empirical work with 
Bitcoin Blockchain’s stakeholders, particularly users and miners, as described in the 
following section.  
 The Design of the Theoretical Framework for the Exploration of People’s Trust 11.2.1
in Bitcoin Technology 
The explorations of trust challenges of people engaging with Bitcoin Blockchain 
technology started with the revision of trust theories and models in HCI. The 
multifaceted concept of trust has been explored across a large range of interactive 
systems, and consistent findings have shown the distinction between technological, 
social, and institutional trust (Leppanen, 2010; Lippert & Swiercz, 2005; Misiolek et al., 
2002) Thus, these three main aspects of trust were used as dimensions of trust in this 
novel theoretical framework developed through this thesis. The framework was expanded 
by mapping the relevant literature on Bitcoin Blockchain technology with trust concepts. 
The framework positioned technological trust as people’s experience and trust in 
engaging with Bitcoin Blockchain technology. The framework also defines social trust as 
trust among Bitcoin Blockchain’s stakeholders (users, merchants, exchanges, and 
miners). Finally, institutional trust captures the support from the central authorities such 
as governments towards Bitcoin Blockchain technology (Figure 11.3). This theoretical 
framework was published in the Proceedings of the OZCHI Conference in 2015 (Sas 
and Khairuddin, 2015).  
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The proposed theoretical framework addresses a gap in understanding people’s trust 
in Bitcoin Blockchain technology. Within the scope of the thesis, the framework has been 
used to discuss empirical findings on Bitcoin users’ and miners’ trust while engaging 
with the Bitcoin Blockchain technology.   
 
Figure 11.3: Research Framework for Exploring Levels of Trust in Bitcoin Technology 
(left) and across Stakeholders Group (right) (Sas and Khairuddin, 2015) 
 The Identified People’s Trust Challenges in Bitcoin Technology 11.2.2
The proposed theoretical framework of trust is later used to discuss the findings 
from the empirical studies with 20 Bitcoin users, and 20 Bitcoin miners (Study 1, and 
Study 2). In addition to trust, these findings also report on their practices of engaging 
with Blockchain technology. Trust challenges, identified by the miners while 
conducting collaborative mining, and the actions they took to mitigate these trust 
challenges, were also discussed. The empirical work on miners’ practices has been 
published in the Proceeding of 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing 
















By reflecting on the theoretical framework for exploring Bitcoin trust, (Sas and 
Khairuddin, 2015), findings from Study 1 and 2 (Sas and Khairuddin, 2017; Khairuddin 
and Sas, 2019) report that users’ technological trust is strong. Their trust relies on 
Blockchain’s characteristics such as decentralised ledger, embedded expertise, low cost, 
and ease of use. Institutional trust indicates that users enjoyed the unregulated features of 
the Blockchain. In other words, they prefer to transact Bitcoins freely among themselves, 
without any governance from central authorities. However, findings also show that users’ 
main trust challenges surface in the context of social trust. Users face risks related to 
dishonest traders, particularly for those Bitcoin transactions occurring offline when 
Bitcoins are exchanged for fiat money or products. Blockchain offers a record of 
transparent Bitcoin transactions on its public ledger (Nakamoto, 2008). However, offline 
transactions with banks or merchants are not captured on the ledger. In order to mitigate 
this problem, some Bitcoin users take action by trading with authorised exchanges. Some 
users prefer dealing through peer-to-peer transactions with a socially authorised trader, 
reputable individual trader, or de-anonymised individual trader. However, the latter 
strategy was reported as the weakest. This is due to the risk to trade with someone that is 
completely unidentified by any of the members in the Bitcoin online groups; also, their 
reputation in Bitcoin transactions is unknown. This empirical study with Bitcoin users 
has been published in the Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference Extended Abstracts, 
and 2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (Khairuddin et al., 
2016; Sas and Khairuddin, 2017). 
To further explore the opportunities to mitigate trust challenges in Blockchain, we also 
looked at miners’ practices in Blockchain, more specifically to their mining approaches, 
and the main categories of miners (Khairuddin and Sas, 2019). However, mining is just a 
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piece of the complex Blockchain infrastructure that is arguably challenging be 
understand.  
 Methods for Exploring Opportunities to Mitigate Trust challenges  11.3
Users’ trust challenges in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions are due to social factors 
rather than technological ones. In order to mitigate these challenges, it is crucial to 
better understand Blockchain’s infrastructure. This section reports on the methods for 
materialising the main concepts of Blockchain in a physical way, and how these can be 
used to explore the opportunities to address the key Bitcoin users’ trust challenges.  
 Materialising the Blockchain Infrastructure  11.3.1
The decentralised Blockchain’s infrastructure consists of distributed nodes 
geographically located world-wide. This is in contrast to the structure of the 
conventional centralised financial systems. Hence, the inner workings of the 
Blockchain’s infrastructure are challenging to understand. This is the motivation for 
exploring the materialisation of Blockchain infrastructure. 
 By advancing the theories of embodied cognition (Hampe & Grady, 2005) and 
material centred-design (Wiberg & Mikael, 2014), BlocKit was constructed to represent 
the initially identified 12 main entities of Blockchain: Bitcoin, wallet, wallet password, 
public key, private key, block, consensus rules, miner’s computational powers, proof of 
work, time stamp, and Blockchain ledger. These Blockchain’s entities were represented 
in physical forms through materials such as clays, plastic containers or sticky notes. 
To evaluate BlocKit, a workshop was conducted with 15 Blockchain experienced 
users. The outcomes of the workshop with the experienced users support the value of 
281 
 
BlocKit to communicate, and design for trust in Blockchain. They also suggested few 
revisions for the representations of the Blockchain main entities, and for creating a new 
object representing the memory pool. The construction and validation of BlocKit was 
published in the Proceeding of Designing Interactive Systems, DIS 2019 (Khairuddin, 
Sas, and Speed 2019). 
Various modalities have been explored to communicate the principles of 
Blockchain technology, and to support uses’ understanding and learning about it, 
primarily through visual representations in the form of infographics, (Cartwright, 2018) 
or videos (The Guardian, 2014). In contrast, the value of physical objects for 
communicating about Blockchain has been limitedly explored, with some preliminary 
work suggesting the value of Lego blocks for Blockchain’s experts and novices to 
communicate and describe its entities (Maxwell et al., 2015). Hence, it is argued that 
the physical three-dimensional artefacts offered by BlocKit provide a new 
methodological contribution for exploring people’s learning, understanding, 
communicating about, and designing for Blockchain.  
 Principles to Design for User’s Trust in Bitcoin Transactions  11.3.2
BlocKit was also explored with experienced users to understand its value for designing 
for trust in the peer-to-peer Bitcoins transactions. The outcome of Study 3 suggested 
four important principles for designing for trust which consist of transparent 
transactions, a valid contract between seller and buyer, decentralised mediator or 
witness, and trust reputation system (Khairuddin, Sas, and Speed 2019). Findings also 
support several requirements for designing those principles on Blockchain by utilising 
the Etherum smart contract, and multisignature wallet. Thus, the proposed principles 
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and requirements were applied to design the solutions to mitigate the challenges of 
users’ trust in Blockchain. 
 Design of Proposed Solutions 11.4
From the physical design of BlocKit, we progressed to the design of algorithms for user 
trust. Then, the validated algorithms were used to design the user interface for BitXFps, a 
Bitcoin mobile application. This section describes the design of this Bitcoin wallet 
application. 
 The Design Algorithms with the Principles to Design for User’s Trust in Bitcoin 11.4.1
Transactions  
The experienced users outlined four important principles for the design of trust 
algorithms in Blockchain: transparent transactions, a valid contract between seller and 
buyer, decentralised mediator or witness, and trust reputation system (Khairuddin, Sas, 
and Speed 2019). They also suggested using Etherum smart contract, and 
multisignature wallet to design a tool embedding those principles. Ethereum’s smart 
contract was built to support Ether cryptocurrency transactions. However, the identified 
trust challenges in this thesis are related to peer-to-peer Bitcoins transactions and 
Bitcoin Blockchain technology did not support the Ethereum smart contract. Thus, 
another tool to assists the Etherum smart contract to verify Bitcoin transactions namely, 
BTC Relay (BTC Relay, 2016) was applied to the algorithms’ design.  
The algorithms have five main steps. The first step describes the preliminary 
process of a transaction, such as creating the wallet account and searching for potential 
buyers or sellers. The second step is about creating the contract agreements between 
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seller and buyers which includes penalties for dishonest traders. This agreement is 
recorded in the smart contract. This, in turns, ensure the validity of the contract as listed 
in one of the principles. The third step describes the transactions in the multisignature 
wallet, including sending Bitcoins and randomly inviting a crowdsourced witness as the 
mediator of the transactions. The multisignature wallet provides transparency for both 
parties involved in transactions, as seller and buyer may observe the movements of the 
Bitcoin and have the authority to control it. The crowdsource witness is a decentralised 
mediator that helps to facilitate the dispute associated with a transaction. Fourthly is to 
proceed with an offline transaction with either bank or shipping company. Finally, the 
last step describes sending the trust tokens to the seller and buyer and witness token to 
the witness which reflects the principle of building a reputation system on Blockchain. 
These algorithms were validated by 10 Blockchain’s experienced users. The outcome 
of the validation provides suggestions on minor revisions of the algorithms, mostly 
regarding witnesses. 
The design for trust solution, extending smart contracts and multisignature, have 
started to be used on Ethereum Blockchain (Horda, 2018), for instance through 
decentralised exchanges such as WeiDEx (WeiDex, n.d.). However, the design of a 
fully decentralised exchange for Bitcoins transactions has been limited (Cuen, 2018), as 
well as the utilisation of the bridge tool (BTC Relay, 2016), and experienced users’ 
suggestions for the four design principles for trust. Hence, it is argued that these 
algorithms for designing for trust in Bitcoin Blockchain are novel.  
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 The Design of User Interface for Mobile Bitcoin Application with the Elements 11.4.2
for User’s Trust in Bitcoin Transactions 
The proposed algorithms for supporting users’ trust in Bitcoin transactions were 
applied to the design of a user interface for a Bitcoin wallet mobile application which 
we called BitXFps. A guideline for the trust-inducing elements was proposed based on 
the prevalent framework of trust inducing features of websites interface, (Seckler et al., 
2015; Wang & Emurian, 2005) for evaluating trust in interface design for websites and 
mobile applications. In addition, four design principles for trust (transparent 
transactions, a valid contract between seller and buyer, decentralised mediator or 
witness and trust reputation system) suggested by the Blockchain experienced users in 
Study 3 were also included in the design for trust guideline. 
The new proposed guideline was then used as the main reference for designing the 
BitXFps user interface.  
 Evaluation of BitXFps’s User Interface Design  11.5
The final part of the thesis is the evaluation of BitXFps interface, the Bitcoin wallet 
application, with 15 Bitcoin experienced users. The evaluation’s aim was to identify the 
elements in the user interface that could support users’ trust in conducting peer-to-peer 
Bitcoin transactions. 
 The Evaluated Design of User Interface for Mobile Bitcoin Application with the 11.5.1
Elements for User’s Trust in Bitcoin Transactions  
An expert review method was applied to evaluate BitXFps’ interface with 15 
Bitcoin experienced users. The evaluation was based on the proposed guideline for 
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trust-inducing features (Seckler et al., 2015; Wang & Emurian, 2005) The outcomes of 
the evaluation method indicate the elements of interface design which support trust. 
They consist of suggestions to improve the effectiveness of witness functions by 
integrating the mobile app with group video call between the seller, buyer and witness 
while enacting offline transactions (sending money through banks or product to the 
shipping company). Other suggestions included a standard guideline for the witness to 
manage the transactions dispute between buyer and seller. In addition, a new element 
for trust was discovered, namely the reversible transaction. Participants realised the 
importance of reversible actions to mitigate the challenge of dishonest transactions. 
The framework of users’ trust-inducing features was initially proposed by Wang 
and Eumarian (Wang & Emurian, 2005). In their initial framework, there are only four 
main characteristics of trust: graphic design, structure design, content design, and social 
cue design. This framework was used to evaluate various types of websites and mobile 
apps including a study by Secklar et al. (Seckler et al., 2015). In their study, they 
adopted the framework to evaluate various websites including financial and e-
commerce websites. The outcome of the Secklar et al. (Seckler et al., 2015) study 
extended the initial framework with another characteristic, namely personal and social 
proof. However, the validation of the framework with any website or mobile 
application related to cryptocurrency has been limited. Hence, it is argued that the five 
principles for designing for trust (transparent transactions, a valid contract between 
seller and buyer, decentralised mediator or witness, trust reputation system, and 
reversible transaction) contribute to novel dimension to the framework. This new 
extended framework can be used to evaluate trust in other user interfaces, specifically 
for Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies wallets on websites or mobile applications. 
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 Reflection on the Thesis Findings 11.6
The main focus of this thesis is the Blockchain users’ trust challenges for engaging in 
peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions, particularly transactions involving Bitcoins and fiat 
money and/or Bitcoins and products. The theoretical framework to explore trust in Bitcoin 
Blockchain technology (Sas and Khairuddin, 2015) was applied to integrate the findings of 






Social trust is the main trust challenge that we aimed to be addressed throughout the 
thesis. It consists of sellers and buyers enacting peer to peer Bitcoin transactions. Since the 
BitXFps app was designed to be fully decentralised, institutional trust is not applicable to 
the framework. However, technological trust was strengthened to mitigate social trust 
challenges.  
The BiXFps app design for user trust was proposed by advanced Blockchain’s 
technological tools, such as Ethereum smart contract, multisignature wallet and BTC Relay. 
These three unique technologies were successfully integrated to inform the design and 
development of BiXFps app. Positioned under the same umbrella of technological trust, 
those principles to design for trusts such as transparent transactions, a valid contract 
between seller and buyer, decentralised mediator or witness, trust reputation system and 
reversible transaction are the elements to support users’ trust towards peer-to-peer Bitcoin 
transactions. In addition, elements in user trust-inducing features of BitXFps such as graphic 
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design, structure design, content design, social design cue, personal and social proof and 


















Figure 11.4:  Empirical Framework to Design in Blockchain for User's Trust in Peer-to-
Peer Bitcoin Transactions 
 
BlocKit offers a physical form of Blockchain’s infrastructure which may be used to 
explore the design of other solutions pertaining to Blockchain. Our framework to mitigate 
trust challenges could also benefit the exploration and design for other cryptocurrencies. In 




















peer systems that are exposed to the risk of dishonest transaction partners, such as the risk of 
cheating among multi-player online-games (Neumann, Prigent, Varvello, & Suh, 2007). 
 Reflection on Thesis’ Research Questions  11.7
This thesis explored five research questions which are further unpacked in this section.   
1) Why do people such as users and miners engage in Bitcoin transactions on 
Blockchain technology? What are the challenges they faced, and the specific trust 
issues? 
The literature exploring the motivations, and trust challenges of Bitcoin Blockchain’s 
stakeholders such as users and miners have been limited. Thus, by reflecting the relevant 
HCI literature on trust, a theoretical framework was developed to explore trust in Bitcoin 
Blockchain technology (Sas and Khairuddin, 2015). This model has been further applied to 
explore users’ and miner’s trust while engaging with Bitcoin transactions on Blockchain.  
In Study 1, interviews with 20 Bitcoin users were conducted with the aim to explore their 
motivations and trust challenges. Findings reported that their motivations were underpinned 
by Bitcoin’s predicted role in monetary revolutions, user empowerment from the 
characteristics of Blockchain such as decentralised, and unregulated, and perceived real 
value of Bitcoin currency (Khairuddin et al., 2016; Sas and Khairuddin, 2017). Findings 
also indicate trust challenges related to Bitcoin users while engaging in a transaction such as 
the risk due to users’ challenges of handling passwords, risks due to hackers’ malicious 
attacks, and risks related to dishonest partner of transaction (Sas and Khairuddin, 2017). 
With a similar aim to Study 1, interviews with 20 Bitcoin miners were conducted in 
Study 2. The outcomes of the Study 2 report that miners’ motivation are impacted by the 
Blockchain’s characteristics such as decentralised, and transparent mining pool, 
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unregulated, and ease of use. In addition, the mining rewards, experimenting with mining 
technology, and lack of regulation regarding taxation of mining fees also contributed to 
miners’ motivations. Findings indicate that miners’ trust challenges are related to the risks 
of mining protocol such as increased time for acquiring block confirmation, limited block 
size, and limited number of full nodes. In addition, dishonest mining pool’s and data 
centre’s administrators, lack of audit for the distributions of rewards in a pool, invisibility of 
data centres, and mining program scams also represent trust challenges identified by miners 
(Khairuddin and Sas, 2019). 
The new findings described in Study 1 and Study 2 offer further explorations for the 
mitigation of the trust challenges, as well as for expanding the research into other types of 
Bitcoin stakeholders such as exchanges and merchants.  
 
2) What are the elements of BlocKit – an innovative kit for materialising Blockchain - 
that could support people’s understanding of Blockchain? What are the values of this 
approach for people to engage with Blockchain? 
Different modalities have been explored to communicate the principles of Blockchain 
technology, and support their understanding and learning, primarily through visual 
representations in the form of infographics (Cartwright, 2018) or videos (The Guardian, 
2014). In contrast, the value of physical objects for communicating about Blockchain has 
been limitedly explored, with some preliminary work suggesting the value of Lego blocks 
for Blockchain’s experienced and novice users to communicate and describe its entities 
(Maxwell et al., 2015). 
By advancing the theories of embodied cognition (Hampe & Grady, 2005) and material 
centred-design (Wiberg & Mikael, 2014), BlocKit was constructed to represent the initially 
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identified 12 main entities of Blockchain, such as Bitcoin, wallet, wallet password, public 
key, private key, block, consensus rules, miner’s computational powers, proof-of-work, time 
stamp, and Blockchain ledger. BlocKit has been evaluated in a workshop with 15 
Blockchain’s experienced users (Study 3). The outcomes of the workshop argued that 
BlocKit’s physical three-dimensional artefacts provide a new methodological contribution 
for exploring, learning, understanding, communicating, and designing for Blockchain 
(Khairuddin, Sas and Speed, 2019). 
 
3) What are the principles to design for trust in peer-to- peer Bitcoins transaction? 
How should the design of Blockchain be supported?  
In order to mitigate trust challenges of peer to peer Bitcoin transactions, the design 
workshop with 15 Blockchain’s experienced users (Study 3) interacting with BlocKit 
suggested four principles to design for trust:  transparent transactions, a valid contract 
between seller and buyer, decentralised mediator or witness, and trust reputation system. In 
order to design algorithms for these suggested principles for Blockchain, the experienced 
users suggested to use Etherum Blockchain’s supporting tools such as Ethereum smart 
contract and multisignature wallet. However, Ethereum Blockchain is only applicable to 
Ether cryptocurrency. Thus, BTC Relay was suggested to be included in the design of the 
algorithms to facilitate the verification of Bitcoin transactions on Ethereum smart contract 
(Khairuddin, Sas and Speed, 2019).  The complete design of trust algorithms was validated 
by 10 Blockchain’s experienced users (Study 4).  
The solution for designing for trust in Blockchain, extending smart contracts and 
multisignature have started to be used on Ethereum Blockchain (Horda, 2018); for instance, 
by decentralised exchanges such as WeiDEx (WeiDex, n.d.). However, the design of a fully 
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decentralised exchange for Bitcoin transactions has been limited (Cuen, 2018) as well as the 
utilisation of the bridge tool (BTC Relay, 2016), and experienced users’ suggestions for the 
four design principles for trust. Hence, we argue that these algorithms for designing for trust 
in Bitcoin Blockchain are novel.  
 
4) What are the approaches to design new tools, such as wallet mobile apps, for users’ 
trust? How to evaluate the design of such tools? 
The BitXFps Bitcoin wallet mobile app is a tool designed based on the proposed 
algorithms for users’ trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions. In order to design the user 
interface of BitXFps app, a design guideline for the trust-inducing elements was proposed 
based on a prevalent framework (Seckler et al., 2015; Wang & Emurian, 2005) for 
evaluating trust in interface design for websites and mobile applications. In addition, the 
four design principles for trust (transparent transactions, a valid contract between seller and 
buyer, decentralised mediator or witness and trust reputation system) suggested by the 
Blockchain’s experienced users were also applied. This proposed guideline was adopted to 
design the Bitcoin app (BitXFps) as well as the guidance for the experienced Bitcoin users 
to evaluate the trust elements in the app’s interface.  
Although this guideline was built based on Wang and Eumarian’s (Wang & Emurian, 
2005) and Secklar et al.’s (Seckler et al., 2015) framework, the evaluations of the 
framework in the context of cryptocurrency mobile applications were limited. Hence, it is 
argued that the design guideline for evaluating users’ trust in the interface of Bitcoin wallet 





5) Which are the elements in the design of BitXFps support people’s trust in Bitcoin 
transactions? 
The mock up prototype of BitXFps app was evaluated by 15 Bitcoin users (Study 5), with 
the aim to identify elements in the user interface that support the trust in peer-to-peer 
transactions. The expert review method was applied to evaluate BitXFps design interface 
with 15 Bitcoin users. The evaluations were based on the proposed trust-inducing features 
for designing Bitcoin wallet mobile application (Seckler et al., 2015; Wang & Emurian, 
2005) The outcomes of the evaluations indicate the elements of interface design supporting 
trust. They consist of suggestions to improve the effectiveness of witness functions by 
integrating the app with group video call between seller, buyer, and witness while enacting 
the offline transaction (sending money through banks or product through shipping 
companies). Other suggestions include the standard guideline for the witness to manage the 
transaction’s dispute between buyer and seller. In addition, a new element supporting trust 
was discovered, namely facilitating reversible transactions. Participants realised the 
importance of reversible transactions required in the case of dishonest transaction’s partners, 
by leveraging the role of the witness. 
The framework of users’ trust-inducing features was initially proposed by Wang and 
Eumarian (Wang & Emurian, 2005). In their framework, there are only four main 
characteristics of trust: graphic design, structure design, content design, and social cue 
design. This framework was used to evaluate various types of websites and mobile apps 
including Secklar et al. (Seckler et al., 2015). In their study, they adopted a framework to 
evaluate various websites such as financial and e-commerce websites. The outcome of 
Secklar et al.’s (Seckler et al., 2015) study extended the initial framework with other 
characteristics, namely personal and social proof. However, the validation of this framework 
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with any website or mobile application related to cryptocurrency has been limited. Hence, it 
is argued that the five principles to design for trust (transparent transactions, a valid contract 
between seller and buyer, decentralised mediator or witness, trust reputation system, and 
reversible transaction) could contribute to a further revised framework. This new extended 
framework can be used to evaluate trust in other user interfaces, specifically for Bitcoin and 
other cryptocurrencies wallets developed for both websites and mobile applications. 
 Chapter Summary 11.8
This chapter presents the overall discussions of the thesis. It shows the interrelation of 
findings from all six studies. It begins to discuss the problem identifications, method to 
explore the opportunities to design trust solutions, proposed solution, design and evaluation 
of these solutions. The main identified problem is users’ trust challenges related to dishonest 
traders in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions. The novel contribution of the thesis is BlocKit, 
a proposed method to design for trust in Bitcoin transactions, and the framework of trust 
inducing features for peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions. Finally, the novel findings of this 
thesis contribute to the empirical framework of designing for the user’s trust in peer-to-peer 
Bitcoin transactions. The research questions were also revisited to unpack the main 
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This is the final chapter of the thesis, which highlights the limitations of this PhD work as 
well as the future works that could be further explored from the outcome of this thesis. 
Finally, in the last section of this chapter is described in the overall conclusion of this thesis. 
 Work Limitation 12.2
The following are the limitations for the research. 
 Time Constraints in Enacting Peer-to Peer Bitcoin-Transactions 12.2.1
The aim of  the design of BitXFps was to create a decentralised platform on 
Blockchain technology to mitigate the issue of dishonest traders in peer-to-peer Bitcoin 
transactions. In return, BitXFps app prototype integrates technologies such as Ethereum 
smart contract, multisignature wallet, and BTC Relay as well as the decentralised 
mediator to witness the transactions. Although the design of the app fulfilled the aim of 
the research, the time consumed for the users to complete their transactions would be 
longer than other methods such as transaction with the centralised exchange company. 
This is due to the waiting time for the decentralised mediator to accept the invitation to 
join the transactions. Other than that, the multisignature mechanism could also 
contribute to time constraints.  
 Limited integration of BitXFps on Bitcoin Blockchain 12.2.2
Another limitation is that the developed interface is not actually integrated in 
Blockchain platform. It is merely illustrates a novel design solution for supporting trust, 
while its integration in Blockchain was beyond the aim of this work. Indeed, the latter 
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would not only require advanced technical competency, but also privileged access 
rights to modify Blockchain’s code, such as the one available to core developers. 
 Future Work 12.3
This research can be further explored in three different studies, which are as follows: 
 Exploring Motivations and Trust among Bitcoins Merchants and Exchanges 12.3.1
In this thesis the exploration of the motivations and trust challenges in engaging 
with Bitcoin Blockchain technology among the Bitcoins stakeholders are limited to 
users and miners. Advances the theoretical framework of exploring trust in Bitcoin 
technology (Sas and Khairuddin, 2015), the exploration can be further expanded with 
the other types of Bitcoin stakeholders, such as merchants and exchanges. This in turns 
will give a solid understanding of motivations and trust challenges across all types of 
Bitcoin stakeholders.  
 Design in Blockchain with BlocKit 12.3.2
 BlocKit is a physical kit that represents 12 objects of Blockchain main entities 
such as block, wallet, and memory pool. In this thesis, the design work on Blockchain 
is limited on the design for trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoins transactions. As for future 
research, BlocKit could be used to explore for design in other fields such as medical or 
business management on Blockchain. The 12 initial objects of BlocKit could also be 
expanded to cater particular design work in Blockchain.  
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 Implementation of BitXFps Bitcoin Mobile Wallet 12.3.3
 This thesis presents the validated and evaluated design for trust of the algorithm 
and user interface of BitXFps Bitcoin mobile wallet.  The aim of the design work of 
this Bitcoin wallet app is to mitigate the trust challenges in peer-to-peer Bitcoins 
transactions. However, there is no development of BitXFps wallet as well as the 
evaluation on a working prototype in this PhD thesis.  Hence, advance the designed 
algorithms and user interfaces, the research could be further expanded for the 
development and implementation work of BitXFPs app.  
 Thesis Conclusion 12.4
This thesis has explored the motivations, practices and trust challenges of 20 Bitcoin 
users and 20 miners in engaging with Bitcoin Blockchain technology, as well as addressed 
the trust challenges for users in enacting peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions. In respect to 
address the trust challenges, a novel method of using physical objects, namely BlocKit has 
been developed to explore the design in Blockchain. BlocKit has been evaluated by 15 
Bitcoin Blockchain experienced users who indicate the kit as a medium to communicate for 
design, learning and understanding on Blockchain.  
By using BlocKit, the study with 15 Bitcoin Blockchain experienced users had suggested 
novel principles to design for trust in peer-to-peer Bitcoin transactions, which are valid 
contract, transparent transactions, decentralised mediator, and user reputation system. These 
principles were adopted to design a Bitcoin wallet app, named BitXFps. The 
implementations of this wallet app could be supported with the Ethereum Blockchain’s tools 
which are a smart contract, multisignature wallet and BTC Relay. Based on the suggested 
principles and supporting tools, two sets of algorithms for Bitcoin wallet app which are the 
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algorithm for transactions between Bitcoins with fiat money also Bitcoins with goods. These 
algorithms were validated by 10 Bitcoin Blockchain experienced users. The validated 
algorithms were used together with a set of newly identified heuristics for trust evaluation to 
design the user interface of Bitcoin wallet application namely, BitXFps. Finally, a mock up 
prototype of BitXFps app was developed to evaluate the users’ trust in its interface with 12 
Bitcoin experienced users in conducting peer-to-peer Bitcoins transactions.   
The thesis has focused significantly on multiple layers of design works for trust such as 
in the physical kit, algorithms and user interfaces. On core message of this thesis is that the 
scope of the design work for trust can definitely be extended to the implementation works of 
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The following are the ethics documentations for Study 1 and 2 (Chapter 4 and 5). 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 1 (Study 1 – Chapter 4) 
Exploring People’s Attitudes and Use of Bitcoin Technology 
 




1. Bitcoin activities are your hobby or it is your fulltime or part time income?  
2. How did you learn about Bitcoin? 
3. Did you attend any training on Bitcoin? 
4. How long have you been using Bitcoin? 




1. Can you please describe your understanding about Bitcoin technology? 
2. Do you know how does the price of Bitcoins is controlled? Why? 
3. Who is responsible to manage the price of Bitcoin? 
4. In your opinion, are there any mechanisms to control the price of Bitcoin? 
5. What are the challenges that you face when using or engaging with Bitcoin technology? 
a. How secured do you perceive Bitcoin transaction to be? Why? Why not? 
b. What do you think about the anonymity aspect of using Bitcoin? Why? 
c. How much trust do you have in Bitcoin technology? Why? Why not? 
d. Literature suggested that there is still people reluctance to use Bitcoin, what is your 
opinion? 
e. Have you experienced any fraud in Bitcoin? If yes can you please describe? 
 
USER 
1. Do you have any IT background? If yes please describe. 
2. Do you have any experience in financial or economic field? If yes please describe. 
3. Do you have any experience in property/forex/others investment? If yes please describe. 
4. What are the differences between Bitcoin and other forms of investment? 
5. Do you think Bitcoin is a good investment? Why? Why not? 
6. What are the motivational aspects that make you start to invest in or collect Bitcoins? 
7. Have you connected with other Bitcoin users? If yes please describe. 
8. Do you monitor the Bitcoins price? How? 
9. When do you normally buy/sell your Bitcoins? 
10. Can you describe your process of buying and selling Bitcoins?  
11. How much trust you have in the exchange or personal seller? Why? Why not? 
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12. Do ever you verify their wallet id/account? How? 
13. Have you encountered any fraud or problem while buying or selling Bitcoins? 
14. How do you think the selling/buying process can be improved? How the Bitcoin technology can 




1. How you create your wallet? 
2. How do you manage it? 
3. How secure you perceive your Bitcoins are secured in your wallet to be? Why? Why not? 
4. Can the Bitcoins be stolen from your wallet? How? 
5. How do you transfer your Bitcoins to local cash? 
6. Do you verify your buyer’s or seller’s the wallet ID? How do you verify? 
7. Have you experienced any loss of BTC from your wallet? If yes how did it happen? How could 
have been prevented? 
 
LEGISLATION 
1. Is Bitcoin technology legal? Which aspects are grey areas? 
2. Have you heard any feedback from local banks about Bitcoin technology? 
3. In your view, is mining a legal procedure? 
4. Could the local banks or governments take any legal action against miners? 
5. Based on literature, there are still government and policy makers who don’t accept Bitcoin 
technology. Why do you think this is the case? What is your opinion on this view? Why? 
6. Can you think of ways in which Bitcoin technology can become widely legal and accepted? 
 
SOCIAL & ECONOMY 
1. What are the impacts of Bitcoin technology on the world economy? Major benefits? Major 
risks? 
2. What makes Bitcoin technology different from other local currencies? 
3. What are the main challenges associated with Bitcoin technology? Can you think of ways of 
overcoming these challenges? 




1. How old are you? 
2. What is your highest level of education? 
3. What is your current job? 










INTERVIEW GUIDE 2 (Study 2 – Chapter 8) 
 
Interviewees              :            Bitcoin Miners  
 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Bitcoin activities are your hobby or it is your fulltime or part time income?  
2. How did you learn about Bitcoin? 
3. Did you attend any training on Bitcoin? 
4. How long have you been using Bitcoin? 




1. Can you please describe your understanding about Bitcoin technology? 
2. Do you know how does the price of Bitcoins is controlled? Why? 
3. Who is responsible to manage the price of Bitcoin? 
4. In your opinion, are there any mechanisms to control the price of Bitcoin? 
5. What are the challenges that you face when using or engaging with Bitcoin technology? 
a. How secured do you perceive Bitcoin transaction to be? Why? Why not? 
b. What do you think about the anonymity aspect of using Bitcoin? Why? 
c. How much trust do you have in Bitcoin technology? Why? Why not? 
d. Literature suggested that there is still people reluctance to use Bitcoin, what is your 
opinion? 
e. Have you experienced any fraud in Bitcoin? If yes can you please describe? 
 
MINER 
1. Did you invest any resources in becoming a miner? How much money? Time? 
2. Why did you make this investment? Do you think it was a good investment? Why? Why not? 
3.  Is there any equipment need for mining? Can you describe? 
a. If so, what is the cost of equipment? 
b. What is the cost of its maintenance? 
4. Can you please explain the mining process? 
5. Do you monitor the mining process? How? 
6. Do you have benefits or returns from each mining transactions? If so, what are they? 
7. In average, within one day how much Bitcoins you earn from mining? 
8. What are the motivational aspects for you to continue mining? Why? 
9. Have you encountered any problem while mining? If yes, which ones it? 
10. How do you think the mining process can be improved or better supported How the Bitcoin 
technology can be improved to better support this Process?  
11. How do you estimate your trust in other miners and in the Bitcoin technology as a whole? 
12. What is your opinion about selfish mining? What are the solutions? 
 
LEGISLATION 
1. Is Bitcoin technology legal? Which aspects are grey areas? 
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2. Have you heard any feedback from local banks about Bitcoin technology? 
3. In your view, is mining a legal procedure? 
4. Could the local banks or governments take any legal action against miners? 
5. Based on literature, there are still government and policy makers who do not accept Bitcoin 
technology. Why do you think this is the case? What is your opinion on this view? Why? 
6. Can you think of ways in which Bitcoin technology can become widely legal and accepted? 
 
SOCIAL & ECONOMY 
1. What are the impacts of Bitcoin technology on the world economy? Major benefits? Major 
risks? 
2. What makes Bitcoin technology different from other local currencies? 
3. What are the main challenges associated with Bitcoin technology? Can you think of ways of 
overcoming these challenges? 
4. What are your future predictions towards this technology? 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
1. How old are you? 
2. What is your highest level of education? 
3. What is your current job? 































The following are the workshop guide for Study 3 and 4 (Chapter 7 and 8). 
 
WORKSHOP GUIDE (Study 3 –Chapter 7) 
 
Evaluating and Designing for Trust with BlocKit  
 
Participants               :            Bitcoin Blockchain Experienced Users 
 






Pretending that I am a novice Bitcoin user, verbally, can you explain a can you please 
explain a complete process of Bitcoins transaction. (i.e; wallet, miner, Blockchain, 





10 Mins Follow up 
questions 
1. What object that you are trying to explain? 
2. How does it look like? 




Pretending that I am a novice Bitcoin user, By using objects provided, can you please 
explain a complete process of Bitcoins transaction. (i.e; wallet, miner, Blockchain, 






1. Why you choose that object to represent the property? 
2. What are the characteristics of the property? 
3. What are the functions of the property? 
4. How does it work? 
5. Who are responsible to manage this property? 




Situation 1 – If the object is not the same as they imagined 
1. What type of object did you try to find? 
2. Can you see the object on the table? 
3. If no, how would you represent it? 
4. Why do you think this object is not working for you? 
5. What should be add or remove on this object 
 
Situation 2 – If the object is not exists 
1. What type of object did you try to find? 
2. Can you see the object on the table? 
3. If no, how would you represent it? 
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1. In your opinion, in between this two methods, which method that 
you prefer to explain on the Bitcoin Blockchain activity? Why? 
2. Do you think that this design kit will help better understanding on 
Bitcoin Blockchain activity? Why? 
3. What are the advantages of this design kit? 
4. What are the disadvantages of this design kit? 
5. How to overcome the disadvantages? 
5 Mins 
 
Session 2: Bitcoin Blockchain Reputation Management System 
Task 1 
“Alice and Bob are both strangers. Alice requested for Bob to send her 1Btc to her Bitcoin’s wallet, and 
as a return, she will send £2000 to Bob’s bank account” 
 
 






a. What is the best way for Alice to transfer the £2000 to Bob’s bank 
account? 
a. How can she ensure that her identity is protected if she does it that 
way? 
b. Are there any way that she can protect her identity? How? 
b. Should Alice generate a new wallet address to allow Bob to transfer 
the Bitcoin to her? 




These are the two types of token of trust. The green token is the sign trust, 
while red is for distrust. If I want to implement this token in this design 
kit:- 
1. Where should we place those tokens?  
2. How should it be used? 
3. Who should use the token? 
4. Who should manage the token? 
5. How to calculate the tokens? 
6. How the token can resembles the trust? 
15 Mins 
Task 2 
“John and Lisa are both strangers. John wants to purchase a notebook from Lisa. Lisa agrees to sell the 
notebook for 0.5Btc” 
 





1. How should the token of trust be placed in the following situations 
a. John received and satisfied with the notebook. Lisa received the 
agreed amount of Bitcoins from John. 
b. John received and satisfied with the notebook. Lisa does not 
receive the correct amount of Bitcoins from John 
c. John received and satisfied with the notebook but Lisa does not 
receive any Bitcoins from John. 
d. John received but not satisfied with the notebook that he 
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received. Lisa received the agreed amount of Bitcoins from John 
e. John does not receive the notebook from Lisa but he already 
sends the agreed amount of Bitcoins to Lisa. 
Wrapping up 
questions 
1. Do you think that the token of trust can help to build the trust among 
the Bitcoin community? 
2. What are the advantages of this token system to the Bitcoin 
community? 
3. What are the disadvantages of this token to the Bitcoin community? 




1. How old are you? 
2. What is your highest level of education? 
3. What is your current job? 





VALIDATION GUIDE (Study 4 – Chapter 8) 
 
Validation for Trust Algorithms Design for Peer-to-Peer Bitcoins Transactions  
Participants               :            Bitcoin Blockchain Experienced Users  
 
 






1. What do you think about the algorithms? 
2. Are any parts of the algorithms that need to be revised? Why? 
3. What is your suggestion for the revise work? 





















The following are the validation guide for the trust algorithms design for peer-to-peer Bitcoins 
transactions in Study 5 (Chapter 10). 
Trust Evaluation for Interface of BitXFps Bitcoin Mobile Wallet App  
(Study 5 – Chapter 10) 
 
EVALUATION GUIDE 







Each of you needs to choose a role as a seller, buyer or witness.  
 
Explanations on the app  
 
1. Create the wallet account 
2. Getting around the app 
a. My BitXFps 
b. Reputation 
c. Send/receive Bitcoins 
d. Trade 





a. List of Bitcoins to sell 
4. Selling  
a. List of Bitcoins to buy 
5. Merchant 





By using BitXFps app, create an honest Bitcoins transactions by selling the 0.0779 BTC 
for the price of 500USD 
 
1. Buyer (Request a trade) 
2. Seller (Create a contract) 







By using BitXFps app, create a dishonest Bitcoins transactions (Buyer did not make the 
fiat money payment through the bank) by selling the 0.0779 BTC for the price of 
500USD 
 
1. Buyer (Request a trade) 
2. Seller (Create a contract) 





By using BitXFps app, create an honest transactions to purchase a laptop with the price 
of BTC 0.0161 
 
1. Buyer (Request a trade) 
2. Seller (Create a contract) 





By using BitXFps app, create a dishonest transactions (buyer receives a broken laptop) 
to purchase a laptop with the price of BTC 0.0161 
 
1. Buyer (Request a trade) 
2. Seller (Create a contract) 
3. Witness (Receive invitation & manage dispute) 
 
5 Mins 
Filling up the heuristic evaluation forms 5 Mins 
Follow-up 
Questions 
Graphic design   
1. What choice of colors that can boost the trust? 
2. What do you think about the arrangement of the app’s layout 
3. What type of photos should be include in the app increase the 
trust?” 
Structure design 
1. Are there any important functions that are not included in the 
app?  
2.  Do you find any difficulties to navigate the functions within 
the app? 
Content design 
1. Do you think that security signs are good for trust? 
2. What else can help to increase trust through the image and 
branding for the app? 
3. What additional contents are relevant to encourage trust that 
needs to be include in the app?  
 
 Personal and social proof 
1. Do you think the social media pages could help to increase the 
personal and social proofs? 
 
Social-cue design  
 
 20 Mins 
333 
 
1. Do you have any suggestions to improve the social-cue for the 
app? 
 
Peer-to-peer transactions cue design  
1. Do you think that the transparency of the transaction could 
improve the trust? 
2. Do you agree that the agreements between buyer and seller 
should be include in a contract will facilitate the trust?”,  
3. Do you think the witness is a good mediator to mitigate the 
trust of the transaction? 
4. Do you agree that the user’s reputation design could assist the 




1. How old are you? 
2. What is your highest level of education? 





























The following are the detailed trust algorithms for Bitcoin peer-to-peer transactions. 
a. Step 1: Pre Transaction between Buyer and Seller  
The first step is explaining on the preliminary interactions between seller and buyer through the system. At 
this stage, buyer and seller are required to create a Bitcoin wallet in order to allow them to interact with the 
system. The buyer and seller may begin to initiate a transaction by finding a suitable trader to either sell or buy 
Bitcoins from the system. They may browse the Bitcoin price, including the details of the traders, such as 
reputation tokens. If they found a suitable trader, they may send a trade request and make further discussions 
and negotiations for the transaction through email. The processes involved are further described in the Use 
Case Diagram in Table and Figure A. 
 
Primary Actor: {A-1- Buyer}; {A-2-Seller} 
Secondary Actor {A-14-Email System} 
Use Cases:  
 
Valid wallet account:  
{UC-1 - To login the wallet (Buyer)}; { UC-8 - To login the wallet (Seller)} 
 
Browsing the Bitcoin price advertisements:  
{UC-2 – Find the best offer price to buy}; {UC-9 – Find the best offer price to sell} 
 
Initiate pre Bitcoin transaction: 





 Figure A: Case Diagram for Pre Transaction between Buyer and Seller  
  
Valid wallet account 
UC-1 - To login to the wallet (Buyer) 
Pre-conditions The Buyer must have a valid wallet ID 
Success Guarantee The Buyer’s wallet ID is successfully verified 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Buyer chooses to log in to the wallet 
2. System asks Buyer valid passcode 
3. Buyer tells the system her passcode *to refer extensions 3.a and 3.b 
4. System verifies Buyer’s passcode 
5. System tells Buyer her passcode is valid *to refer extensions 5.a 
6. Suyer says OK to the system 
7. System shows the Buyer the main screen 
8. Use case continues at UC-2  
Extensions 3.a Buyer chooses to create a new wallet account 
1. System gives 12-word phrases and asks Buyer to write down those words 
and keep for future wallet recovery 
2. System asks Buyer to enter the 12 words 
3. Buyer keys in all the 12 words 
4. System tells the buyer the 12 words are correct 
4.1. If the system tells the buyer the 12 words are incorrect 
4.2. Use case repeats at step 3.a.2 
5. System asks Buyer to create 6 digit passcode 
6. Buyer creates 6-digit passcode 
7. System asks Buyer to re-enter the passcode 
8. Buyer re-enters the passcode 
9. System verifies the passcode 
10. system tells Buyer the passcode is valid 
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10.1. If the passcode is invalid  
10.2. Use case repeats at step 3.a.6 
11. Buyer says OK to the system 
12. Use case continues as step 7 
3.b Buyer chooses to restore her wallet 
1. Use case continues at 3.a.2 
5.a System tells Buyer her passcode is invalid 
1. System tells Buyer to re-enter the passcode 
2. Buyer re-enters the passcode 
3. System verifies the passcode 
3.1. If the passcode is valid, use case continues at step 5 
3.2. If the passcode is invalid, use case repeats step 5.a  
Valid wallet account 
UC-8 - To login to the wallet (Seller) 
Pre-conditions The Seller must have a valid wallet ID 
Success Guarantee The Seller’s wallet ID is successfully verified 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Seller chooses to log in to the wallet 
2. System asks the Seller valid passcode 
3. Seller tells the system his passcode *to refer extensions 3.a and 3.b 
4. System verifies the Seller passcode 
5. System tells the Seller his passcode is valid *to refer extensions 5.a 
6. Seller says OK to the system 
7. System shows the Seller the main screen 
8. Use case continues at step UC-9  
 
Extensions 3.a Seller chooses to create new wallet account 
1. System gives 12-word phrases and asks Seller to write down those words 
and keep for future wallet recovery 
2. System asks Seller to enter the 12 words 
3. Seller keys in all 12 words 
4. System tells Seller the 12 words are correct 
4.1. If System tells Seller the 12 words are incorrect 
4.2. Use case repeats step 3.a.2 
5. System asks Seller to create 6 digit passcode 
6. Seller creates a 6-digit passcode 
7. System asks Seller to re-enter the passcode 
8. Seller re-enters the passcode 
9. System verifies the passcode 
10. System tells Seller the passcode is valid 
10.1. If passcode invalid,  
10.2. Use case repeats step 3.a.6 
11. Seller says OK to the system 
12. Use case continues as step 7.  
3.b Seller chooses to restore her wallet 
1. Use case continues at 3.a.2 
5.a System tells Seller his passcode is invalid 
1. System tells Seller to re-enter the passcode 
2. Seller re-enters the passcode 
3. System verifies the passcode 
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3.1. If passcode valid, use case continues at step 5 
3.2. If passcode invalid, use case repeats step 5.a  
Browsing the Bitcoin Price Advertisement 
UC-2 – Find Bitcoin best offer price to buy 
Pre-conditions Buyer must log in to the wallet 
Success Guarantee Buyer’s wallet ID is verified 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Buyer chooses to enter the options for Buyer 
2. System shows a list of Bitcoin price to sell by Sellers 
3. Buyer chooses the best offer price and click Buy 
4. System shows the details of the Seller  
4.1. reputation score 
4.2. Bitcoin selling price 
4.3. payment method 
4.4. trade limit 
4.5. payment window 
4.6. Additional description 
5. System asks Buyer the amount of Bitcoin to buy 
6. Buyer enters the amount of Bitcoin to buy 
7. Buyer chooses to send the trade request to Seller 
8. System send the trade request to Seller 
9. Use case continues at UC-43 
Extensions NIL 
Browsing the Bitcoin Price Advertisement 
UC-9 – Find Bitcoin best offer price to sell 
Pre-conditions Seller must log in to the wallet 
Success Guarantee Seller’s wallet ID is verified 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Seller chooses to enter the options for Seller  
2. System shows a list of Bitcoin price to buy by Buyers 
3. Seller choose the best offer price and click sell 
4. System shows the details of the Seller  
4.1. reputation score 
4.2. Bitcoin selling price 
4.3. payment method 
4.4. trade limit 
4.5. payment window 
4.6. Additional description 
5. System asks Seller the amount of Bitcoin to sell 
6. Seller enters the amount of Bitcoin to sell 
7. Seller chooses to send the trade request to Buyer 
8. System send the trade request to Buyer 
9. Use case continues at UC-43 
Extensions NIL 
Initiate Pre Bitcoin Transaction 
UC-43-Send trade request  
(e.g. Buyer initiates a request trade with Seller) 
Pre-conditions Buyer sends the trade request to Seller 
 
Success Guarantee Seller must receive the trade request in his Email System 
Main Success 1. System asks Buyer the amount of Bitcoin to buy 
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Scenario 2. Buyer enters the amount of Bitcoin to buy 
3. System asks if Buyer want to request the trade to the Seller 
4. Buyer tells the system that she agrees to send the request to trade 
5. The system sends the trade request to Seller's registered email system 
6. Use case continues at UC-44  
 
Extensions NIL 
Initiate Pre Bitcoin Transaction 
UC-44-Receive trade request  
(e.g. Buyer initiates a request trade with Seller) 
Pre-conditions NIL 
Success Guarantee NIL 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Seller receives email for trade request from Buyer 
2. Use case continues at UC-27  
 
Extensions NIL 
Initiate Pre Bitcoin Transaction 
UC-27 – Respond to trade request 
(e.g. Buyer initiates a request trade with Seller) 
 
Pre-conditions Trade request is sent to Seller’s email  
Success Guarantee Seller must receive the trade request email from buyer 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Seller receives trade request from Buyer 
2. Seller sends email to Buyer about the details of the transaction 
(payment time, offline payment method, type of offline proof, multisignature wallet, 
contract fee, Trust token fee, Witness for the transactions and Witness token fee for 
Witness)  
3. Buyer replies to Seller email to agree with the details * to refer extensions 3.a  
4. Use case continues at  Step 2: Create a Valid Contract for the Transaction  
Extensions 3.a Buyer reply to Seller email to negotiate on some of the details for the transaction 
1. Seller replies to Buyer’s email to agree with the negotiations  
1.1. If Seller replies to Buyer email to not agree with the negotiations 
the transaction is void.  
1.2. Use case End 
2. Use case continues at step 4 
Buyer reply to Seller’s email to not agree with the details 
1. Transaction is void 
2. Use case End 
 
Table A: Use Cases Details for Pre-Transaction between Seller and Buyer  
b. Step 2: Create a Valid Contract for the Transaction  
The second step describes the algorithms to create a valid agreement between buyer and seller in a smart 
contract.  The agreements details are including the Bitcoin price, method for offline payment, types of 
evidence for the offline payment, contract fee, witness, multisignature wallet, trust token fee, and witness 
token fee. They write the contract based on those agreed details. The processes involved are further described 




Primary Actor: {A-1- Buyer}; {A-2-Seller} 
Secondary Actor {A-5-BTC Relay} 
Use Cases:  
 
Creating contract: 
{UC-3 – Verifying Create contract}; {UC-30 – Verifying Contract details}; {UC-31 – 
Verifying Signature}; {UC-29- Verifying Contract fee}  
 
Contract output:  
{UC-45- Create New Multisignature wallet} 
 
Figure B: Case Diagram for Creating a Valid Contract between Buyer and Seller  
 
Creating a contract 
UC-3 – Create a contract 
Pre-conditions Write details of the contract agreed by Seller and Buyer 
 
Success Guarantee Signed by Seller and Buyer and paid contract fee 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Seller chooses the option from the main screen to create multisignature wallet 
2. System asks Seller to give a name for the wallet 
3. Seller tells the system the name of the wallet 
4. System tells the Seller the name and the address of the wallet 
5. Seller says OK 
6. System asks Seller to write the contract 
7. Seller writes the Contract details (UC-30) as previously agreed by Buyer 
8. Seller confirms the Contract details (UC-30) to the system 
9. Seller sends the multisignature wallet address to Buyer’s email 
10. Buyer joins the contract * to refer extensions 10.a 
11. System shows Buyer the Contract details (UC-30) written by Seller 
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12. Buyer tells the system that she agrees with the contract * to refer extensions 12.a 
13. System asks Buyer and Seller to pay Contract fee (UC-29)  
14. Buyer and Seller pay the Contract fee (UC-29) in Bitcoin 
15. System asks Buyer and Seller to sign the contract 
16. Buyer and Seller sign the contract (UC-30)  
17. Use case continues at UC-45  
 
Extensions 10.a Buyer decline to join the contract 
1. Use case Ends 
 
 12.a Buyer did not agree with the contract  
1. Buyer makes changes on the Contract details (UC-30)  
2. Buyer confirms the changes to the system 
3. System asks the seller about the changes made by Buyer 
4. Seller tells the system that he agrees with the changes  
4.1. If the seller tells the system that he does not agree with the 
changes 
4.2. Contract is void 
4.3. Use case Ends 
5. Use case continues at step 14 
Creating a Contract 
UC-30 – Verifying Contract Details 
Pre-conditions Mutual agreement between Buyer and Seller as discussed through email 
 
Success Guarantee Includes all the details of the agreement in the contract 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Verify the contract details 




Creating a Contract 
UC-31 – Verifying Signature 
Pre-conditions Buyer and Seller must both agree with the contract details 
 
Success Guarantee Buyer and Seller signed the contract 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. System verifies Buyer and Seller's signature 
2. Use case continues at UC-3  
Extensions NIL 
 
Creating a Contract 
UC-29 – Verifying Contract Fees 
Pre-conditions Buyer and Seller agree to bear the contract fee 
 
Success Guarantee Paid the contract fee 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Verify the contract details 






UC-45 – Create New Multisignature Wallet 
Pre-conditions Multisignature wallet must be specified as an output of the contract 
 







Table B: Use Cases Details for Creating Valid Contract for the Transaction between Seller and Buyer  
c. Step 3: Enacting the Bitcoin Transactions 
The third step describes the processes of buyer sends Bitcoin to the multisignature wallet.  The buyer and 
seller also send the token fees as stated in the contract to the same wallet. Those Bitcoin payments will be 
verified by BTC Relay to ensure that the Bitcoin payments are support the Etherum smart contract. An 
independent user is also randomly invited to join the contract as a witness for the transaction. The processes 
involved are further described in the Use Case Diagram in Table and Figure C.  
Primary Actor: {A-1- Buyer}; {A-2-Seller} 
Secondary Actor: {A-3 – Witness}; {A-5 – BTC-Relay};{A-15 – Multisignature wallet} 
Use Cases:  
 
Sending Bitcoins:  
{UC-32 – Send Trust and Witness token fees}; { UC-11 – Send Bitcoin for buyer} 
 
Bridging Bitcoin with etherum smart contract: 
{UC-47 – To verify the Bitcoins} 
 
Updating Multisignature Wallet: 
{UC-46– Contract receives the Bitcoins}; {UC-50– Update signature for multisignature 
wallet} 
 
Witnessing the transaction 




Figure C: Case Diagram for Enacting Bitcoin Transactions 
 
Sending Bitcoin 
UC-32 – Send Trust and Witness token fees 
Pre-conditions Buyer and seller send the token fees 




1. Seller and Buyer send the fee for the tokens as stated in the contract to the  system  
2. Seller and buyer sign their personal wallet to proceed with the actions 
3. Use case continues at UC-46  
Extensions NIL 
Sending Bitcoin 
UC-11 – Send Bitcoins for the buyer 
Pre-conditions Seller sends Bitcoins for the buyer to the multisignature wallet 
Success Guarantee The number of Bitcoins received in the multisignature wallet must be matched with the 




1. Seller sends the amount of Bitcoin to sell as stated in the contract to the  system  
2. Seller signs his personal wallet to proceed with the action 
3. Use case continues at UC-46   
Extensions NIL 
Bridging Bitcoin with Ethereum Smart Contract: 
UC-47 – To verify the Bitcoin 
Pre-conditions System send Bitcoin to BTC Relay 





1. System sends the payment details to BTC Relay to verify the Bitcoin 
2. System receives a notification from BTC Relay that the Bitcoin is verified  
3. Use case continues at UC-46   
Extensions NIL 
Updating Multisignature Wallet 
UC-46– Contract receives the Bitcoins 
Pre-conditions Seller and Buyer sends the Bitcoins, and token fees as agreed in the contract 
Success Guarantee Multisignature Wallet must receive all Bitcoins and token fees as agreed in the contract 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. System verifies the number of Bitcoins received based on the contract 
2. System confirms the amount of Bitcoins send by seller are accurate * to refer 
extensions 2.a 
3. System confirms the amount of token fees send by the seller are accurate * to refer 
extensions 3.a 
4. System confirms the amount of token fees send by the buyer are accurate * to refer 
extensions 4.a 
5. System stores the verified Bitcoins and token fees in the Multisignature Wallet  
6. Use case continues at UC-49  
Extensions 2.a If the amount of Bitcoin sent by the seller  are inaccurate 
1. System asks the seller to make an additional payment 
2. Seller says OK to the system 
2.1. If Seller does not agree 
2.2. The remaining Bitcoins will be returned to the respective sender 
2.3. Contract end 
3. Use case continues at UC-11 
3.a If the amount of token fees send by Seller  are inaccurate 
1. System asks the seller to make an additional payment 
2. Seller says OK to the system 
2.1. If Seller does not agree 
2.2. The remaining Bitcoins will be returned to the respective sender 
2.3. Contract end 
3. Use case continues at UC-32 
4.a If the amount of token fees sent by Buyer is inaccurate 
1. System asks Buyer to make an additional payment 
2. Buyer says OK to the system 
2.1. If Buyer does not agree 
2.2. The remaining Bitcoins will be returned to the respective sender 
2.3. Contract end 
3. Use case continues at UC-32 
Updating Multisignature Wallet 
UC-50– Update signature for multisignature wallet 
Pre-conditions An independent valid user willing to be a witness 
Success Guarantee The valid user must sign the contract 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. System updates the witness signature to be associated with the multisignature wallet  
2. System changes the Multisignature Wallet signature requirements from 2 of 2 to 2 
of 3.  
3. System shows Witness the complete pseudoanonymous contract between seller and 
buyer 




Witnessing the transaction 
UC-49 – Invite user as a witness 
Pre-conditions Seller and Buyer must send the Bitcoins and the tokens fees 
Success Guarantee Bitcoins and fees are available in the multisignature wallet 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. System randomly sends an invitation to a user that has a valid wallet ID to join the 
multisignature wallet  as the witness for the transaction  
2. The system shows the summary of the contract (UC-30) between Seller and Buyer 
anonymously (including the buyer and seller wallet ID)  
3. Use case continues at UC-16  
Extensions NIL 
Witnessing the transaction 
UC-16 – Response to the Invitation 
Pre-conditions Agree with the conditions stated in the contract 
Success Guarantee Signed the contract 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. The system receives a notification of acceptance from the invited wallet ID as the 
witness  * to refer extensions 1.a 
2. System asks the wallet ID  to sign the contract as a witness  
3. The wallet ID signs the contract 
4. Use case continues at UC-50  
Extensions 1.a If system receives a notification of decline from the invited wallet ID as the 
witness  
1. Use case continues at UC-49  
Table C: Use Cases Details for Enacting the Bitcoin Transaction 
d. Step 4: Enacting Offline Transaction  
The fourth step describes the process of buyer sending the fiat money to the seller’s bank account. The 
proof of offline payment is essential evidence for the transaction. Once the offline payment is made, the buyer 
will request to release the Bitcoins from the multisignature wallet as well as the seller will also sign to release 
the Bitcoins to the buyer. However, if one of the signatures is not received on the multisignature wallet, the 
witness will be invited to facilitate and make a decision for the dispute based on the proofs for the transactions. 
The processes involved are further described in the Use Case Diagram in Figure and Table D. 
Primary Actor: {A-1- Buyer}; {A-2-Seller} 
Secondary Actor: {A-3- Witness}; {A-5 – BTC-Relay};{A-15 – Multisignature wallet} 
Use Cases:  
 
Sending money:  
{UC-4 – Send money to seller}; { UC-33 – Seller bank account}; { UC-34 – Offline 
payment proof} 
 
Updating Multisignature Wallet: 
{UC-54 – Request to release Bitcoins}:{UC-35- To verify Bitcoins release}; {UC-67 – 
Decision for disputes} 
 
Managing disputes 
{UC-52 – Send invitations to witness to manage disputes}; {UC-53 – Witness responses 




Figure D: Case Diagram for Enacting Offline Transaction 
Sending Money 
UC-4 – Send money to the seller 
Pre-conditions The amount of money sent must be accurate as stated in the contract to the correct bank 
account number 
 
Success Guarantee The money must be received in the Seller’s bank account 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Buyer sends the amount of agreed fiat money as stated in the contract (UC-30)  
2. Buyer sends the money to the bank account number as stated in the contract (UC-
30)  
3. Use case continues at step UC-33 
Extensions NIL 
Sending Money 
UC-33 – Seller bank account 
Pre-conditions The amount of money sent must be accurate as stated in the contract to the correct bank 
account number 
Success Guarantee The money must be received in the Seller’s bank account 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Seller access his Bank account  to check the amount of money send by Buyer 
2. The amount of money in Seller's bank account matched with the amount stated in 
the contract * to refer extensions 2.a 
3. Use case continues at UC-56 
4. Reverse Bitcoins (UC-56)  
Extensions 2.a If the amount of money in Seller's bank account did not match the amount stated 
in the contract 
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1. Seller emails the buyer to inform the insufficient amount of money 
2. Buyer respond positively to Seller email 
2.1. If Buyer did not agree with Seller's email and does not send the 
remaining balance 
2.2. Use case continues at step 3 
3. Use case continues at UC-4 
Sending Money 
UC-34 – Offline payment proof 
Pre-conditions Produce proof for the bank transaction 
 
Success Guarantee Receive money in the bank account 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Bank receives money from Buyer * to refer extensions 1.a 
2. Bank produce the proof of transaction made by the buyer 
3. The proof of Bank transaction is sent to Seller and Buyer  
4. End of offline transaction 
Extensions 1.a If seller's bank did receive any money  
1. No proof of transaction produced 
2. Use case continues at step 1 
Updating Multisignature Wallet: 
UC-51 – Request to release Bitcoins 
Pre-conditions Two signatures request to release the Bitcoins 




1. The system receives a signature from Buyer to request Bitcoin from multisignature 
wallet  
2. System receives a signature from Seller to release Bitcoin from multisignature 
wallet  * to refer extensions 2.a 
3. System releases the Bitcoins from Multisignature Wallet to Buyer  
4. Use case continues at Step 5: Sending Reputation Token 
Extensions 2.a If the system did not receive the signature from Seller 
1. Use case continues at UC-52  
Updating Multisignature Wallet: 
UC-35- To verify Bitcoins release 
Pre-conditions Any of two signatures from either seller, buyer or Witness signs on the multisignature 
wallet 
Success Guarantee Received two signatures on multisignature wallet 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. System verifies both signatures to ensure it full fill the requirements for 2 of 3 
signatures 
Extensions NIL 
Updating Multisignature Wallet: 
UC-67 – Decision for disputes 
Pre-conditions Witness had examined the proof and proposed the actions to solve the disputes 
Success Guarantee Seller and buyer had received the proposed actions to solve the disputes and decided 
either to take the corrective actions or not 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. The system receives the dispute report from Witness 
2. The system asks the witness to choose the preference either seller or buyer to 
receive the Bitcoins from the Multisignature Wallet 
3. Witness tells system that her preference is Buyer * to refer extensions 3.a 
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4. System asks Witness to sign the wallet 
5. Witness signs the wallet 
6. The system releases the Bitcoins from the Multisignature Wallet to Buyer's wallet 
7. Use case continues at Step 5: Sending Reputation Token 
Extensions 3.a Witness tells the system that her preference is Seller  
1. System asks Witness to sign the wallet 
2. Witness signs the wallet 
3. The system releases the Bitcoins from the Multisignature Wallet to Seller's 
wallet 
4. Use case continues at step 7 
Managing Disputes 
UC-52 – Send invitations to witness to manage disputes 
Pre-conditions Only one signature requested to release the Bitcoins from multisignature wallet 
Success Guarantee Only 1 valid signature received within the agreed time frame as stated in the contract 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. System asks witness to manage the disputes 
2. System shows witness the contract between seller and buyer  
3. Use case continues at UC-53  
Extensions NIL 
Managing Disputes 
UC-53 – Witness responses to the invitations 
Pre-conditions Witness manage the dispute 
Success Guarantee Witness received and accepted the notification from the system to manage the disputes 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Witness tells the system that she will manage the dispute based on the contract * to 
refer extensions 1.a 
2. Use case continues at UC-36  
Extensions 1.a If the witness did not respond to the invitation for the dispute 
1. System makes the witness status as idle until the contract end 
2. System appoints new Witness 
3. Use case continue at UC-49 (Step 3: Enacting the Bitcoin Transactions) 
Managing Disputes 
UC-36- Verify the disputes 
Pre-conditions Witness handle disputes based on evidence provided by Seller and Buyer 
Success Guarantee The witness is granted with access to the contract 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. Witness accesses the email address of seller and buyer from the contract UC-30  
2. Witness contacts Seller and Buyer ask for proof for the offline transaction (UC-34) 
made and other supportive evidence 
3. Witness compares the evidence with the contract  (UC-30)  
4. Use case continues at UC-53 
Extensions NIL 
Table D: Use Case Details for Enacting Offline Transaction  
e. Step 5: Sending Reputation Tokens  
At the fifth step, describes the processes in contract to release either trust or distrust tokens to the seller and 
buyer. If there are no disputes between them, both will receive the trust tokens in their wallet. However, if 
there was a dispute reported then the type of tokens to be received by seller and buyer are depending on the 
witness decision. The witness also receives the witness token from the multisignature wallet. The processes 




Primary Actor: NIL 
Secondary Actor {A-3 – Witness}; {A-15 – Multisignature wallet} 
Use Cases:  
 
Updating Multisignature Wallet: 
{UC-61- Tokens release for the transaction without witness action}; {UC-70-
Transaction with witness actions}; {UC-71 – Trust token release for transaction disputes 
caused by seller}; {UC-62 – Trust token release for transaction disputes caused by 
buyer} 
Figure E: Case Diagram for Sending the Reputation Token  
Updating Multisignature Wallet: 
UC-61- Tokens release for the transaction without witness action 
Pre-conditions Seller and Buyer had signed to release Bitcoins from multisignature wallet 
Success Guarantee The Bitcoins in the multisignature wallet were sent to the Buyer’s wallet 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. System releases trust tokens for Buyer and Seller from Multisignature Wallet 
2. System releases witness tokens to Witness from Multisignature Wallet * to refer 
extensions 2.a 
3. System dismisses the contract 
4. Use Case End 
Extensions 2.a If there are 2 Witnesses 
1. The first Witness who did not respond to the invitation of the dispute will 
receive the irresponsible witness token 
2. Use case continues at step 2 
Updating Multisignature Wallet: 
UC-70-Transaction with witness actions 
Pre-conditions Witness and either Buyer or seller had signed to release Bitcoins from multisignature 
wallet 
Success Guarantee The Bitcoins in the multisignature wallet were sent to the Buyer or Seller’s wallet 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. System asks the witness to choose the preference either seller or buyer or offline 
technical error that causes the dispute *to refer extensions 1.a 
2. Witness tells system the dispute is caused by Seller  
3. Use case continues at UC-71 
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Extensions 1.a If Witness tells the system the dispute is caused by Buyer  
1. Use case continues at UC-62  
Updating Multisignature Wallet: 
UC-71- Trust tokens release for transaction disputes caused by seller 
Pre-conditions Witness and either Buyer or seller had signed to release Bitcoins from multisignature 
wallet 
Success Guarantee The Bitcoins in the multisignature wallet were sent to the Buyer or Seller’s wallet 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. System asks witness whether Seller has taken the corrective action as propose to 
solve the dispute or not.  
2. Witness tells the system that Seller did not take any corrective action for the dispute 
*to refer extensions 2.a 
3. System sends the distrust token to Seller's wallet 
4. System sends the trust token to Buyer's wallet 
5. System sends the witness token to Witness wallet 
6. System dismisses the contract 
7. Use Case End 
Extensions 2.a If Witness tells system that Seller did not take corrective action for the dispute 
1. System sends the trust token to Seller's wallet 
2. Use case continues at step 4 
Updating Multisignature Wallet: 
UC-62- Trust tokens release for transaction disputes caused by buyer 
Pre-conditions Witness and either Buyer or seller had signed to release Bitcoins from multisignature 
wallet 
Success Guarantee The Bitcoins in the multisignature wallet were sent to the Buyer or Seller’s wallet 
Main Success 
Scenario 
1. System asks the witness whether the buyer has taken the corrective action as 
propose to solve the dispute or not.  
2. Witness tells the system that buyer did not take any corrective action for the dispute 
*to refer extensions 2.a 
3. System sends the distrust token to buyer wallet 
4. System sends the trust token to Seller's wallet 
5. System sends the witness token to Witness wallet 
6. System dismisses the contract 
7. Use Case End 
Extensions 2.a If Witness tells the system that buyer did take any corrective action for the dispute 
1. System sends the trust token to buyer wallet 
2. System sends the trust token to Seller's wallet 
3. System sends the witness token to Witness wallet 
4. Use case continues at step 4  
Table E: Use Case Details for Sending Reputations Token 
